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The problem undertaken. In this dissertation is 
to discover the importance of the role played by Eugene 
Beauharnais as viceroy of the Kingdom of Italy during 
the existence of the Napoleonic Empire. The dominant 
figure of Napoleon overshadows all other persons, and 
appreciation of the importance of the men about him has 
been lost in many instances. Such is the case of Eugene 
Beauharnais. Some historians dismiss him as simply one 
of Napoleon*s lackeys who supinely served the whims of 
the French Emperor. It is the belief of this writer 
that such an interpretation of Beauharnais is in error. 
Indeed, it is unjust.
The evidence contained in the personal letters 
of Eugene written to members of the Italian government 
during his viceroyalty indicates that the Prince Viceroy 
did take action on his own initiative as occasion de­
manded. More importantly, a number of the letters indi­
cate that from time to time he took action diametrically 
opposed to orders he received from Napoleon.
I have arrived at the conclusion that Beauharnais 
became a first-class administrator. The conclusion was
reached after reading the letters of Napoleon to Eugene 
reproduced in the official Correspondance of the Em­
peror, the letters of Eugene to Napoleon reproduced in 
his Memoires, and Eugene*s Letterbook, which is con­
tained in manuscript in the Beauharnais Archive at 
Princeton University. In addition to these letters, 
selected Napoleonic authorities have been consulted for 
material on the Emperor himself, disappointingly lit­
tle material on the Yiceroy is available, and most of 
that is of doubtful worth.
In studying the development of the Kingdom of 
Italy under the direction of Eugene, his role as ad­
ministrator loomed ever larger. As important, at least, 
as his actions were his personality and ability. With­
out men of ability to aid him, Napoleon would have been 
an impossibility. It is hoped that this dissertation 
will help to bring into clearer light Eugene Beauharnais, 





Eugene-Rose de Beauliamais, the only son of the 
vi comte Alexandre de Beauharnais and Josephine Tascher 
de la Pagerie, was bora in Paris, 3 September 1781
A, Du Casse (ed.). Memoires et correspondence 
politique et militaire du Prince BugSne flO vols.s Paris: Miahel Levy FrSres, 1858-60), I, 27-2 8. (Hereafter cited 
as Eugene, Memoires). The dictated portion of Eugene 
Beauharnais* Memoires consists of only some one hundred pages of the first of ten volumes* There is doubt con­
cerning the worth of these hundred-odd pages as a valid 
historical source, for the editor states that they were 
dictated by Prince Eugene to his secretary in 1822, some seventeen to twenty-five years after the events narrated 
occurred. Eugene suffered a stroke in late March 1823, and never fully recovered* As a result, the narrative 
stops with Eugene’s report of becoming viceroy in 1805. 
Regardless of the reasons for approaching Eugene’s dic­tated memoirs with caution, the letters reproduced in Du Casse's edition are invaluable as source material.
The commentary interspersed between sections devoted to 
letters is worthless as a source. Du Casse loved his 
subject too much; in his eyes Eugene was nothing short of a genius in every field, and the commentary is de­
signed to bring the reader to the same conclusion. See 
also Mine. P. E. Planat de la Faye (ed. and arranger),#Vie de Planat de la Faye, souvenirs, lettres. et dietees 
(.Paris; Paul Ollendorff, 1895)* 449. (Hereafter cited as ffime. Planat, Tie de Planat).
1
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His parents separated in 1784, due to Josephine*s in- 
2discretions, and were not reconciled until just before 
the outbreak of the French Revolution. Sometime during 
the period of his parents* estrangement Eugene entered
•Zthe college at Harcourt and remained there until 1790. 
From this time until the arrest of his father in 1794 
he was at home with his parents and served as a page 
during the sessions of the National Constituent Assembly. 
He recalled that his father, having embraced the princi­
ples of the revolution, sat on the left, while his uncle, 
Frangois de Beauharnais, sat on the right. Because of 
their political differences the brothers did not speak 
to each other. Instead they depended upon notes which 
Eugene often carried.
pEugene, Memoires, I, 28; William Milligan Sloane, The Life of Napoleon Bonaparte (4 vols.; New York: Thedeniury do.', 1916;, il, 5l4. (Hereafter cited as Sloane, 
Napoleon); Jean Hanoteau (ed.), The Memoirs of Queen 
Hortense. trans. by Arthur K. Griggs (2 vols.; New York: 
Cosmopolitan Book Corporation, MCMXXVIII), I, 3. (Here­after cited as Hortense, Memoirs); F. M. Kircheisen, 
Napoleon, trans. by Henry-St. Lawrence (New York: Har­
court, Brace and Companv, 1932), 69. (Hereafter cited 
as Kircheisen, Napoleon]. According to Sloane the reason for the estrangement of Josephine and Alexandre is un­
known. Hortense, however, reports that the separation was due to Josephine*s jealousy of Alexandre*s popularity. Kircheisen maintains that the charge of infidelity brought by Alexandre after the birth of Hortense in 1783 was only an excuse to get rid of an unwanted, uncouth wife.
The college in the French system of education was a secondary sehool. The College d* Harcourt, closed 
during the revolution, is now the-lyeee of Saint Louis.
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For a time his father served as the presiding 
officer of the Assembly and held that office at the moment 
of the attempted flight of Louis XVI. According to his 
Memoires. Eugene could remember his father swinging him 
up to his saddle on the streets of Fontainebleau and ex­
claiming, "Here is the new Dauphin."^
When war broke out between Revolutionary France 
and those nations determined to prevent the revolutionary 
virus from infecting all Europe, the elder Beauharnais 
loaned his sword to the Revolutionary cause, and young 
Eugene went to live with his paternal grandfather at 
Fontainebleau* There an attempt was made to rectify the 
damage done by neglect of his education, but the effort 
was hampered by his bad eyes* However, when his father 
became commander of the Army of the Rhine, Eugene went to 
be with him and entered the college at Strasbourg* It 
was here, if we can trust his Memoires. that he first be­
came infected with the love of nation and glory which was 
to remain with him for the rest of his life*
Before long Eugene returned home, for Alexandre 
quit the army with the beginning of the Terror. The 
arrest of Alexandre and Josephine soon followed* Tried 
and condemned to death at Paris for treason, the elder 
Beauharnais lost his life on the guillotine; only the
^Eugene, Memoires. I, 28-29; See also Kircheisen, 
Hapoleon* 69*
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efforts of highly placed friends enabled Josephine to
5escape the same fate.
Following the execution of his father, Eugene be­
came an apprentice to a cabinetmaker, with whom he re­
mained for some months. But Josephine found new friends 
who relieved the financial distress of the family, and as 
a result Eugene was taken from the cabinetmaker's shop.
He then began his military career as aide-de-camp to 
General Lazare Hoche, who was engaged in suppressing the 
counter-revolution in the Vendee. In the words of his
Memoires. "The master was severe and the school was none
7the less good for being hard.”1
QPrior to the Quiberon Bay Affair, Eugene was sent 
back to his mother in Paris and witnessed the events of 
13 Vendemiaire, Year IV (5 October 1795)* Following that 
attempt to overthrow the Convention a decree was issued 
requiring that all arms of the nobility be surrendered,
3 *•'Eugene, Memoires, I, 29-33; Sloane, Napoleon,
I, 314-315*
^Madame 0. Desplaces et M. Michaud (eds.), Biographie universelle ancienne et moderne (45 vols.; 
taris: Henri PIon, 1854), III, 373* (Hereafter cited as Biographie universelle).
n'Eugene, Memoires. I, 31.
8The Quiberon Bay Affair was an unsuccessful attempt by the British and emigres to invade Brittany 
in June 1795*
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and General de Beauharnais1 sword was taken. Eugene went 
to plead for the return of the sword Before General Na­
poleon Bonaparte himself, who returned it in person the 
next day. Touched by this show of filial devotion, Bona­
parte asked to be introduced to the rest of the family,
and Eugene had the opportunity of presenting his mother
qand his sister Hortense to the general. A rather swift
Eugene, Memoires, I, 31-32; Barry E. 0*Meara, 
Napoleon in Exile (2 vols.; New York: Peter Eckler,n.d. K  I, 111. ("Hereafter cited as O ’Meara, Napoleon in 
Exile); Emmanuel, Comte de Las Cases, Memorial de Sainte- 
Hfel&ne (3 vols.; Paris: Ernest Bourdin. n.d.), I, 318.(Hereafter cited as Las Cases, Memorial); Sloane, Na­
poleon. I, 316; J. M. Thompson, Napoleon Bonaparte~TNew 
York: Oxford University Press, 1952), £>3. (Hereafter
cited as Thompson, Napoleon); John Holland Rose, The Life of Napoleon I (2 vols.; New York: Harcourt, Brace and
Company, 1924), I, 67. (Hereafter cited as Rose, Na­
poleon I); Hortense, Memoirs, I, 25, 329 n. 4; Kircheisen, Napoleon. 72. Napoleon*s version states that Josephine came to thank him for his kindness a few days later, but 
it is possible that Las Cases is the source of the tale of the sword and Napoleon’s meeting with Josephine.
Sloane discounts entirely the story of the sword and con­tends there was no disarmament of any group of people as 
a result of the events of 13 Vendemiaire. The editor of 
Hortense*s Memoirs, however, places the date of the order 
to give up arms on 22 Vendemiaire, Year IV (14 October 
1795). Concerning Napoleon’s meeting with Josephine,
Rose reports that - Napoleon met Josephine at Barras’ house; however, Kircheisen maintains that this is only a proba­
bility. According to Hortense she attended a dinner 
party at Barras’ house with Josephine where Hortense 
first met Bonaparte and sat between the general and Jo­sephine at dinner. She states, however, that this inci­
dent was after the alleged return of Alexandre’s sword 
to Eugene* Hortense could have been mistaken about the time of the meeting, for she was writing from memory 
several years later. Thompson finds there is no reason to assume Eugene’s story is false.
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courtship ensued, and General Bonaparte soon had the run 
of the Beauharnais house. Both Eugene and Hortense op­
posed the courtship, feeling it was an insult to their 
father’s memory. Bonaparte and Josephine realized the 
hostile attitude of the children and sent them to school 
at Saint-Germain.^
Soon after their arrival at Saint-Germain, Eugene 
and Hortense learned of Josephine’s marriage to Bonaparte 
and of Bonaparte’s appointment as commander of the Army 
of Italy. Eugene hoped that he might go with his new 
stepfather, hut he was disappointed. Instead, Bonaparte 
informed him that if he studied hard and mastered his 
work, he would he called later. As a result, for fifteen 
months Eugene applied himself particularly to the study 
of history, mathematics and the English language. His 
reward was a brevet 2nd lieutenancy in the 1st regiment 
of Hussars and the coveted call to report to Bonaparte's 
camp
Eugene arrived in Italy too late to take part in 
the campaign of 1796-97, and while the general negotiated 
the peace, Eugene was entrusted with a mission of re­
connaissance of the mountainous territory separating the
Eugene, Memoires. I, 32; Hortense, Memoirs„ I, 23-25. Hortense says ikey were sent to school at Saint- 
Germain before the courtship began.
^Eugene, Memoires. I, 33-34.
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Drave and Tagliamento rivers and of the Isonzo Biveri12basin. Following the negotiation of the Treaty of 
Campo-Formio Hapoleon appointed Beauharnais to oversee 
the transfer of the Ionian Islands from Austria to 
France.15
Inactive during the winter of 1797—98, Bonaparte 
convinced the Directory that an expedition to Egypt 
would produce good results and obtained the command for 
himself. As a member of Bonaparte's staff, Eugene was 
ordered to the port of embarkation, Toulon, 1 April 
1798,"^and went aboard the flagship, the Orient. on 17 
May. The expedition set sail three days later* Ac­
cording to Eugene only a few officers knew the destination 
of the expedition. The rumor that they were going to 
Malta was verified on 10 June, when they arrived at that 
island.15
12Biograph!e universelle. Ill, 375*
15Eugene, Memoires. I, 34-35.
14~Ibid.. 35-36.
15Ibid.. 38; Sloane, Napoleon. II, 55; Deo Gershoy, The French devolution and Hapoleon I Hew Yorks Appleton 
Gentury-6roits, Inc• , 1933)» (Hereafter cited as
Gershoy, French Revolution); August Fournier, Hapoleon I , trans. by Annie ElizabethAdams (2 vols.; Hew Yorks Henry 
Holt and Company, 1911), I, 150. (Hereafter cited as Fournier, Hapoleon). Both Sloane and Gershoy place the 
date the expedition set sail as 19 May 1798.
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On 11 June Eugene was assigned as a courier to 
General Louis Besaix in the morning, and to Colonel 
Auguste Marmont in the afternoon. While under Marmont's 
orders he was in a party under counterattack hy the garri­
son of Malta. The attack was repulsed, and Eugene per­
sonally took one of the five flags captured hy Marmont*s 
group. He was given the honor of delivering the flags 
to Bonaparte.
There is no indication of the impact that this
engagement made on young Beauharnais; he does not tell
us whether the sight of men meeting violent death, or
his part in bringing their death, affected him at all.
Eager to prove himself worthy of the military profession,
17he probably enjoyed the afternoon's work thoroughly.
The expedition left Malta 15 June, and the troops 
learned their ultimate destination only when they ar­
rived off the African coast 2 July 1798. The debarkation 
was accomplished that night in a quite heavy sea, and it
^Eugene, Memoires. I, 38-39.
IVIt is quite plain throughout Eugene's Memoires that he thoroughly loved war and the glory that one might gain as a result. There is abundant evidence that 
Eugene gave no thought to personal danger, and there is little evidence that he was moved at all by the suffering of men under his command or the prodigious losses some­
times suffered. In most matters he was quite stolid and busine s slike •
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fell to Eugene*s lot to "be the messenger sent from ship 
to ship in a light boat where, he tells us, he was in
18constant danger of death by drowning or being crushed.
The day after debarkation Beauharnais partici­
pated in the seizure of Alexandria and had an opportunity 
to demonstrate his bravery to his general. Eugene, ac­
cording to his story, was a member of Bonaparte*s escort 
and as the party made its way into the city and rounded 
the corner of a street, it was met by such a fusillade 
from a house ahead and on the other side of the street 
that the whole group, including Bonaparte himself, thought 
the house must be defended by at least a platoon of rifle­
men. Eugene, detailed to lead the party charged with re­
ducing the attack, discovered an old man on the second 
floor with about a dozen muskets which his wife and ten
or twelve offspring were loading as rapidly as they could.
19Eugene personally made the capture* ^
On the march from Alexandria to Cairo, Beauhar­
nais was introduced to the difficulties of a desert
1 8Eugene, Memoires. I, 38-39; Rose, Napoleon I . I, 171; Fournier, Napoleon. X, 152. Rose sets the day of debarkation as 2 JulyT” Fournier sets the day of de­
barkation as 1 July, and the seizure of Alexandria on 2 July.
19 *Eugene, Memoires, I, 40. This story is im­
possible to substantiate. The only source is Eugene*s Memoires.
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campaign. The troops suffered from the heat, intensified 
"by reflection from the sand; thirst and hunger were con­
stant companions, and Eugene speaks wryly of the soldiers
20sleeping on sacks of grain hut having no bread or flour. 
Eugene participated in the battle of the Pyramids and 
the occupation of Cairo. He longed for action and volun­
teered for every detail which seemed to promise some 
excitement until the general told him, "Young man, in 
our profession it is not necessary to seek danger; it is
only necessary to do your duty, do it well, and hope to
21God that it pleases." Thus Eugene learned there is 
more to soldiering than being rash.
When the French moved against Suea from Cairo, 
it was Beauharnais who led the advance guard. The move­
ment required five days, during which time the terrible 
heat took its toll of the men*s strength. Eugene com­
plained that an inadequate amount of water had been pro­
vided, his detachment having only two water bags per man, 
and that this was no more sufficient for their needs than 
two glasses in Prance on a normal summer day. Under these
20Ibid., 40-41; Sloane, Hapoleon. II, 59; Gershoy, French Revolution. 337; Hose, Hapoleon I. I, 173; Thomp- 
son. Hapoleon. 125: Fournier, Hapoleon. I, 154.
O']Eugene, Memoires. I, 42.
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circumstances Eugene rationed water and put the water 
bags under guard. On the fourth night out from Cairo the 
soldiers, driven to desperation by thirst, overpowered 
the guard and slit the waterskins. In an attempt to save 
the water Eugene laid about him with a will using the 
flat of his sword, but none of the water was saved. In 
the telling he remarked that he was later somewhat ap­
palled at the figure he must have cut as an unshaven lad
belaboring the ferociously moustached veterans of the
22Italian campaign. At this point the army was evidently 
still well disciplined.
At Suez Eugene reconnoitered the country and sub­
mitted a sketch to Bonaparte. This assignment, coupled 
with the fact that the previous year he had been entrusted 
with the duty of performing a similar job in northern 
Italy, indicates that even at the age of seventeen he was 
a keen observer, that he had the ability to reproduce ac­
curately what he had seen and to make some evaluation 
concerning the military significance of the terrain.
After Bonaparte's arrival at Suez, it became Eugene's
22Ibid., 46-47; Kircheisen. Napoleon, 177* Ac­cording to Kircheisen, Napoleon made the trip from Cairo 
to Suez in three days, traveling with 100 mounted guides and 200 infantry.
p7Eugene, Memoires. I, 47.
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duty to lead the general*s staff to Mt. Sinai. He re­
ported that the Eed Sea could easily he crossed at that 
point on horseback at low tide, due to the ridges formed 
hy the action of water on the sand. The ridges were 
easily seen in the daytime, hut at night became quite 
difficult to see. In spite of the remonstrances of his 
general staff, Bonaparte stayed longer at Sinai than was 
wise, and consequently the recrossing had to he made at 
night. The water was more than horsebelly deep, and to 
prevent riding off the ridges in the sand, it was neces­
sary to dismount and lead the horses#2^
As a reward for his handling of the advance 
guard on the movement to Suez, the scouting he had done, 
and the sketches he had made, Eugene received his lieu­
tenant* s commission, and a letter from General Alexandre 
Berthier, Bonaparte*s chief of staff, commending him for 
his work. He was hardly more than two months beyond his 
seventeenth birthday.2^
On the march to Kan-Tounes, a way-point on the 
route to Gaza, the whole army became lost. It approached 
a village and found entry blocked by a troop of enemy 
cavalry; unprepared to fight, the army retreated. Eugene’s
24Ibid., 47; Thompson, Hapoleon. 133; Kircheisen. Hapoleon. l7§7 -- ;—
25 *jBugene, Memoires. I, 49*
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horse, overcome with the heat and fatigued hy running in 
the sand, dropped from exhaustion, and Eugene was left 
alone and afoot in the desert. Had it not been for the 
Moslem dislike of night fighting, Beauharnais* career 
would have ended in the desert as he struggled through 
the night. After walking three leagues he came up with 
the main body, which Bonaparte*s scouts found the next 
day. After this fiasco the army moved to G-aza, and though 
Turkish cavalry was present, the French army camped on
the heights above the city where Samson is supposed to
26have deposited the gates of Gaza. The tone of his 
Memoires indicates that Eugene was rather deeply affected 
by visiting this religious landmark.
Following the battle at Gaza, Bonaparte detailed 
Eugene to carry orders to General Jean-Baptiste ELeber 
to begin an advance early the next day. Worn out from 
the exertions of the day’s work, Eugene overslept. Find­
ing Eugene asleep, the officer of the day, General Geraud 
Duroc, awakened him, and Beauharnais arrived at Eleber’s
headquarters with the orders at the hour ELeber was to




that Eugene ever again allowed fatigue to threaten his 
career.
In the Syrian campaign the young lieutenant was 
again entrusted with several difficult assignments. At 
El-Arisch he was ordered to take one of the houses built 
into the wall; on a bright moonlight night he lost seven 
men before reaching his objective, and after having ac­
complished the mission, dashed back to report it cap­
tured. While under heavy musket fire, he tripped and
fell. He arrived at Bonaparte*s camp just as observers
28were reporting to the general that he had been killed.
At 'Ramieh a torrential rain fell, and the troops 
were soon wet to the skin. -To dry clothing and equipment 
they set fire to the olive grove in which they were 
camped. The fire burned long and hot, and Eugene reported 
that there was wild, magic beauty in the sight. He gave 
not one indication that he was concerned about the de-
29struction and loss the burning of the grove might cause.
When the army approached Jaffa, Beauharnais led 
the attack on the town and accepted the surrender of the 
garrison. It was his first time to see a town taken by 
assault, and he observed the wanton cruelty of the
28Ibid., 49 Kircheisen, Hapoleon. 180.
29 ' *^Eugene, Memoires. I, 53.
15
30conquerors with revulsion. This is the only indication 
in his dictated Memoires that war and death seemed had 
to him.
At Jaffa Eugene first saw the dark streak of 
cruelty in Bonaparte*s nature when he learned that the 
general intended to have the 800 defenders of the gar­
rison shot. At a staff meeting, Eugene and several others 
protested the proposal, hut the will of the general over­
rode all opposition. After the event, out of devotion 
to Bonaparte, Eugene defended the act as justified hy 
the facts that there was a shortage of food and water and 
many of those paroled at El-Arisch were in the garrison 
defending Jaffa.^"*"
30Ibid., 53-54; Biographie universelle. Ill, 375—376; Sloane, Hapoleon^ II, •
T*!Eugene, Memoires. I, 53-54; Biographie univer­selle , III, 375-376; Sloane, Mapoleon. II, 69-76; 6'Meara, 
Hapoleon in Exile. I, 202-204; Kircheisen, Hapoleon. 181- 182; Bose. Hapoleon I . I, 186; Thompson, Hapoleon. 142; Fournier, Hapoleon. t. 166-167. There is a great dis­crepancy in numbers between Sloane*s version of this en­
counter and Eugene’s. Sloane reports the number of the 
El-Arisch garrison taken at Jaffa as 800, and the total number shot as 3,000 to 4,000. Hapoleon places the num­
ber of those shot at Jaffa at 1,000 to 1,200. He makes no mention of a shortage of food and water, simply as­
serting it was due to the El-Arisch garrison having broken its parole. Kircheisen defends the massacre of prisoners at Jaffa mainly on the grounds of military necessity. Rose reports that Hapoleon was reluctant to order the execution of troops at Jaffa and states that 
he did so only on the demand of the soldiers and generals.
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Prom Jaffa the road led to St. Jean d'Aore. At 
Caiffa, en route, Beauharnais led a cavalry patrol on a 
scouting expedition to determine if the place was de­
fended. It was a small place hy the sea, and as Eugene 
and his party approached they saw a large crowd of men on 
the walls, hut could not determine whether the men were 
armed. A closer approach drew no fire and Eugene ordered 
the gate opened; this was done. Beauharnais and his men 
dashed in and discovered a British longboat just pulling 
away from the town. They fired upon it with pistols and 
muskets with no effect, and the return fire likewise did 
no harm. Tears later Beauharnais discovered that one of
the occupants of the boat was none other than Sir Sidney
•2.0Smith, British commander in that area.
At St. Jean d'Acre, a practically impregnable 
city, Bonaparte's staff advised that the city be bypassed, 
but the great conqueror persisted in his plans for a 
siege and for sixty-four days attempted the impossible.
. Here Beauharnais learned that a city which cannot be cut 
off from its source of supply can seldom be besieged 
.successfully. Assault followed assault, all doomed to 
failure.
Hear the beginning of the siege Eugene was rather
7pEugene, Memoires. I, 55-56.
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seriously wounded in the head, the only "battle wound he 
was ever to suffer. He was out of the fight for nine­
teen days. Upon his return to active duty he was among 
those who penetrated the last defenses of the city for 
the only time; "but the attackers could not hold and were
forced back. He participated in the cavalry battle of
3 3Nazareth as well. ^ Finally, out of provisions, his men 
ill and wounded, Bonaparte accepted the fact that he had 
been defeated and ordered the retreat to begin. As the 
general*s troops retreated they abandoned their guns, 
caissons, and other equipment, though one of Bonaparte’s 
dicta was never to leave guns. Then as now, men were 
expendable, but guns were hard to obtain*
The charge of inhumanity so often hurled at Bona­
parte is supported by at least one historian* Sloane 
asserts that as the general ordered the retreat, he sug­
gested that the soldiers in the hospital at Tentoura who 
were so badly wounded they could not be moved should be 
killed with an overdose of opium. In his Memoires* 
Beauharnais holds that this claim is completely unfounded.
^ Ibid.. 56; Biographie universelle. Ill, 375-376 •
34.Sloane, Napoleon* II, 75* For conflicting opinions see O ’Meara* Napoleon in Exile* I, 204-205; Hose, 
Napoleon I . I, 193; Thompson* Napoleon. 142; Kircheisen, 
Napoleon. 184-185; Fournier, Napoleon. I, 172. Napoleon, 
ai St. Helena, contended it was a medical officer, Larrey, who suggested an overdose of opium, and Napoleon approved.
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He reports that the artillery horses, the officers'
horses, the wagons of the artillery service corps, and
in truth all means of transport were commandeered hy
Bonaparte to move the ill and wounded. According to
Eugene, the retreat was as ghastly as the retreat from
Moscow in 1812, the only difference being in the numbers
involved. When they arrived bach at Cairo, the army
35Bonaparte led was only a skeleton.
From Cairo the route led to Alexandria, and from 
Alexandria to Aboukir Bay, where Bonaparte's tarnished 
glory was somewhat brightened. Eugene relates that the 
defeat of the Turks came as the result of the destruction 
of a French unit attempting a flanking attack. The Turks 
swarmed out of their entrenched positions to take the
However, smother medical officer, Desgenettes, opposed 
the suggestion and the opium was not given. Both Sloane and Napoleon report the hospital located at Jaffa instead of Tentoura. Napoleon says hospitalized soldiers were 
ill of the plague. Hose reports that Napoleon ordered all horses commandeered for transport of sick and wounded. Rose supports Eugene's statement that Napoleon did not 
order the ill poisoned and that Sir Sideny Smith found 
seven of the few left in the hospital alive when the English took Jaffa, while Thompson reports that Napoleon 
ordered opium to be given to prevent troops falling into 
the hands of the Turks. Kircheisen says that 1,200 wounded were evacuated from Jaffa by sea and 800 by land 
to Egypt. He affirms Napoleon's contention that a worse 
death awaited them at the hands of the enemy. According to him Napoleon suggested the opium poisoning; however, he attributes the atrocity claim to Sir Sidney Smith. 
According to this authority, no one knows whether the troops actually were poisoned. Fournier is inclined to accept Napoleon's story.
"^Eugene, Memoires. I, 63-64.
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heads of the French, for which they were paid "bonuses. 
Taking quick advantage of the Turkish error, Bonaparte 
sent his own infantry into the abandoned trenches and 
had Joachim Murat lead his cavalry in behind the Turks. 
The Turks, caught between the infantry and the cavalry, 
attempted first to stand, and then to swim to the ships 
from which they had disembarked. The cavalry followed 
the hapless swimmers into the water as far as possible, 
and the infantry and the artillery harassed those who es­
caped the flashing sabres of the French horsemen. In 
this action, though a cavalry man, Beauhamais commanded
■zga battery of artillery.
Following the triumph at Aboukir Bay, Bonaparte
is supposed to have negotiated with the British for the
delivery of French newspapers from which he learned the
”57 *true condition of affairs in France. In his Memoires 
Eugene tells us that he and Bonaparte sat up all night
^ Ibid., 64-70; Herbert Fisher, Hanoleon (New York: Henry bolt and Company, 1913), 69* (hereafter
cited as Fisher, Napoleon): Sloane, Napoleon. II, 78; 
Thompson, Napoleon. 144: Kircheisen. Napoleon. 188; 
Fournier, Napoleon. I, 174. Kircheisen makes no mention of this maneuver m  his brief discussion of the battle 
of Aboukir.
^^Eugene, Memoires. I, 70-71. For conflicting accounts of newspaper delivery to Napoleon see Sloane, 
Napoleon. II, 79; Fisher. Napoleon. 69; Kircheisen, Na­
poleon .""191: Hose, Napoleon I. I, 195; Thompson, Na­poleon. 1*44; Fournier, Napoleon. I, 175*
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reading the news, and that the general became so agitated 
he often dashed the papers to the ground in his tent and 
strode forcefully back and forth while cursing the Di­
rectory and the defeats of French arms. Beauharnais 
leaves the impression that it was at this juncture that 
Bonaparte began to lay his plans to return to France, but 
that it was a well-kept secret, and the ones who were to 
return with him were notified of the decision to abandon
70the army only a few hours before they set sail.
The return to France accomplished, Eugene continued
to share in the adventures of the Corsican and was a part 
of the cavalry contingent present when Bonaparte attempted 
to coerce the Council of Five Hundred. He reported that 
while he was in position to observe the general and the 
crowd pressing around him during the reported attempt to 
stab Bonaparte, he did not see the attempt, though he 
would not deny that it happened. He also stated that while 
he supported the general in his seizure of power, he did 
not know what was actually taking place and indicated 
that he for one did not particularly care if it succeeded
80; Fisher, Napoleon, 69; Thompson, Napoleon. 144; Fournier, Napoleon. I. 169, 176. SIoane indicates that the decision to return to France was made after the re­
ceipt of newspapers at Aboukir Bay; according to Fisher, 
Napoleon made the decision to leave Egypt while at St. Jean d*Acre. Fournier agrees with Fisher.
^^Eusene. Memoires. I. 70-71: Sloane. Napoleon. II 
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or net » T/?hen the success of the coup was assured, Eugene 
carried the word to Josephine that all was well. Re­
gardless of his lack of interest in the coup d*etat, 
Eugene soon profited from Bonaparte's success. Realizing 
that the position of aide to Bonaparte would be one of 
inactivity for some time to come, Eugene requested and 
received appointment to a company of the newly-created 
Consular Guard. He received promotion to the rank of 
captain on 22 December 1799> and was given command of his 
company. He epent the remainder of the winter of 1799- 
1800 studying the profession of arms and perfecting his 
knowledge of the operation of cavalry, on parade and in 
the field.40
9?he second Italian campaign in 1800 gave young 
Beauhamais the action for which he longed and for which 
he had prepared himself through study of the art of war. 
He served under Murat at Buffalore and Milan. From Milan 
he was sent to Pavia, where he met General Desaix, just 
returned from Egypt. He reports that he was slightly up­
set by Desaix*s telling him, "Austrian balls have known 
me earlier, and I fear they will know me better now.*
^Eugene, Memoires. I, 76 ff.
4 0Ibid.. 79? Fnovost et Roman d'Amat (eds.), Dictionnaire ‘aTe bio graph! e franoai.se (Paris: Bibrairie
Letouzey ei Ane, 1951), V, 1096-1691. (Hereafter cited as D.B.F. ). Only six volumes of this work have appeared to date.
4-1 .Eugene, Memoires. I, 80.
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42A few days later Desaix was killed at Marengo, where
Eugene distinguished himself by his action and cool
headedness. Prom 4:00 p.m. until the last shot was
fired, he and his company were in the thick of the action.
That it had been a brutal experience is indicated by the
losses his company suffered. Eugene entered the battle
with 115 men and emerged with 45- For his bravery and
ability in action he received promotion on the field of
45Marengo to the rank of squadron commander.
Following the armistice after Marengo, Eugene 
and his men received orders to escort Bonaparte to Milan. 
The general set such a pace that upon arrival Beauharnais
A Ahad only seven men other than himself in the saddle.
Ordered to take the captured flags to Paris, 
Beauharnais and his company stopped to have their horses 
reshod at Geneva, where Madame Anne de Stael flted them. 
The delay caused them to arrive at Paris on the morning of 
14 July, the fete day, about 10 o’clock in the morning. 
They rode directly to the Invalides to deposit the flags, 
and then to the Champ de Mars to a hero’s welcome. The
42Kircheisen, Napoleon. 195; Thompson, Napoleon.178.
45 •Eugene, Memoires. I, 80.
44Ibid., 80 ff.
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cheers of the crowd were heady wine for the dusty, travel- 
weary youth.4^
From this point on, Eugene accompanied the First 
Consul on his trips of inspection, and as in Egypt, Bona­
parte lost no opportunity to school him in the military 
art. At every opportunity Eugene commanded the cavalry 
as it maneuvered under the eagle eye of his general, and 
never was found wanting.
From 1800 until 1802, Eugene led a quiet life, 
and continued to study the military art. In this year he 
received promotion to the rank of colonel, and Bonaparte
told him he would never rise higher than this rank, "for
4-6you do not have the stuff of which a general is made."
In spite of this evaluation, Eugene received promotion to 
the rank of Colonel General of Chasseurs in 1804*
On 1 February 1805* he became the viceroy of Italy, 
and in December of that year he became commander-in-chief 
of the Army of Italy.4^ In statecraft Beauharnais had
4 5Ibid., 8 5 .
46P.B.F.. Y, 1090-1091.
4 ^Ibid.; J. Dumain and Henri Plon (eds.), Corre­spondence de Han ole on Ier (52 vols*; Paris* Henri !Pion, 
18$8—1870), XI* (Hereafter cited as tfapoleon,
Correspondence J * Beauharnais Archive, Alexandre Berthier 
to Eugene, 18 December 1805. The Beauharnais Archive is 
a collection of approximately 3 0 , 0 0 0 letters written to Eugene Beauharnais by various imperial officers. It also
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little experience to guide him when he became the lieu­
tenant of Napoleon in Italy. His only experience in this 
field had come as envoy to the Ionian Isles in 1797. He 
was far more at home with his soldiers and horses than he 
was in a drawing room or presiding over a meeting of the 
Council of State. But there was in him a spark of the 
politician which if properly nourished could become a 
real flame. Whether Napoleon realized that his stepson 
had the makings of an able statesman is beside the point. 
Eugene probably was placed in Italy as viceroy because 
Napoleon thought he would be a willing tool, for there is 
no question that Eugene revered his stepfather and that 
Napoleon knew it. Whether or not he was that willing
tool in the master*s hand is the task with which we must %
now engage ourselves.
contains Eugene*s letterbook which has in it some of his correspondence with members of his cabinet. It was de­
posited in the Princeton University Library in the De­partment of Rare Books and Manuscripts by Mr. Andre de 
Coppet, who purchased the letters in 1934.
CHAPTER II
THE ESTABLISHMENT AND INITIAL ORGANIZATION
OP THE KINGDOM
French, domination of* Lombardy had been secured by 
the campaign led by Bonaparte in 1800, and he had been 
responsible for organizing Lombardy under the name of the 
Italian Republic. The constitution of the new state, 
written at Lyons, became the fundamental law of the 
Italian Republic. Under this constitution Bonaparte 
filled the office of president and Francesco Melzi d*Eril 
filled the office of vice-president.
As long as Prance remained a republic such an 
organization was acceptable; but the destruction of the 
Prench Republic by the elevation of Bonaparte to the 
status of emperor in 1804 made it necessary that the 
Italian Republic be reorganized.
That Italian officials realized the probability




of a change to come is revealed in the report of the 
Italian Secretary of State to the Vice-President on 21
May 1804, just three days after a senatus consultum
2named Napoleon the Emperor of the Prench. As a result
of the report Vice-President Melzi, on 29 May 1804,
wrote Napoleon:
The homage that I render at the foot of the throne of Your Majesty contains all 
the sentiment which ought to be inspired 
by the admirable results of unparalleled 
recognition by the nation, and the marve­
lous genius which commanded such recog­nition. I do not have words to express 
the sentiment I feel. May Your Majesty 
deign to find this sentiment in the pro­
jects of decrees of the Council of State, 
which I have the honor to submit to him.
The first decree suggested the erection of an
equestrian statue of Napoleon and the second, dated 28
May 1804, recommended that Napoleon become King of Italy.4
It is by no means certain that Italian officials desired
to have the republic transformed into a Kingdom simply
because the suggestion came from them, for Bonaparte
pJ. E« Driault, Napoleon en Italie (Paris: Librairies Fe3.ix Alcan et Guillaumin B&uniea. 1908), 
295-296. (Hereafter cited as Driault, Napoleon en 
Italie). The senatus consultum was legislation by the 




often had his seconds carefully arrange such, matters 
well in advance*
Napoleon was gratified when the Italians indi­
cated a desire to make him their king, and he asked the 
Council of State to put its proposals in concrete form*
These were presented in July 1804 by the Italian Secre­
tetary of State* The Council proposed that the title of 
the sovereign be "the Constitutional King of the Italian 
Republic," and called for a national viceroy who should 
reside in the republic during the kingfs absence; it 
indicated that the present Vice-President, Melzi dfEril, 
should be the one to receive this honor* In addition, 
it proposed that the Italian diplomatic corps be located 
in Milan rather than Paris* The Council further desired 
that the Corps legislatif* which was patterned after that 
of Prance, be modified and made into two chambers* One 
of the chambers should be composed of thirty members 
having property valued in excess of 4,000 crowns *^ This 
chamber should have legislative initiative and the right 
of petition* The Council did not stipulate the property 
requirements for the second chamber; it only established
K *Ibid,, 300* The Italian Consulte d*etat became the Council of State*
^Ibid, The crown was a silver coin equivalentin value to three pounds sterling*
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its membership at forty-five persons and requested that
its duties should be to examine and accept or reject
7the laws proposed. It is clear that the Italians in­
tended to make the legislative body an active force in 
government.
In addition, the Council called for the creation 
of a new organ in the Italian government to be called 
the ^supreme conservative magistrate," to be made up of 
eight councillors-of-state appointed for life. This 
organ should be independent of all other organs of 
government, even the king, and be the most important 
body in the government. The first supreme magistrate 
should be formed from the present Council. According 
to the plan of the Council, the supreme magistrate 
would have the power to rule on all things and all 
events not foreseen and provided for in the constitution 
of the state; it would have the power to dissolve the 
electoral colleges, dissolve the Corps legislatif. 
choose the king from among the princes eligible for the 
kingship, name the king in case of the extinction of 
the royal line, and even propose a new dynasty if the 
present one died out. Upon the death of a member of 
the supreme magistrate, the other members should have 
the authority to name his replacement from a list
7Ibid.
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presented by the provincial electoral colleges with.-
Qout the advice of the king.
The Council of State deemed it necessary that
Napoleon recognize the independence of Italy. Sometime
during the year 1804, Melzi wrote Fernando Maresealehi,
the Italian Secretary of State:
The execution of the project is always subordinate to two essential conditions which are those of the guarantee /of independence/, and of a treaty with 
France. These two items ought to pre­
cede any attempts on the part of the 
electoral colleges. It is necessary that the Emperor of the French remit to the Italian Republic a solemn act of 
guarantee of the Treaty of luneville 
which has never been communicated to it.It is to the advantage of His Imperial 
Majesty that this solemn guarantee pre­cede his nomination to the throne of 
Italy and the establishment of the dy­nasty in his family, to the end that all of Europe see and recognize in this 
memorable act a free and spontaneous 
recognition of a people which unites its destiny to that of its august bene­
factor and that of his descendents.The treaty of alliance is no less 
necessary to put the two states morally 
on a level of equality.9
Napoleon did not find the presentations of the 
Council acceptable, for he was determined that none of 
his states should be independent. Realizing the
8Ibid., 300-301. The^electoral colleges nomi­
nated persons for the Corps legislatif.
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impossibility of a victory for the Council and himself, 
Melzi requested that he be allowed to resign, but the 
request was refused.^ After a long struggle the Council 
accepted defeat and presented the crown of Italy to 
Napoleon on his own terms. The Italian deputation to Na­
poleon's coronation formally offered the Iron Crown of 
the Lombards to the Emperor in the course of an audience 
a few days before the deputation left the French capital. 
Napoleon graciously accepted.^
It was in this situation that the kingship of
Napoleon was accepted by the Council of State on 15 March
12and decreed on 17 March.
The acceptance of Napoleon as King of Italy by 
Melzi and a deputation of the Council of State was an­
nounced to France and Europe in the official French news­
paper on 18 March 1805• The announcement was in the form 
of a resolution and was divided into articles, some of 
which were to be incorporated into the First Constitutional
10Ibid.
^Tbid.; Baron C. F. de Meneval, Memoirs of Na­poleon Bonaparte (3 vols.; New Yorks P. F. Collier & %
Son, 1910), I, 320. (Hereafter cited as Meneval, Memoirs)*
12 1 Beauharnais Archive, Report of the Minister of
War. 1 January 1805 - 1 July 1807: Kircheisen. Napoleon.312. ihe only place I have found a statement concerning
the date when the Council of State accepted and decreed
Napoleon as king is in this report. Kircheisen mentionsthe two dates, but does not clearly state that the 17th
was the date the Italian government issued the decree.
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Statute of Italy. Article 4 carried the provision that 
the crown of Italy and the crown of Prance should not be
united on the same head except that of Napoleon, and
Articles 5 and 6 provided that Napoleon should wear both 
crowns until Naples, Malta, Corfu, and the Ionian Islands 
were free of foreign troops. Article 9 required* a
guarantee of religious freedom; the assurance of the in­
tegrity of Italian territory; equal rights for all sub­
jects; and governmental protection of political and civil 
liberty. The same article further stated that imposts 
would be established only by law, only Italian subjects
would be qualified for governmental offices, and the sale
1̂ 5of land from the public domain would be irrevocable.
The next day the First Constitutional Statute ap­
peared. The provisions of the Statute were as follows*
Article 1. Napoleon I, Emperor of the
Prench, is the King of Italy.
Article 2. The Italian crown is heredi­tary in his direct descendance, 
whether natural or adoptive, 
from male to male to the per­
petual exclusion of women and 
their descendance, except that
13̂ Gazette nationale ou le Moniteur universel (Paris), 27 Ven*&se',"T e a T  m T  (16 ka'rch 1505).— There­after cited as Moniteur). The Constitutional Statutes 
were to be only temporary, but they became the permanent 
constitution of the Kingdom of Italy. Napoleon toyed 
with the idea of an Italian constitution in 1806, but 
put off establishing one until the crown should be passed 
to another person.
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his right of adoption shall 
not extend to any other per­
son than to a citizen of the French Empire or the Kingdom 
of Italy.
Article 3. At the moment when foreign
armies have evacuated the state 
of Naples, the Ionian Isles and the island of Malta, the Emper­
or Napoleon will transmit the hereditary crown of Italy to 
one of his legitimate male children, whether natural or adoptive•
Article 4. From the date of that epoch, the 
crown of Italy ought not to be 
reunited to the crown of France on the same head, and the suc­cessors of Napoleon I in the 
Kingdom of Italy ought constantly 
to rpside on the soil of the 
Italian Republic.
Article 5. During the course of the present year, the Emperor Napoleon, with the advice of the Council of 
State and of the deputations of 
the electoral colleges, will give to the Italian Monarchy a 
constitution founded on the same 
bases as that of the French 
Empire, and on the same princi­
ples as the laws which he has already given Italy.14
On 27 December 1804, in his speech opening the’ 
session of the French Senate, Napoleon explained the need 
for reorganization of the Italian state.^ The acceptance
I4Ibid., 28 Ventftse, Year Kill (19 March 1805) 
^Sloane, Napoleon. II, 347.
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of the Italian crown by Napoleon and his speech to the 
Prench senate regarding the need for reorganization of 
the Italian government caused international disturbance. 
Austria particularly was concerned and immediately began 
stationing troops in the areas where her borders touched 
those of the new Italian kingdom. On 1 January 1805 
Napoleon wrote Emperor Francis II of Austria that he need 
not become alarmed because Italy had become a kingdom with 
Napoleon as king, for the Emperor had ceded his rights 
to the crown to his brother Joseph whc* had been proclaimed 
hereditary king of the country. The cession, Napoleon 
said, carried the renunciation of Joseph's rights to the 
crown of France. There was, therefore, no need of troops 
in the countries controlled by Austria which bordered upon 
Italy. He told Francis II that if he persisted in keeping 
troops in the regions bordering Italy, France would have 
no alternative but to strengthen her forces in Italy and 
along the Bhine. Perfectly aware of the machinations of 
the British at this time, Napoleon warned the Austrian 
Emperor against giving ear to their blandishments.^
Napoleon hoped that the appointment of Joseph as 
king of Italy would cause Austrian fears to be dispelled, 
for if any of the Bonapartes could be considered a man 
of peace, Joseph was the one. But the Austrians knew
1 gDriault, Napoleon en Italie. 307*
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Napoleon himself too well and rightly feared that if
Joseph took the throne, Italy would he only an appendage
of France itself. Therefore, the Austrian government
asked what guarantee it would have that the separation
of France and Italy would exist in fact as well as in
form. Austria further requested a statement from Na-
poleon concerning his intentions toward the other Italian
republics, and proceeded to establish a "cordon sani- 
17taire." The situation was considered serious enough 
that Count Fran5ois La Rochefoucauld was sent to Vienna 
with the rank of ambassador to replace the charge dfaf-
"I Qfaires, Dodun.
On 27 January 1805, Joseph refused the crown of
Italy, pleading that he wanted to keep his rights to the
I QImperial crown intact. J
Continuing his search for a king, Napoleon next 
suggested that he adopt the infant son of Louis Bonaparte, 
make the child king of Italy, and retain the regency for
17Ibid., 308.
18Ibid.. 305.
iqLouis Madelin, The Consulate and the Empire,trans. by E. F. Buckley (*Dhe National History of FranceSeries" /jL vols.; New York: G. H. Putnam's Sons, 1934/),I, 248. (Hereafter cited as Madelin, Consulate and Empire); Briault, Napoleon en Italie. 310: Rose. Nanoleon 
I, II, 9. ' ■ , •
»  > t  *
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himself*. Louis rather violently refused to allow this 
procedure.̂
Rehuffed hy his own brothers, the Emperor turned 
to the Beauharnais family, and on 30 January 1805 named
his stepson, Eugene, as viceroy. Two days later Beau—
21harnais became the Archchancellor of State* To quiet 
international fears Napoleon insisted that as soon as 
foreign influence was eradicated from Naples, the Ionian 
Islands, and Malta, he would give the crown Of Italy to 
either an adoptive or natural son. The protestation of 
such intent did not calm Austria, and she continued the 
negotiations with Russia which had been initiated in 
December 1804. A further indication of Austria’s lack 
of confidence in Napoleon was voiced by Baron Moll, the 
Austrian representative at Milan, who made the state­
ment that Joseph’s refusal of the Italian crown could
22only end in war.
Though the Moniteur would have us believe that 
Italy was overjoyed at the prospect of becoming a member
20Madelin, Consulate and Empire. I, 248; Driault, Napoleon en Italie. 3l0; Rose. Napoleon I*
II, 9.
^^Driault, Napoleon en Italie. 313; Rose, Na- poleon I. II, 9; Kircheisen. Napoleon. 312. KireheTsen states that in appointing Eugene viceroy, Napoleon in­
tended to show his brothers he could get along without them •
22Driault, Napoleon en Italie. 313.
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of Napoleon*s new empire, the reports of the Council of
State do not hear out this assumption. Driault writes
that the Council reported the country filled with apathy
instead of joy, for the people knew that the location of
Italy would make her once more a battlefield in any
23future war between Napoleon and Francis II.
Thus the Kingdom of Italy came into being, and 
the Constitutional Statutes became the governing instru­
ments of the state. In all, seven Constitutional Statutes 
were issued during the life of the kingdom. As soon as 
the news of the erection of the kingdom reached Italy, 
the cities, towns, villages, departments, and the various 
branches of the Italian army and navy sent congratulations 
to their new king. Considering the statement of Driault, 
noted above, perhaps it is not amiss to suggest that the
spontaneity and happiness expressed in the Moniteur were
24more of less foreed.
It was decided that the coronation of the new
23Adolphe Thiers, The History of the Consulate and the Empire of France. trans. by D. Forbes Campbell 
and H. W. Herbert C5 vols.; Philadelphia: J. B. Lippin-cott & Co., 1865), I. 665. (Hereafter cited as Thiers, Consulate and Empire): Driault, Hapoleon en Italie. 319; 
Kircheisen, Hapoleon. 312. Kircheisen also states that the Italians had little enthusiasm over becoming Na­poleon^ subjects.
^ Moniteur. 23 Germinal, Year Kill (13 April
1805). “
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king would take place in May 1805* and Napoleon, Jose­
phine, and the general staff of the empire began the 
journey to Italy early in April. They entered Pavia on 
16 Ploreal, Tear XIII (6 May 1805), and were met by Vice-
President Melzi, the Council of State, the 1st Italian
2 5Chasseurs, and the artillery of the army. Two days 
later, with Marshal Jean Jourdan and his staff added to 
the retinue, the Emperor's train entered Milan. Na­
poleon was honored with a sixty gun salute, and the
cheers of the crowd filled the air as the hero of Marengo
2 6passed through the streets. Prom the time of his ar­
rival until 26 May, Napoleon combined work, pleasure, and 
preparation for the coronation. On 26 May 1805, amid 
great pomp and display, the coronation took place. In 
order that the crowd might be properly inspired to cheer 
the new sovereign, the police selected the recipients of 
invitations and tickets to the coronation and even as­
signed the spots where certain ones would sit. The ladies 
attending were particularly mortified to learn that the 
police had chosen, among others, many of the "public
2 5Ibid., 25 Ploreal, Tear XIII (15 May 1805); Kircheisen, Napoleon. 312.
26Moniteur. 25 Ploreal, Tear XIII (15 May 1805).
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27women* of Milan, and had seated them among the nobility. 
Having placed the Imperial Crown upon his head
with his own hands at his coronation as Emperor, Napoleon
28likewise placed the Iron Crown of the Lombards upon his 
head himself and pronounced the traditional words of the 
Italian coronation, "God has given it to me, let him be­
ware who touches it." He was proclaimed King of Italy 
and the crowd gave him a thunderous ovation. Following 
the coronation, Milan celebrated for days with the court 
joining in the merrymaking. The new king entered into 
the spirit of the occasion, but following his usual 
pattern he did not allow it to interfere with the business 
of state.
The Corps legislatif was called to meet on 7
^Lriault, Napoleon en Italie. 321 ff. The coro­nation originally had been planned for 24 May, but a torrential rain and massive thunderstorm prevented it.Why the police seated prostitutes among the nobility re­
mains a mystery. There is no evidence that Napoleon punished the police for this insult.
28The Iron Crown of the Lombards was so named because, according to legend, one of the nails with which Christ was nailed to the Cross at Calvary was in it. It 
was the crown used at the coronation of the Holy Homan 
Emperors when they took possession of their Lombard fiefs and received fealty from their Lombard subjects. It had not been used since the late 15th century. During the intervening three centuries it had been kept at Monza 
and was brought to Milan from Monza for the coronation of Napoleon.
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June 1805, and at the opening session Napoleon ad­
dressed the legislators* The government promulgated 
the Third Constitutional Statute, which established the 
vice—royalty and named Eugene Beauharnais as viceroy*
He was to exercise "all civil and military authority"
viceroy could he exercised only during the absence of 
the Icing, but even then the viceroy was to be nothing 
more than a "grand prefect*" As long as Napoleon wore 
the crown, Eugene could be no more than a small cog in 
a large machine* It is the contention of some historians 
of the Empire that Beauharnais thus became only the 
lackey of Hapoleon, and that in his role of lieutenant
to the great captain he was consistently subservient to
•anthe Emperor*s wishes and directives* There is evidence,
29 *^Driault, Napoleon en Italie, 337; Napoleon,Correspondence. X, 487; Moniteur. 25 Prairial* Year XIII
C12 June 1805 7$ Beauharnais Archive, Report of the M3.n1 s-ter of Var* 1 January 1805 - 1 July 1867* "
"50 #Briault, Napoleon en Italie* 583; Thiers, Con­sulate and Empire. I, 6 6 ^*
■^Driault, Napoleon_en Italie* 583; Madelin,t £2 9 * Moniteur* 24 Prairial,
29in the state* * This proved to be a rather empty decla­
ration, for Napoleon reserved for himself the final 
authority on all decisions* Eugene*s authority as
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which will he presented in later chapters, that in­
dicates this interpretation is to some degree in error.
At this point the concern is with the organization of
the state and the manner in which Napoleon intended it
to he directed.
During the period 1800-1805 Italy had failed to
32achieve a stable governmental organization. The 
election of officials was attended with a considerable 
degree of corruption, and most officials looked upon 
public office as a means of enriching themselves.
A part of the difficulties faced by Italy during 
this period undoubtedly stemmed from the fact that during 
the centuries of Spanish and Austrian rule Italians, with
the exception of the rule of Maria Theresa (1740-1780),
had not directed local affairs themselves. They had no 
experience with the intricacies of national finance, 
national defense, or any attendant problems.
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Italy 
also suffered from that age-old European malady, a 
stratified social system which allowed great extremes in 
wealth and poverty, and the upper classes enjoyed the 
privileges that went with rank in all European society 
at that time.
32This brief discussion of the condition of Italy 
in 1805 depends upon A. J. Whyte, The Evolution of Modern 
Italy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell & Mott Ltd., 1959), 1-19.(Hereafter cited as Whyte, Modern Italy).
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Having been for centuries an area divided by- 
local loyalties, Italy enjoyed no sense of unity.
Mutual distrust existed between Milanese, Venetians, 
Parmesans, Luccans, and Homans. All the Italian re­
publics had the character of city states rather than 
the character of nations.
This was the sort of state Napoleon appointed 
Eugene Beauharnais to administer on 7 June 1805*
Though untrained in politics and government Eugene had 
several qualities which made him a perfect choice to 
fill the role of an imperial administrator. Pirst of 
all, he possessed a good nature which drew people to 
him and could serve as a buffer to the irritant of 
foreign control in Italy. Secondly, Eugene was rigidly 
honest— a rare quality indeed. Thirdly, as pointed out
above, Eugene was devoted to the Emperor and found his
33satisfaction in serving Napoleonrs cause.
33G-ershoy, Prench Revolution. 472; Sloane, Na­
poleon. Ill, 211; Mine. IPlanat. Vie de Planat. 416-417• Sloane calls Eugene "that excellent youth."
CHAPTER III
STATE ADMINISTRATION
Following the opening of the Corps legislatif 
on 7 June 1805* Napoleon began the business of organ­
izing his new kingdom. On 8 June the King appointed 
two secretaries of state by decree, one to remain near 
him to counter-sign decrees and to perform duties of 
like kind, while the other remained near the Viceroy
ito perform the same function for him.
Keenly aware of Eugene*s inexperience in govern­
ment, Napoleon gave him advice in statecraft in a per­
sonal letter dated 7 June. The King told the Viceroy 
he did not have enough experience in the field of govern­
ment to handle affairs personally and that at first he 
should depend upon his councillors. The King advised 
Eugene to cultivate Italian ways and customs, observe 
Italian fftte days, and visit all places of military 
interest in order that he might be able to defend the 
state if that should become necessary. The Viceroy 
should meet with ministers twice weekly, once with each
^Moniteur. 26 Prairial, Year XIII (15 June 1805)•
4-2
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of them alone and once in council, and ttLe King warned 
him against taking the advice of only one person on any 
given problem. Napoleon ordered Eugene to keep all
correspondence between them secret; their letters were
2to be shown to no one, not even a councillor.
The King also gave Beauhamais guidance in the 
direction of ministers. Napoleon wrote Eugene on 19 
June 1805, upon receiving for approval a four-page di­
rective to the Minister of Interior, that in giving in­
structions to his ministers he should only outline the 
laws he wanted them to present to the Council of State, 
tell them what he wanted to accomplish by the laws, and 
allow them to draw up the bill. In this instance he 
suggested the following to replace Eugene's long di­
rective s
M. Felici, Minister of the Interiors The intention of His Majesty is that the 
magistracy of revision be suppressed, and 
that no censorship of the press ought to 
be undertaken; in case of anonymous author­ship, the publisher should be held re­
sponsible if the writing contains anything contrary to the public good. His Majesty intends also that seven days before a publi­
cation goes on sale, a copy be sent to the Minister of Interior so that if it contains 
anything contrary to the public good or the 
government, it can be suppressed.3
2Napoleon, Correspondence. I, 488 ff.
^Ibid., 536, Napoleon to Eugene, 19 June 1805*
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Hapoleon, two days after the beginning of the 
first session of the Corps legislatif. began appointing 
ministers. Giuseppe Luosi, on 9 June, became Minister 
of Justice. Giuseppe Prina, on the same day, received 
the portfolio of finances, Luigi Lambertenghi the customs, 
Pietro Moscati the Department of Public Instruction, and . 
Gian Paradisi the Department of Bridges and Roads. The 
Department of Finances, directed by Prina, became a 
branch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Depart­
ment of Public Instruction and the Department of Bridges 
and Roads were to be branches of the Ministry of the 
InteriorAlso, on 9 June Napoleon decreed that two 
bureaus in the Department of Finances should administer 
direct and indirect taxes. Napoleon, at the same time, 
issued a decree establishing the Council of State. Ap­
parently Eugene had no voice in the appointments.
Luosi began his duties as minister of justice 
by appointing a commission to translate the Code Na­
poleon into Latin and Italian.^
For administrative purposes Napoleon divided the 
kingdom into fourteen departments, adding two to the
4Moniteur. 26 Prairial, Year XIII (15 June 1805); 28 Prairial, Year XIII (17 June 1805).
5Ibid., 1 Messidor, Year XIII (20 June 1805).
gtwelve which, had made up the Italian Republic. The 
departments were divided into districts, cantons, and 
communes. The administration of each department was to 
be directed by a prefect, who was to be assisted by a 
prefectoral council of forty members. The districts 
were to be administered by a sub-prefect and a district 
council. Each sub-prefect was responsible for the ad­
ministration of the communes in his district. Each 
canton was to have a justice of the peace and a scribe. 
There were three classes of communes; a first-class 
commune was to be a city of 10,000 population or more, 
a second-class commune was to have a population of 3,000 
to 10,000, and a third-class commune was to be one with 
less than 3,000 population. Each commune was to be 
served by a communal council and a municipalite.*̂ The 
councils of the first-class communes were to consist of 
forty members, those of the second-class of thirty 
members, and those of the third-class of fifteen members. 
The decree stipulated that at least three members of 
each council should be chosen from the propertied class. 
The municipalites of the first-class communes were to be
6Ibid.. 14 Messidor, Year XIII (3 July 1805);23 Messidor, Year XIII (12 July 1805); Eugene. Memoires.I, 26.
9 \.
J k-A municipalite was simply the combined members 
of the governing bodies of a city.
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composed of a mayor and six elected representatives, 
the second-class municipalites were to he composed of 
a mayor and four elected representatives, and the third- 
class municipalites were to he composed of a syndic and 
two old men. Only the King had the power to appoint the 
prefects, sub-prefects, secretaries-general of the pre­
fectures, prefectoral councils, and councils of first- 
and second-class districts and communes. He would 
appoint the scribes of the tax collectors and the mayors 
from a list of three candidates for each position to he 
presented by the communal councils. The syndics^ and the 
communal councils of the third-class communes were to he
Qappointed by the prefects.
Pellowing the issuance of the organizational 
decree, Napoleon made a grand tour of his kingdom, and 
according to the reports carried in the Moniteur the 
tour was a triumphal march.^
Napoleon's progress brought him to Piacenza on 
28 June 1805, and Eugene met him there to work with him 
on the issuance of a number of decrees which were designed
Moniteur. 14 Messidor, Year XIII (3 July 1805). The syndic was a governmental trustee.
Q^Thiers, Consulate and Empire. I, 665; Moniteur. 1 Messidor, Year Xtll (26 June 1805); 7 Messidor, Year XIII (26 June 1805).
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to organize further the functions of the government.
The decrees issued were concerned with financial 
affairs and established the administration of the contri­
bution placed upon Italy. One dealt with the adminis­
tration of the national lottery; another established two 
mints, one at Milan and another at Bologna, and es­
tablished the rules for administering them; a third was 
concerned with the administration of the national domain 
and the indirect taxes; still another organized the oper­
ation of the postal service; customs were organized and 
their administration regulated; finally, still another 
decree regulated the tax on salt, tobacco, powder, and 
consumer goods.^
Soon after the meeting of the King and Viceroy 
at Piacenza, Napoleon returned to Paris and issued an­
other financial decree, which ordered that the liqui­
dation of the public debt, not yet provided for, should 
be administered through the Ministry of Pinance. The 
decree provided for the establishment of a commission 
to work through a particular bureau of the Ministry of 
Finance. The bureau should be under the direction of 
a director-general and four private persons. Decisions 
reached by the commission on the liquidation of the 
public debt were to be referred to the Minister of
1 QMoniteur. 22 Messidor, Year 2ZII (11 July1805).
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Finance, who in turn would report the decisions to the 
Council of State for action. The reports of the com­
mission and Minister of Finance were to be made 
monthly.'^
While Napoleon remained in Italy, the role of 
the Viceroy was simply that of an overseer, a foreman 
as it were, to see that the orders and decrees of the 
King were carried out. In this role he was simply the 
administrator, pure and simple, of decisions made on a 
higher level.
A part of the duty of the Viceroy in his role 
of overseer was to report to Napoleon concerning the 
progress of the reorganizjation of the state as ordered 
by the decrees of the King issued 9 June 1805. In his 
first letter to the Emperor, Beauharnais reported that 
he had called a meeting of the ministers of the various 
departments and had chided them for their slowness in 
presenting departmental budgets, for the inactivity of 
their bureaus, and the condescension with which they 
treated bureau subordinates. He reported further that
Ibid., 26 Thermidor, Year XIII (14 August 
1805); Duane Koenig, “The Napoleonic Regime in Tuscany, 
1807-1814“ (Doctoral dissertation, University of Wis­consin, 1942), 107» 111. (Hereafter cited as Koenig, 
"Tuscany"). According to Koenig, confiscated Church lands were utilized to. pay. the public debt wherever 
the French established themselves in Italy. Eater in the same chapter, however, Koenig indicates that the 
public debt was paid from the revenues of the Imperial Domain, which included confiscated Church property.
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he had been working with Secretary of State Antonio 
Aldini on the formation of the various sections of the 
legislative council. Eugene included a report to 
Napoleon concerning the make-up of the legislative
council and asked Napoleon to approve the membership of
12the council.
It is evident that in the role of viceroy Eugene 
had a hand in the selection of the Council of State, for 
on 11 June 1805 he reported that at least one of the ap­
pointees to the council of auditors was a bad subject
15and should be removed. J Six days later the Viceroy 
nominated twelve persons to be auditors
In an effort to find a suitable president for 
the Council of State, Eugene began the practice of having 
each minister exercise the chairmanship. Shis met with 
Napoleon’s approval, but the King warned the Viceroy 
that he should not take too long to decide whom he
wanted, for too great a delay would make the maintenance>
of control difficult.3'̂
-i p Eugene, Memoires. I, 123, Eugene "to Napoleon,11 June 1805* The report Eugene mentioned is not con­tained in his Memoires or in the correspondence of the Prince in the Beauharnais Archive.
•^Ibid.. 124, Eugene to Napoleon, 11 June 1805*
•^Ibid.. 126, Eugene to Napoleon, 17 June 1805*
15̂ Napoleon, Correspondence. X, 512, Napoleon to
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On 10 August Eugene reported four vacancies on 
the Council of State and nominated several persons* He 
called particular attention to one of his nominees,
Luigi Lambertenghi, whom he recommended for the post of 
Minister of the Interior. Lambertenghi, according to 
Beauharnais, had travelled widely in Prance and had 
most carefully and acutely observed the operation of 
the institutions of Prance* The Viceroy assured Na­
poleon that the nomination did not stem from any person­
al difficulties with the present Minister of the 
Interior, but that he thought for the interests of the
state and the Empire that Lambertenghi would be a better
"L 6man for the post* This recommendation was not acted 
upon.
On the day of his first attendance at sessions 
of the Corps legislatif as viceroy, Eugene sat to the 
right of the throne with the insignia of Italy on a 
table to the left of the throne. After the presidential 
speech, Eugene, speaking in Italian, made the following 
address:
Eugene, 12 June 1805; Eugene, Memoires. I, 125, Eugene 
to Napoleon, 17 June 1805*
1 6Eugene, Memoires* I, 242-243, Eugene to Na­poleon, 10 August I&6 5.
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Though very young, I have heen called by 
the hero who presides over the destiny 
of Prance and Italy to be the organ of his will among you. Today I am only able to offer you hope. Gentlemen, the thought 
which animates me is that this hope will 
not be forlorn#
Prom this moment, I belong entirely to the 
people over whom government has been en­
trusted to me. Aided and assisted by all authorities, and particularly by the zeal of the savants of the Corps legislatif. always directed bv the vast ana powerful spirit of our august sovereign, remember­
ing the great lessons and examples I have 
received from him, I will have only one 
end and one desire, the glory and well 
being of the Kingdom of Italy#17
With a touch of pride the Viceroy wrote Napoleon
that the Corps legislatif had received his address very
well and, though he had not written it himself, the
ideas it contained were his# There is no indication of
the Emperor's approval or disapproval in Napoleon's
Correspondence. Eugene's Memoires. or the Beauharnais
Archive•
On the same day, Eugene reported that the decree 
concerning departmental organization was not yet ready 
for signature due to the fact that a number of errors
had been made in translation, but that he had a battery
18of clerks working on the necessary corrections#
^Ibid.. I. 115. Address to the Corps legis­latif, 13 Jhne 1805.
18Ibid#. 141, Eugene to Napoleon, 13 June 1805*
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On 24 June Eugene sent Napoleon a list of the
employees in the various departments of government. He
further reported that the requested list of the great
proprietors would not he completed for some time due to
difficulties in communication with the various parts of
the kingdom. However, the list of departmental employees
did include the names of a significant number of the
iqgreat proprietors. J
In organizing the government in Italy, Napoleon 
followed closely the structure of government in Prance, 
and Eugene made the error of tampering with Napoleon* s 
handiwork. Some time in 1806 it came to the Emperor’s 
attention that Eugene had introduced a new system of 
departmental direction by substituting "civil magis­
trates" for the prefects. On 28 April 1806 Napoleon 
wrote his stepson that he could not allow the substi­
tution and ordered Eugene to return the prefects to 
office 1 July 1806. He instructed Eugene to use Ve­
netians as prefects in Italy and Italians as prefects 
20in Venetia. Apparently he felt that the jealousy
10Ibid.. 176-177. Bueene to Napoleon. 24 June1805.
20Napoleon, Correspondence. HI, 337.
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which existed 'between Venetians and Italians would in­
sure a closer adherence to directives issued*
Napoleon, on 31 March 1806, created hereditary 
duchies in Venetia# The creation of the dukedoms 
caused immediate concern in Italy. Eugene reported on
7 April that the consensus of the Council of State was 
that only the royal family should enjoy hereditary 
rights*, The Council objected to the creation of dukes 
on the ground that probably Napoleon would not confer
a dukedom upon an Italian, and. therefore the holders of 
the duchies would not have the welfare of Italy at 
heart* Eugene told the Emperor that Italians feared 
Napoleon would give all the national domain of Venice 
to the dukes* The Italians speculated that the emolu­
ments given to the dukes would take from Italy nearly 
40,000,000 francs yearly, or approximately one-third of 
her income* The Council of State was of the opinion 
that the creation of the duchies was harmful to the 
Viceroy and his political future and attempted to deter­
mine his attitude toward the creation of hereditary 
dukes. Beauharnais told Napoleon he had promised to 
give the Council of State his reply in its meeting of
8 April* Eugene pledged his support to every Napoleonic 
program and promised to attempt to make public opinion
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21more favorable toward the idea of duchies.
Apparently Napoleon considered the above 
mentioned letter an indication of Italian criticism 
of his political wisdom, for he wrote the Viceroy on 
14 April that he could not understand a people who pre­
sumed to criticize his political wisdom when they knew 
he had more sense in his little finger than they had in 
their collective heads; even the Parisians ^who by
P Pinference were not quite bright/ knew better than that.
Following the creation of the duchies in Ve- 
netia in 1806, Napoleon told Eugene that he should 
utilize the talents of the new dukes in administration, 
but that the Viceroy should say nothing of this in the 
proclamation of annexation of Venetia to Italy which 
Eugene should make public on 25 April 1806. Napoleon 
made this suggestion in spite of the fact that he had 
previously instructed Eugene to tell the Council of 
State that the creation of the duchies was a political
P i Eugene, Memoires. II, 218-220, Eugene to Na­poleon, 7 April 1806.
22Napoleon, Correspondence. XII, 283-284, Na­poleon to Eugene, 14 April 1806.
2^Eugene, Memoires. II, 228-229, Napoleon to Eugene, 14 April 1806.
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necessity and that the newly created dukes would have
24no voice in Italian administration or affairs.
Certain administrative procedures not provided 
for at the time of the establishment of the kingdom 
demanded the Viceroy's attention from time to time.
For instance, Eugene complained that without his 
knowledge the Italian ministers executed private orders 
of the Emperor. Eugene did not believe this practice 
would please the Emperor, for he did not think Napoleon 
intended Italian ministers to by—pass the authority of 
the Viceroy. The most serious instance of this sort 
occurred, Eugene reported, when Antonio Aldini mentioned 
during a meeting of the ministers that Napoleon had 
ordered him to release a prisoner of Bomagnan extraction. 
Even the suggestion that this person might gain his 
freedom appalled the ministers, for they all swore that 
the Bomagnan was a bad subject and should not be set 
free. Eugene investigated and. discovered that the one 
in question was indeed a criminal, having been convicted 
of embezzlement, extortion, and other major crimes. 
Thereupon, the Viceroy suspended the execution of the 
order and wrote Prince Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand- 
Perigord, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Empire,
24Napoleon, Correspondence. XII, 287, Napoleon to Eugene, 15 April 1806; Eugene."Memoires. II, 60-62, Eugene to Napoleon, 6 February 1806.
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soliciting his support in the storm he expected to
2 5follow such a breach of duty. " There is nothing in 
Eugene’s and Napoleon’s correspondence to indicate that 
the storm erupted.
The procedure to be followed in appointing 
representatives from Italy to foreign courts also pre­
sented problems. In 1806 Eugene and Marescalchi ex­
changed a number of rather fiery letters about the 
appointment of a representative to the court of Holland. 
Marescalchi wanted* to appoint a person named Matteo 
Galdi (a name which in Eugene’s Letterbook is spelled 
Goldi), whom Eugene did not know personally. The 
Viceroy did not wish to be represented by a stranger 
and instructed Marescalchi to nominate another person. 
The Foreign Minister felt that the objection voiced by 
Beauharnais exposed his determination to force the ap­
pointment of a Frenchman. Eugene protested that Mares­
calchi interpreted his objections incorrectly, but the 
Italian insisted. Thereupon, Eugene wrote that it 
really made no difference whether he wanted Galdi or 
not, for the Bnperor would make the final decision 
about the appointment, what rank the appointee would 
hold, and whether a residence would be opened at The
25"Beauharnais Archive, Eugene to Talleyrand,
12 October 1805#
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2 6Hague. Ho other letters or disagreements of this 
nature appear in Eugene’s correspondence. Therefore, 
it is safe to assume that Italian representatives to 
foreign courts received their appointments from the 
King.
During the existence of the Kingdom of Italy 
the Italian Foreign Minister had his residence in Paris. 
The location of the foreign ministry at Paris caused 
a considerable degree of inconvenience to Italians who 
wished to travel, for it was necessary that passports 
he obtained from the Foreign Minister. In April 1806 
Eugene apparently received a letter or had a conver­
sation with Councillor-of—State Testi about the issu­
ance of passports, for the Viceroy wrote Testi that he 
agreed that the issuance of passports should fall with­
in the province of the minister of interior rather than 
the minister of foreign relations. Beauharnais promised 
Testi to make a complete study of the problem after the 
annexation of Venetia on 1 May and after determining 
the thinking of the judges and Venetians on the problem. 
He ended by remarking that the government would still 
require consuls and foreign agents to register with the
26Ibid.. Eugene to Marescalchi, 29 July 1806; Eugene to Marescalchi, 17 August 1806.
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27police*. Since Eugene and his ministers later at­
tempted to get the headquarters of the Italian diplo­
matic corps returned from Paris, to Milan in order that 
the government could expedite the issuance of pass­
ports, it appears that Eugene and his ministers did not 
succeed in transferring the authority to issue pass­
ports from the minister of foreign relations to the 
minister of the interior.28
It appears that during the first year and a 
half of the existence of the kingdom Eugene did not es­
tablish firmly a method of communication with foreign 
governments, for Marescalchi, on 4 February 1807, com­
plained in a letter to the Viceroy that directors- 
general corresponded directly with foreign governments. 
He told the Prince that he thought such action should 
fall exclusively within the duties of the ministry of 
foreign affairs. In answer, Eugene wrote that he 
agreed with the views of the Foreign Minister and that 
he had ordered the directors-general and ministers not 
to continue the practice, with the exception of the
27Ibid., Eugene to Councillor-of-State Testi,
11 April 1806; Eugene to Talleyrand, 13 November 1806.
28Ibid., Eugene to Marescalchi, 2 January 1807.
59
pqdirector-general of police.  ̂ In connection with, corre­
spondence between governments it may be mentioned that 
in 1807 the government of the kingdom considered the 
possibility of establishing a consistorial advocate at
Home, but both Eugene and Marescalchi opposed the move,
"50and the proposition never became a reality.
In 1807 Eugene began a program of forcing 
Italians employed by foreign governments or living 
abroad to give up such employment or residence and re­
turn to the kingdom or gain the government’s consent to 
remain where they were. A decree of August 1807 es­
tablished the policy and provided seisure of property 
and its division among heirs living in Italy as punish­
ment for failure to comply with the decree. This de­
cree caused a considerable stir among members of the 
Italian government, and the Foreign Minister wrote the 
Viceroy a letter of protest in which he requested the
Ibid.. Eugene to Marescalchi, 26 February 
1807* Directors-general were directors of bureaus within departments. Marescalchivs letter does not ap­
pear in the Beauharnais Archive, but Eugene’s answer makes the content of the letter quite clear.
^ Ibid.. Eugene to Marescalchi, 22 August 1807* According to Father W. E. O ’Donnell, S.J., Creighton University, Omaha, Nebraska, a consistorial advocate 
was an advocate, either lay or ecclesiastical, who pled cases before the curia at Borne.
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abrogation of the decree. Eugene informed the Foreign 
Minister by letter that the decree could not be re­
called, for it had the approval of the Emperor. Though 
the letter written by Marescalchi is not available for 
examination, Eugene’s reply indicates the Foreign Minis­
ter based his opposition on the assertion that the de­
cree denied the right of Italians to live abroad. She 
Viceroy defended his order by stating that the govern­
ment had no intention of denying the right of Italians 
to live abroad; it only required that the persons af­
fected by the decree gain the government’s consent to 
■551do so.
There can be little doubt that the decree in 
question represented an attempt on the part of the 
government to prevent the development of an emigre 
problem and an effort to control the entry of news from 
the outside, for all communication with relatives and 
friends was denied persons to whom the decree applied. 
Probably the decree represents an attempt on the part 
of Eugene to prevent wealth from leaving Italy and to 
make it impossible for political undesirables to return 
to Italy once they had left. Political undesirables 
returning to comply with the decree and others returning
31Ibid., Eugene to Marescalchi, 7 November 1807.
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after the deadline would be arrested, imprisoned, per­
haps even shot*
By mid-1807 the structure and practice of state 
administration was for all practical purposes complete, 
and only a few innovations were introduced after that 
date. The most important changes made came about in 
autumn and early winter of that year when Napoleon paid
his second visit to Italy.
Napoleon was delayed by a storm and he arrived 
at Milan when no one expected him. Therefore, his re­
ception in 1807 differed markedly from that given him 
at his coronation in 1805. Eugene had ordered the con­
struction of an arch of triumph at the point where the
road from the Simplon Pass entered Milan, and had made 
plans for a triumphal entry. But communications failed 
for some reason, and Napoleon was only a short distance 
away when Eugene learned of his presence. The Viceroy 
hastily leaped on his horse and dashed to meet the Sling, 
reaching his party only a half-league from Milan.
Eugene, Memoires. Ill, 364—366. The Moniteur announced Napoleon*s arrival as having occurred on 21 November 1807, but Eugene's Memoires places the ar­
rival on 16 November 1807* There were changes made in various branches of government after 1807, such as the courts. Such changes will be discussed in the chapter 
on reforms. However, the broad outlines of administration remained the same after 1807.
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After the Emperor*s arrival fltes were held to 
honor him, and the court was at its glittering "best. 
Among those who greeted the conqueror were the King and 
Queen of Bavaria and the King and Queen of Etruria.
One personage missing at the court was none other than 
the Vice-Queen, Augusta Amelia, who had recently 
suffered a miscarriage and was recuperating at Monza. 
Curiously, she did not return to Milan until the day
following Napoleon’s departure for other parts of the
33realm."
During the first few days of his visit Napoleon 
entered into the festive mood, hut then he gave his at­
tention to the affairs of state. He met with the 
Council of State, called the ministers into conference, 
examined carefully all phases of administration, and
then congratulated Eugene on the good condition of the
34state. On 26 November 1807 Napoleon issued a call to
the electoral, colleges to meet in extraordinary session
33on 10 December.
'^Ibid.. 365; Moniteur, 7 December 1807.
34 .'Eugene, Memoires. Ill, 365.
33'Moniteur. 7 December 1807.
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Napoleon left Milan 28 November and went di­
rectly to Venice where be engoyed additional fetes and 
merrymaking, met with, the Venetian naval officials, and 
issued decrees designed to improve the public health, 
beautify the city, and provide a public walk on the 
banks of the St.-Joseph Canal. Prom Venice Napoleon 
visited Trevino, Palmanova, Udine, Osoppo, and Mantua
-2 gbefore returning to Milan on 15 December.
The electoral colleges convoked for 10 December 
held a royal session on 20 December. Napoleon, at that 
time, promulgated the Fourth Constitutional Statute. 
This statute provided for Napoleon's adoption of Eugene 
and provided that the Viceroy would be heir to the 
Italian crown when Napoleon relinquished it to another 
person. The Fourth Constitutional Statute established 
the crown as hereditary in Eugene's direct male de­
scendants. Female descendants were denied the right to
3 7succeed to the crown. Apparently collateral line^ 
were also excluded.
Immediately after the promulgation of the 
Fourth Constitutional Statute, Napoleon issued the 
Fifth Constitutional Statue, which transformed the
■^Eugene, Memoires. Ill, 366-367•
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Council of State into a consulting senate and provided 
that each department would he represented in that body 
by at least one member. Prom this time forward the 
Consulting Senate served as the legislative body of the 
Kingdom of Italy. At the same time, Napoleon de­
clared that the title ttPrince of Venice” should desig­
nate the heir-apparent to the Italian throne. By 
decree Napoleon set the membership of the legislative 
section of the Council of State at eighteen persons and
the membership of the council of auditors at twenty,
■50plus twelve assistants. In addition, Napoleon con­
ferred several honorific titles with hereditary quality. 
Those Italians who had embraced the tenets of liber­
alism did not receive the creation of Italian nobility 
at all well, for it seemed to them that Napoleon in­
tended to reintroduce inequality of men, and they 
feared social distinction might replace merit as a de­
terminant in relationships between sovereign and sub­
ject.^





divided into seven military districts as Prance was, 
but Napoleon refused to accept the suggestion for all 
of Italy, Eugene received instructions to establish 
two military districts, one at Venice and one at Ra­
venna, The duty of the district of Ravenna would be to 
provide protection for the coasts, and that of the 
district at Venice to provide protection for Friuli and 
Udine, The remainder of the departments each had a 
military commander and commissar who reported to the 
Minister of War, and there was no reason to transform 
them into military districts.^-1 In fact, if not in 
name, they already had that quality.
It is in the tact and ability with which the 
Viceroy met problems affecting the popularity of Prance 
in Italy during the first eighteen months of his ad­
ministration that his political capabilities are ex­
posed most fully. Eugene was required to please Napoleoi 
without alienating the Italians. This was a difficult 
assignment because of the programs the Viceroy had to 
initiate, such as the imposition of a land tax. Yet 
Eugene accomplished his task with consummate skill.
Proof of this statement is to be found in the fact that 
the Italians formed no serious opposition outside the
41^ Ibid.. 53-54. Napoleon to Eugene. 30 January 1808. ■
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Council of State and the Corns legislatif* Eugene 
seldom had to have recourse to reminders of Napoleonic 
power in his dealings with subordinates, his letter to 
Marescalchi in the incident over the appointment of a 
minister to Holland being the strongest such statement 
on record. If he used such persuasion, it is not re­
corded in letters as being a common occurrence.
Eugene*s attempts to alter the structure of 
administration with the appointment of civil magistrates 
in the place of prefects and his suggestion for the es­
tablishment of military districts in Italy indicate 
that his interests went beyond following instructions 
given from Paris.
During the period 1805-1806, Eugene overcame 
his initial handicap of political inexperience, and 
emerged as a first-rate administrator. Napoleon had no 
reason to complain of the choice he had made to hold 
his sceptre in Italy.
CHAPTER IT
LEGAL REFORM
Italy Had Hardly become a kingdom when Eugene 
began a policy of reforming civil institutions to bring 
tHem into Harmony with tHe institutions of France.
The courts and schools particularly experienced a re­
juvenation under Napoleonic domination. THe Italian 
courts and judicial system Had remained largely feudal 
under tHe Italian Republic, and tHe new government 
determined to eradicate such an archaic method. It 
intended to replace the old courts with the shiny new 
Imperial design.
THe first available indication of an imminent 
change in the Italian judicial system is a letter from 
Napoleon instructing Andre-Joseph Abrial to go to 
Milan, meet with Eugene, and direct the reorganization 
of the judiciary in Italy. THe letter also contained 
instructions that Abrial should make a study of crimi­
nal and civil procedures in order to determine the 
applicability of French laws to Italian procedures.1
Napoleon, Correspondance. X, 155* Napoleon to 
Abrial, 12 June 1805. Abrial was the French legalist
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It appears, therefore, that at least in the first 
instance the government intended to retain Italian 
legal procedure, hut had the intention of rewriting the 
statutes of the realm.
The order to reform statutes came quite soon, 
and on 21 June.1805 the grand judge created two com­
missions, one charged with the task of drawing up a 
code of criminal procedure and the other with drawing 
up a penal code. The penal code commission contained 
some of Italyfs leading legalists, including Di Lorenzi, 
judge of the Tribunal of Cassation; Giuseppe Luini, 
judge of the court of appeal of Olona; Antonio Canova, 
judge of the court of appeal of Mincio; Silva, judge 
suppliant of the court of appeal of Olona; Tommaso 
Nani, professor of criminal jurisprudence at the Uni­
versity of Pavia; and Giuseppe Raffaelli, professor of 
criminal jurisprudence at the law school at Bresa,
This commission began its deliberations at Milan, 1 
July 1805* and was to finish its work by 15 August of 
the same year.2
who headed up the Napoleonic commission charged with 
codifying French law. The commission produced the 
Code Napoleon.
2Moniteur, 22 Miessidor, Year XIII (11 July 
1805). Bresa probably was Brescia. I have been un­
able to locate Bresa on any map.
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The commission appointed to establish a code of
civil procedure also represented Italy*s best legal
thinking- This commission consisted of Fidele Sopransi, 
president of the tribunal of revision at Milan; Bor- 
sotti, a member of the same court as Sopransi; Qnuz- 
zarelli, president of the court of appeal of Panaro; 
Tacconi, substitute for the commissioner to the tribunal 
of revision,of Bologna; and Carlos Prancesco Caselli, 
commissioner to the courts of Crostolo* This commission 
held its sessions at Milan* The commission began its 
work on 1 July 1805, and had instructions to present
3its proposals to the grand judge by 15 August 1805*
It is evident that the suggestions of the com­
missions on a penal code and code of civil procedure 
did not receive acceptance, for the Code Napoleon was 
translated into Italian and Latin, and Eugene, in No­
vember 1805, sent it to Antonio Aldini at Paris with 
instructions to lay,it before Napoleon at the earliest
v-
opportunity. At the same time the Viceroy wrote Na­
poleon that he had sent the translation of the Code to 
Aldini and that if Napoleon delayed approval, the Code 
would not be put into execution in Italy on 1 January
5Ibid.
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41806 as planned. It is apparent that reading and ap­
proval of the translation of the Code did not proceed 
rapidly enough; it was not applied in Italy until 1
ITApril 1806. As the various Napoleonic codes were com­
pleted, they were applied in Italy. Thus, after the 
adoption of the Napoleonic Code of Commerce in France 
in 1807 it became the Italian commercial law. In the 
same year the Italian government adopted the Penal Code 
then in force in France and all French codes of pro­
cedure.^
Though no record of Eugene*s suggesting a ju­
dicial code is available, it is evident he offered one 
for Napoleon*s consideration, for on 13 May 1806 Na­
poleon refused to accept Eugene's suggestion for an 
Italian judicial code and ordered that the one followed 
in France be applied to Italy.^ In the following month
4Beauharnais Archive, Eugene to Aldini, 4 No­vember 1805; Eugene, Memoires. I, 439-440, Eugene to 
Napoleon, 9 November 1865-
M̂oniteur. 10 April 1806.
6Eugene, Memoires. Ill, 360; Moniteur. 6 October 
1807; Gershoy, French Beyolution. 4571 Dudasse gives the date of the application of the Napoleonic Code of Commerce as 1810. Beo Gershoy gives the date as being 
1807.
7*Napoleon, Correspondence. XII, 364-370, Na­poleon to Eugene, 13 May 1806.
71
the Moniteur carried the announcement that the section 
of the Code Napoleon dealing with the judicial code
Owould not be put into operation until 1807*
Between 7 June and 25 June Eugene sent proposals 
to Napoleon for the organization and location of courts 
of the first instance* Napoleon approved the locations, 
but reduced the number of courts to be established in 
several areas* Eor example, he ordered that only one 
court of first instance should be established at Adda 
instead of the four suggested, for, he wrote, sufficient 
justices of the peace existed there to make four courts 
of first instance at that place unnecessary* In all, 
Napoleon reduced the number of such courts to be es­
tablished in the kingdom from the proposed thirty—seven
qto twenty-seven* The establishment of courts of first 
instance represents the extent of court reform in 1805•
On 17 June 1806, by a decree issued from St.- 
Cloud, Napoleon established the courts, tribunals, and 
justices of the peace for the kingdom and set the sala­
ries of the presidents, vice-presidents, members, and
8Moniteur, 27 June 1806*
q^Napoleon, Correspondance * X, 561, Napoleon to Eugene, 25 June 1805.
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clerks. By the same decree he provided for royal procu­
rators and their substitutes.^
Hard on the heels of the application of the 
Code Napoleon came the establishment of four courts of 
appeal at Milan, Venice, Bologna, and Brescia. The 
court at Milan served the departments of Adda, Lagogna, 
Upper-Po, lario, and Olona; the one at Venice the de­
partments of Adriatico, Bacchiglione, Brenta, Istria, 
Passeriano, Piave, and Tagliamento; the one at Bologna 
the departments of Lower-Po, Crostolo, Tanaro, Eeno, 
and Eubicon; and the court at Brescia the departments 
of Adige, Mella, Mincio, and Serio.11
The court system in Italy during the existence
12of the kingdom was identical to that of Prance. The 
absence of documentary material concerning the Italian 
courts forces one to depend upon the French system to
•yzdetermine function and organization of Italian courts.
^ ^Moniteur. 25 July 1806«
^ Biographie universelle. Ill, 377; Eugene, 
Memoires. Ill, 359-360. '
12Driault, Napoleon en Italie. 590.
13Jacques Godechot, Les institutions de la 
Prance sous la revolution et 1*empire (.Paris: Presses
universitaires de Prance, 1951). 522-555. (Hereafter 
cited as Godechot, Institutionsj. Unless otherwise in­
dicated, all material concerning the functions, powers, 
and composition of the courts is derived from Godechot *s 
work.
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The application of the French judicial system in Italy
progressed rather slowly. Eugene, on 22 August 1807,
wrote the Minister of Justice that the courts should be
ready to enter into the new system by September of that
year. The courts of appeal should be prepared to begin
operation under the French codes by 10 September, and
the courts of c-ivil and criminal justice and the counts
of the first instance should begin their operation under
14the new codes by 15 September at the latest.
The judicial institutions in Napoleonic France 
had their origin in the Constitution of the Year VIII 
and the law of 27 Ventose, Year VIII (18 March 1800), 
and remained unchanged until 1810. After that date a 
few modifications in court structure were effected which 
will be indicated in the proper chronological order.
The judicial hierarchy was reinstated by the organic 
senatus consultum which established the life consulate.
Under the Constitution of the Year VIII jus­
tices of the peace held their positions as the result of 
an absolute majority gained in cantonal elections.
After the end of Year X the cantonal assemblies nomi­
nated two men for the position; the names of the two men 
were then presented to the First Consul, who in turn
14Beauharnais Archive, Eugene to the Minister of Justice of the kingdom, 22 August 1807*
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chose one of the two nominees to fill the vacancy. The 
one thus chosen served for ten years and, as all other 
justices, had the privilege of wearing the judicial 
robe. The age requirement for a justice of the peace 
was set at thirty years, and he had the function of 
arbitrating disputes among citizens of the canton.
The Constitution further provided that courts 
of first instance should he composed of a presiding 
judge and two. deputy judges. In villages of less than
5,000 the president of the court functioned also as a 
director of an accusative jury, In villages of more 
than 5*000 the court had one additional judge whose 
special function was to direct the accusative jury, and 
an extra deputy. In towns of more than 30,000 the 
courts of first instance were divided into two sections 
with seven justices and four deputies each; in "sig­
nificantly” larger cities additional sections were es­
tablished as they became necessary due to the demands 
of the population. The president of the court of first 
instance, chosen by the head of state, held his position 
for three years.
Oases were prosecuted by a public prosecutor, 
analogous to the American Attorney-General. The public 
prosecutor*s office consisted of a government com­
missioner and a deputy for each section of the court 
beyond the first section. After 1804 the commissioners
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carried the title of imperial procurators. The im­
perial procurators were appointed by the Emperor and 
could he discharged only hy him.
The courts of first instance had their recesses 
between 1 September and 1 November, and during the 
period of recess they held a session every ten days.
In March 1808 a recess section was created for each 
court and section.
In civil cases the courts of first instance 
judged all affairs appealed from the courts of justices 
of the peace and also judged commercial affairs if a 
commercial court did not exist in the locality. They 
applied the civil code until the issuance of the Code 
of Civil Procedure in 1806, which did away with some of 
the more progressive features of the Bevolution's legal 
reforms. Under Napoleon, civil procedure utilized the 
process established by an ordinance of 1668. This ordi­
nance made provision for prosecutors and attorneys, as 
representatives of interested parties, to argue cases 
before judges. After hearing the cases, the judges 
rendered their decisions, which were based upon the 
arguments presented. The ordinance made no provision 
for jury trial.
There were four courts of appeal in Italy. They 
heard appeals from decisions rendered in civil cases by 
the courts of first instance and from the decisions of
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the commercial courts. In Italy a bill was introduced 
on 12 April 1810 to rename the courts of appeal and 
provide that the judge auditors who had moved up to the 
position of councillor to the court of appeal should 
retain their function, but the title "judge auditor” 
should be suspended.^ By a law of 20 April 1810 the 
courts of appeal were renamed Imperial Courts.
Both the courts of first instance and appellate 
courts were divided into two sections if the population 
of their jurisdictional areas exceeded one million in­
habitants. A one-section court consisted of twelve or 
fourteen justices; a two-section court consisted of 
twenty or twenty-two justices. If the pressure of 
business made more justices necessary, they were added 
as needed. The president of the court of appeal enjoyed 
a lifetime appointment. If the court had more than one 
section, he carried the title of "first president” and 
each additional section had a president as well.
The public prosecutor’s office for each court
of appeal consisted of a government commissioner and
16his aides. Under the Empire the public prosecutors
^Moniteur. 16 April 1810. Apparently the Italian bill was introduced in anticipation of the re­naming of the courts of appeal by the imperial govern­
ment. It may be that Eugene hoped to avoid the 
appearance of "toadying" to Uapoleon.
^ A  government commissioner with his aides was the equivalent of the American Attorney-General’s office.
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were entitled imperial procurators—general and justices 
were entitled "His Majesty*s counsellors in the Imperial 
Courts." After 16 March. 1808 judge auditors, who after 
1810 had the title "associate justices," were added to 
the courts of appeal. They filled one-third of the 
positions on the courts of appeal and obtained their 
posts by appointment of the Emperor. To be eligible 
they must have had two years of legal experience gained 
in a court of first instance and an annual income of
3,000 francs or a pension of a like amount.
There was a court of criminal justice in each 
department. The court consisted of a president, ap­
pointed by the Emperor for life, two other justices who 
held a permanent appointment, and two deputies. Crimi­
nal public prosecutors were imperial procurators who, 
in the larger towns, were often assisted by one or more 
deputies.
Apparently the only juries used in the criminal 
courts were accusative juries. At first the justice of 
the peace drew the jury lists. He proposed three jurors 
per 1,000 inhabitants of the district. The sub-prefect 
reduced by one-third the list proposed by the justice of 
the peace, and the prefect reduced by two-thirds the 
list drawn by the sub-prefect. The prefecture council 
selected juries from the list presented by the prefect. 
After 1811 the prefect prepared jury lists without
78
reference to the justices of the peace or sub-prefects.
An accusative jury did not hear defendant or 
plaintiff, but made its decision from depositions placed 
before the jury. After the jury read the depositions, 
the jury president reported to the court on the determi­
nation of the jury. The police advocate also made a 
report to the court on his investigation of the case. 
After considering both reports the court determined 
whether the accused should be bound over for trial. If 
the accused was to be held for trial, he must be charged 
immediately, and if he was to be released, he must be 
released immediately. The reports of the president of 
the accusative jury and of the police advocate must be 
made within three days after hearing all depositions.
In actual practice the criminal courts had very 
little to do, for their functions were exercised largely 
by special courts. Each special court was composed of 
a president, two justices from the criminal court, three 
military men with at least the rank of captain, and two 
civilians. Special courts heard cases in secret. They 
were courts of first and last resort for such crimes as 
burglary, brigandage, armed robbery, murder in the first 
degree, counterfeiting, vagabondage, beggary, arson, and 
seditious assembly. There was no appeal from the special 
courts.
The court of Cassation, the supreme court of
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appeal, consisted of forty-eight judges who were nomi­
nated "by the Emperor and elected for life "by the Senate. 
This position required a law degree. The Court of Cas­
sation was divided into three sections; criminal, re­
quests, and civil. A decision could not he rendered 
unless at least eleven members were present. The Court 
of Cassation had authority to try cases in all cate­
gories covered hy its three sections. An imperial 
procurator-general and six advocates-general, two to 
the section, represented the public prosecutor*s office. 
If the decision rendered hy the Court of Cassation was 
attacked on the same basis as the first decision ren­
dered in the case, it was reheard hy all three sections 
of the court. If the decision of the whole court was 
attacked, it became the duty of the Corps legislatif to 
explain the law.
Until 1807 justices were appointed for life.
In 1807 a senatus consultum decreed that a life ap­
pointment could he enjoyed only after five years of 
service, giving the government an opportunity to purge 
undesirable and refractory justices. It effectively 
destroyed the independence of the courts.
Napoleonic justice brought the workhouse, an 
institution unknown to Italy before this time. Eugene 
defended the institution as a necessary item to guard
80
17against "lazy and dangerous men." ' Since beggary was
a crime punishable by trial before a special court, and
punishment often meant the workhouse, beggary almost
18disappeared from the kingdom.
True justice did not come automatically to Italy 
with the introduction of the French system. This is 
evidenced by a letter from Eugene to the Minister of 
Justice written in September 1808, in which Beauharnais 
told the Minister that there were a number of prisoners 
being held at Udine for long periods of time without the 
benefit of having had a hearing. Eugene ordered such 
abuses halted and a full investigation of the prisons 
of the kingdom in order to bring such injustice to aniqend. 3 Only with the application of the full series of
Napoleonic codes in Italy could the Moniteur report
that the codes had brought the first real measure of
justice to Italy, and the people were happier under the
20codes than they had ever been under any other system.
There can be little doubt that reforms in areas
17Moniteur, 1 March 1808.
1 ftEugene, Memoires. IV, 14.
iqBeauharnais Archive, Eugene to the Minister ofJustice of the kingdom, 30 September 1808.
20Moniteur. 11 November 1811.
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of local administration and law enjoyed great popu­
larity * Though judicial and legal reforms made in 
Italy did not spring from Italian experience, the re
forms did significantly better the administration of
21justice•




The Italian budget -was the first order of 
business for the Council of State and the Corns legis- 
latif in the summer of 1805. Eugene called the Council 
of State into extraordinary session for Tuesday, 18 
June 1805, and ordered the Minister of Finance to pre­
sent a tentative budget to the Council at that time 
under the title of the law of Finances. If the Council 
accepted the budget, the Minister should have it printed 
and sent to the Viceroy.1
The Council did not approve the proposed budget, 
and when Napoleon learned of the opposition to the law, 
he wrote Eugene to call a meeting of the president of 
the Corps legislatif and the commission on finances to 
explain the position of the government, and to stress 
that the meeting had been called at the express request 
of the King. He ended by telling Eugene to send him
pthe finished decree for signature. Napoleon apparently
^Beauharnais Archive, Eugene to the Minister of 
Finance of the kingdom, 13 June 1805.
2Napoleon, Correspondence. I, 512, Napoleon to Eugene, 12 June 1805.
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thought that a statement of his displeasure would "bring 
the desired result. If that was his thought, he was in 
error, for the Council of State continued in its op­
position, and it was some time "before the passage of 
the law could be effected.
In the interim, to meet the needs of the state, 
governmental spending was determined by estimates of 
needs based upon expenditures of the previous year/ 
Eugene ordered the Minister of Finances to render a 
monthly accounting of the cost of all services that had 
been established as the responsibility of the state. 
Local expense accounts were to be rendered to the Minis­
ter of Finance by the prefects, and all other state 
departments were to render the Minister of Finance a 
report on the cost of operation of their departments in 
order that an overall estimate of expenses might be 
made .
In addition to the regular budgetary items, 
the finance law as presented to the Corps legislatif
^Eugene, Memoires. I, 198-200, Eugene to Na­
poleon, 14 July 1805*
4.Napoleon, Correspondance. X, 490, Napoleon to Eugene, 7 June 1805•
êBeauharnais Archive, Eugene to the Minister 
of Finance of the kingdom, 13 June 1805.
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provided the following: (l) payment of priests* sala­
ries every six months, (2) governmental power to es­
tablish and apply customs regulations, (3) a new custom 
on grain, (4) a law of registration. The addition of 
these provisions caused the development of opposition 
to the finance law.
Finding that the Italians were determined to 
continue resistance to the Law of Finances, Eugene re­
ported on 14 July 1805 that he would no longer argue 
with the Council of State and that he would allow it 
to delete what it would from the law.1 Three days 
later he announced the passage of the law and reported 
the Minister of Finance hard at work on the draft of a 
law of registration which would meet the approval of 
the Council of State and which would not be opposed to 
the governmento The law, as it was being drafted,
would exempt from registration those whose estates
8amounted to less than 300 livres.
At the same time Eugene wrote that the customs
^Eugene, Memoires. I, 231-232, Eugene to Na­poleon, 1 August 1805•
^Ibid.. 198-200, Eugene to Napoleon, 14 July
1805.
8Ibid., 201-202, Eugene to Napoleon, 17 July
1805.
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law had not yet been enacted because Italians feared
qthat Napoleon would allow export to France only*
In reporting this delay, Eugene reflected that the 
Italians never occupied themselves with great problems, 
only the little ones. They did not worry themselves 
much about the annual contributions of 30,000,000 
francs to be paid to France for the upkeep of the army, 
but feared a customs which would cost them much less*
To be sure, he noted, the Italians were petitioning 
Napoleon for a reduction in the contribution, but they 
did not expect that it would be considered, and Eugene 
told his master that he should not give the petition 
serious thought.^
The deletion of the proposed customs law and 
the law of registration from the general budget law 
represented a departure from the role Napoleon in­
tended the Viceroy to play, and Napoleon complained 
bitterly about it. Eugene defended the move by the 
fact that he had to have a budget if government was to 
be carried on, and that the customs law and the regis­
tration law could be established by a simple decree 
if necessary. Eugene also reported that the success
^Ibid.
^Ibid*, 201, Eugene to Napoleon, 17 July 1805*
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of the Council of State and the Corps legislatif in 
opposing the laws and holding up their passage had 
affected adversely Italian public opinion. He felt 
it better to lose a small battle over the passage of 
these two items than to have the whole budget refused,
thus giving the legislators the status of defenders of
11the public welfare when a budget was decreed. Eugene
wrote later that the Corps legislatif and the Council
of State had the idea that they were to rule rather 
12than to serve. In answer to a query put by Napoleon
whether the opposition had come from Melzi*s clique,
Eugene wrote that no one particular group had opposed
the law, but that the opposition had come from the
feeling that the finance minister had done nothing but
13increase taxes.
Ihe result of the opposition to Napoleonic legis­
lation was the dissolution of the Corps legislatif. In 
a letter of 26 July 1805, Napoleon wrote the Viceroy 
that he was sending a budget for two years and that he 
would not need a Corps legislatif during that period;
11Ibid.. 203-205, Eugene to Napoleon, 21 July 
1805. ----
12Ibid.. 233-234, Eugene to Napoleon, 2 August1803.
225-22?, Eugene to Napoleon, 30 July
8 7
in another letter written the same day he announced
his displeasure with the chamber and stated that as
long as he remained king of Italy, he would not call
it again# By the same letter Marescalchi was appointed
14-interim Secretary of State.
A few days later Eugene wrote the King that he 
had seen the president of the Corps legislatif and a 
few members of that body# He had been asked to send 
a letter from them to Napoleon, which he had done, and 
remarked that probably the letter contained nothing 
but excuses; to hear them tell it, he said, none of 
them had a thing to do with the refusal of the Law of 
Finances as it was first presented.
In answer to the letter, Napoleon, master of 
wry wit, wrote the president of the Corps legislatif 
that he was gratified to learn that the faithfulness 
of this body was greater than its actions indicated#
He went on to say that he could brook no interference 
with his directives, and gave no indication that he 
intended to recall the Corns legislatif. He made it 
crystal clear that the various governing bodies in 
Italy were only 1atermedlaries between himself and his
14Uapoleon, Correspondence. XIf 43*44# Ba~> poison to Bugene, 26 M f  i W ^ e j i d  Sapolese to geresealehi# 26 July 180$.
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of the Council of State and the Corps legislatif in 
opposing the laws and holding up their passage had 
affected adversely Italian public opinion. He felt 
it better to lose a small battle over the passage of 
these two items than to have the whole budget refused,
thus giving the legislators the status of defenders of
11the public welfare when a budget was decreed. Eugene
wrote later that the Corps legislatif and the Council
of State had the idea that they were to rule rather 
12than to serve. In answer to a query put by Napoleon
whether the opposition had come from Melzi*s clique,
Eugene wrote that no one particular group had opposed
the law, but that the opposition had come from the
feeling that the finance minister had done nothing but
13increase taxes.
The result of the opposition to Napoleonic legis­
lation was the dissolution of the Corps legislatif. In 
a letter of 26 July 1805, Napoleon wrote the Viceroy 
that he was sending a budget for two years and that he 
would not need a Corps legislatif during that period;
^Ibid., 203-205, Eugene to Napoleon, 21 July1805.
12Ibid., 233-234, Eugene to Napoleon, 2 August1805.
^ Ibid.. 225-227, Eugene to Napoleon, 30 July1805. “
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in another letter written the same day he announced
his displeasure with the chamber and stated that as
long as he remained king of Italy, he would not call
it again. By the same letter Marescalchi was appointed
14-interim Secretary of State.
A few days later Eugene wrote the King that he 
had seen the president of the Corps legislatif and a 
few members of that body. He had been asked to send 
a letter from them to Napoleon, which he had done, and 
remarked that probably the letter contained nothing 
but excuses; to hear them tell it, he said, none of 
them had a thing to do with the refusal of the Law of 
Finances as it was first presented.
In answer to the letter, Napoleon, master of 
wry wit, wrote the president of the Corps legislatif 
that he was gratified to learn that the faithfulness 
of this body was greater than its actions indicated.
He went on to say that he could brook no interference 
with his directives, and gave no indication that he 
intended to recall the Corps legislatif. He made it 
crystal clear that the various governing bodies in 
Italy were only intermediaries between himself and his
14̂Napoleon, Correspondence. XI, 43-44, Na­
poleon to Eugene, 26 July 1805* and Napoleon to 
Marescalchi, 26 July 1805*
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subjects. They were tools of the King. He would rule
it:as well as reign. J Hot until 1810 did Italians again 
vote on a finance measure, and then the consulting 
senate, which had replaced the Corps legislatif in 
1807, voted.^ The result of the vote cannot be de­
termined from available sources. There is no reason, 
however, to believe the senate voted against the 
measure.
Even though Napoleon had sent a budget for two 
years in July 1805, it was very general and useful only 
as a guide to the approximate amounts to be spent. For 
itemized spending Eugene had to depend upon budgets 
which were prepared in Paris every two months. The 
return of budgets was chronically slow during the first 
two years of the existence of the kingdom. The sections 
of Eugene's Memoires devoted to correspondence with Na­
poleon are replete with requests for the return of 
monthly budgets, and many letters in his correspondence
with his finance minister are announcements of requests
17for the return of the budgets.
^Eugene, Memoires. I, 237-239» Eugene to Na­poleon, 5 August 1805; Napoleon, Correspondance. XI, 77-78, Napoleon to Tavema, President ox the frorps legislatif at Milan, 11 August 1805*
16Moniteur. 21 March 1810 and 28 December 1807.
^Eugene, Memoires. I, 370-371, Eugene to Na­poleon, 16 September 1865» Beauharnais Archive, Eugene
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It appears that during the first few weeks of 
the existence of the new kingdom the treasurer paid in 
bonds for services rendered the state, for Eugene re­
ceived a letter from the Emperor telling him that the 
treasurer should be made aware of the difference between 
bonds and money. Napoleon felt that when bonds were 
sold money came into the treasury, but when they were 
given in payment for services rendered, money was taken 
out. Napoleon sarcastically reflected that if all
nations paid their obligations with bonds the result
18would be disastrous. Napoleon's reasoning on this 
point seems to be somewhat muddled, for regardless of 
whether bonds were sold or used as payment for services 
rendered, at the time of redemption money would be 
taken out of the treasury. Perhaps the King was re­
luctant to increase the bonded indebtedness of the 
state before provision had been made to fund the debt.
Though Napoleon made provision for paying the 
public debt, funds were lacking for even the most
to the Minister of the Public Treasury, 13 September 1805* and Eugene to the Minister of Foreign Relations of the kingdom, 21 April 1810. No effort is made here to cite every instance in which Eugene made such re­
quests. The letters cited are representative of the Viceroy's requests for the return of monthly budgets.
“| QEugene, Memoires. I, 154-155, Napoleon to Eugene, 18 June 1865.
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pressing financial needs. As long as the Council of 
State held up the law of Finances, the Italian govern­
ment could meet its expenses only by advances from the 
imperial treasury, Eugene expected the imperial 
government to mark off these sums, but in September 
Napoleon informed the Viceroy that the Italian govern­
ment must repay all advances from the imperial treasury
19and advised Eugene to economize. There is nothing 
in the published Mfemoires of Beauhamais, Napoleon*s 
Correspondence, or Eugene*s correspondence with his 
finance minister indicating how Eugene could reduce the 
cost of governing in Italy except by reducing his 
personal expenses. TWien the Viceroy presented the 
budget for the Royal Household to Napoleon in 1806, it 
amounted to 10,000,000 francs. Napoleon reduced the 
amount to 3,000,000 and added that by exercising a
little economy Eugene should have 500,000 francs left
20of this sum at the end of the year.
Napoleon was anxious to know what he might 
expect in the way of revenue from his newly acquired
19'Napoleon, Correspondence. X£, 210, Napoleon to Eugene, 16 September 1805.
20Ibid.. XEI, 14, 33, Napoleon to Eugene, 5 February 1&66 and Napoleon to Eugene, 11 February 1806.
91
kingdom* In order to supply this information, Eugene,
in October, demanded a report on the amounts realized
from the imposition of the direct tax and the cost of
collection* In the letter demanding the report the
Viceroy told the finance minister the report should be
21exact since the Emperor had ordered it.
Having entered the campaign of 1805 by the time 
Eugene asked for the report, the Emperor could not give 
his personal attention to the study of details for 
which he is justly famous* However, upon his return 
to Paris in January 1806, Napoleon complained that he 
could make nothing of the report and said that he had 
written Aldini, who. served as treasurer, for a report 
on all subjects relative to Italian finances and the 
Italian budget for 1806 in order that he might fully 
inform himself of the financial condition of the 
state.22
Apparently, Eugene’s report contained mention 
of expenditures on canals and roads, for four days 
later the Emperor informed the Viceroy that he was 
spending on ill-advised projects; canals and roads
21Beauhamais Archive, Eugene to the Minister 
of Finance of the kingdom, 2 October 1805*
22Napoleon, Correspondence * XII, 33, Napoleon 
to Eugene, 11 February 1806; 52, Napoleon to Eugene,15 February 1806•
92
could wait until a later date. Napoleon 1;old Eugene
that a councillor-of-state, accompanied by a receiver,
was coming from Prance to untangle and administer
23Italian finances.
By the terms of the Treaty of Pressburg,
Venetia became a Prench possession, and the Emperor 
wrote that he hoped the increase of wealth derived 
from the addition of Venetia to the Kingdom of Italy 
would make it possible for governmental revenues to 
meet the needs of the state, for he needed the war 
contributions of the Italian states for expenses in 
Prance. At the same time Napoleon desired a report 
which would show exactly the condition, composition, 
and cost of the Italian army, squad by squad.^
Two weeks later Napoleon complained that he had 
not received the reports requested on the condition of 
the Italian army, the national wealth of Italy, or the 
wealth of Venice. In his letter he told the Viceroy 
that sucli reports were not really work- if he just ap­
plied himself. The Emperor went on to tell Eugene 
that he was spending too much money in Italy and that
23Ibid.. 51-52, Napoleon to Eugene, 15 Febru­ary 1806.
A iIbid., XI, 566, Napoleon to Eugene, 31January 1805.
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he must economize; Napolepn had increased the armies 
of the French Empire and needed all the money he could 
get for French forces. The armed force in Italy, sup­
ported until this time by France, became the responsi-
2*5bility of the Italian treasury. J
In another letter of the same day Napoleon 
wrote the Viceroy that contributions for the Grand 
Army from the Venetian territories were as follows: 
Verona 400,000 francs; Vicenza 1,000,000; Trevino 
1,500,000; Padua 1,500,000; Udine 1,000,000; and 
Trieste 2,000,000, totaling 7,40G,000 francs. Napoleon 
ordered 10,000,000 to be collected, but in this letter 
made no mention of the manner in which the remaining
2,600,000 francs were to be assigned. A portion of 
the contributions had been collected during the cam­
paign of 1805, and the Emperor demanded to know what
portion remained outstanding and ordered Eugene to
26collect the unpaid portion immediately. Siphoning 
off such sums did not aid the Italian economy.
Eugene misinterpreted Napoleon's request for 
a report on the cost of the Italian army and reported
2^Ibid., XII, 54-55, Napoleon to Eugene, 16 February 1866.
26Ibid., 54. Napoleon to Eugene. 16 February1806.
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only the cost of troops in Venetia. This cost amounted 
to 1,790,320 Milanese francs.^ At the same time the 
Viceroy reported that estimated overall revenue from 
Venetia would amount to 24,000,000 or 25,000,000 francs. 
He estimated that administrative costs in Venetia would 
he ahout 15,000,000 francs, and the cost of the army 
would be some 8,000,000 to 9*000,000 French francs.^® 
According to these estimates there would be a surplus 
of about 1,000,000 francs in revenue from Venetia. 
Napoleon did not consider this to be enough profit and 
ordered a re-examination of Venetian revenues.^
Eugene had only estimated expenses, and when careful 
investigation was made the finance minister discovered 
that his estimates were too optimistic. The finance 
ministers investigation revealed that revenues from 
Venetia would be 22,400,000 francs and administrative 
costs would be 14,500,000 Milanese francs. Adminis­
trative costs and the cost of the army in Venetia
27'One Milanese franc equalled .768 Frenchfranc •
28Eugene, Memoires. II, 106-112, Eugene to Napoleon, 3 March 1865.
29̂ Napoleon, Correspondence. XII. 106-108, Napoleon to Eugene, 27 February 1806.
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destroyed Napoleon*s hope that Venetia would profit 
50him. Though Napoleon continued to complain, the 
finance minister’s report remained correct.
In answer to Napoleon's complaints about 
Venetian revenues, Eugene reported that a significant 
portion of the revenue collected in Venetia came from 
a land tax collected quarterly. Since the territory 
became legally subject to Italian laws on 1 January 
1806, Eugene explained he had decreed that the govern­
ment would begin collection of the land tax in March
51and the collection of unpaid contributions in April.
At the same time, Eugene reported that he had a deficit
in army funds for February 1806 totaling 2,560,729
52livres. Finally convinced of the Viceroy’s financial 
difficulties, the Emperor came to his rescue with a 
gift of 5»000,000 francs for the Italian treasury* Na­
poleon told Eugene to take the 3,700,000 francs Marshal 
Andr& Mass&na repaid, the 360,000 assessed against 
General Jean-Baptiste Solignac,333G0,000 from the
•^Eugene, Memo ires. II, 88—90, 106-112, Eugene 
to Napoleon, 24 February 1806 and 3 March 1806*
51 Ibid., 106-112, Eugene to Napoleon, 3 March1806.
52Ibid., 1491 Eugene to Napoleon, 11 March1806.
35Infra, 146-148.
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paymaster-general, and 450,000 from the sale of se­
questered quicksilver. This totaled only 4,800,000 
francs, but Napoleon told Eugene that General Solignac 
would make up the difference.^
In addition to the armed forces, the repair 
and construction of fortifications constituted a heavy 
drain upon the Italian treasury in 1806. General 
Frangois Chasseloup proposed to spend 800,000 livres 
at Palmanova; 200,000 at Osoppo; 300,000 at Venice and 
in the lagoons; 300,000 at Peschiera; 100,000 at Rocca 
d'Anfo; 700,000 at Legnago; 500,000 at Mantua; 40,000 
at Pizjaighettone; and 10,000 at Verona. Coupled with 
administrative costs of 50,000 livres, Chasseloup 
planned to expend some 3,300,000 livres in 1806 on 
engineering works alone at the fortifications.^ In 
this area Napoleon ordered that spending be reduced.
He would allow no construction at Venice, and would 
permit an expenditure of only 500,000 francs at Pal­
manova and Osoppo combined. Chasseloup should spend 
nothing at Pizzighettone or Rocca d'Anfo and only
200,000 at Mantua. In addition to the Italian funds
34  .y Eugene, Memoires. II, 247, Napoleon to Eugene, 22 April 1806.
35 Ibid., 94-96, Eugene to Napoleon, 25 Febru­
ary 1806. In Napoleon's and Eugene's letters francs and livres are used interchangeably.
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to be expended at Palmanova, the French treasury al­
located 2,000,000 francs, for it was of the utmost 
necessity that these places be brought into a condition 
of defensive capability.
The Italian treasury suffered from the ne­
cessity of supplying the administrators of the Illyrian 
provinces with money and paying the upkeep of Italian 
units on detached duty at Naples. An example of this 
expense is that on 10 April 1806 Eugene sent 400,000
francs to Dalmatia, 200,000 to Istria, and 100,000 to
57Marshal Auguste Marmont in Friuli, 'and when Eugene*s
financial condition was most critical, Napoleon forced
the Viceroy to send 500,000 gold francs to Naples to
satisfy a claim of the paymaster of the Neapolitan 
38army.
The Viceroy repaired the depleted Italian 
treasury in 1806 by rigid economy, subsidies from
Napoleon, Correspondance. XII, 118-119* Na­poleon to Eugene, 2 March 16G6; 1^3, Napoleon to Jean Dejean, 28 February 1806; 307-308, Napoleon to Eugene, 
25 April 1806. Dejean was Minister of the Adminis­tration of War in France.
•^Eugene, Memoires, II, 221—223, Eugene to Na­poleon, 10 April 1806.
^^apoleon, Correspondance. XII, 114, Napoleon to Eugene, 28 February ±806.
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France, careful collection of taxes, war contributions,
customs duties, and a loan from Venetian banking 
39houses.
If the absence of complaints concerning fi­
nances in Eugene*s and Napoleon's letters is an indi­
cation of financial condition, the finances of the 
Italian government were in good condition by the end 
of 1806. Indeed, one historian reports that Italy was 
the only Napoleonic state which did not suffer a defi­
cit between 1806 and 1813— that until the Russian
AOcampaign a surplus existed. Even so, the fact re­
mains that Italy suffered under a heavy burden of 
financial exactions during the French occupation, and
^ Ibid., 278, Napoleon to Mollien, 14 April 
1806; 286-2577 Napoleon to Mollien, 15 April 1806; 287, Napoleon to Eugene, 15 April 1806; Eugene, Memoires,
II, 367-368, the Minister of the Public Treasury of the kingdom to Napoleon, 30 April 1806; 60-62, Eugene to Napoleon, 6 February 1806; III, 210-211, Eugene to 
Napoleon, 23 November 1806. Francis Mollien was the 
Director of the Public Treasury in France.
40 %M. H. Weil, le Prince Eugene et Murat. 1813-
1814 (5 vols.; Paris: Albert % Font emoing, 1902), I, 12.(.Hereafter cited as Weil, Eugene et Murat). It is not 
intended to indicate that from 1806 -to 1&L2 there were 
no times of financial stress. In 1807 Eugene was obliged to borrow 500,000 livres for defensive works from the reserve of the engineers at Venice, and late 
in 1808 he reported a bad treasury situation to Na­poleon. In general terms it is true that Italy was financially stable.
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apparently Eugene's letters of 1805 and 1806 carried
4-1requests for a reduction of taxes. Becoming im­
patient with such importunities from his viceroy, Na- 
poleon wrote that the 2 ,5 0 0 , 0 0 0 franc monthly contri­
bution of Italy provided hardly enough for his needs 
and he wanted to hear nothing more of lowering Italian 
taxes. He told Eugene that Frenchmen paid heavier 
taxes than the Italians and that not until the French 
Empire was secure could he reduce the Italian contri­
bution.^
Though Napoleon appointed a commission for 
liquidation of the public debt in 1805* the absence of 
commission of liquidation reports in available sources 
makes it impossible to determine the amount of the 
public debt. The only statement that one can make with 
certainty from available sources is that Napoleon
41Available letters of the Viceroy concerning financial conditions often carry mention of the blow delivered to the Italian treasury by the necessity of sending funds out of the state. Bepresentative of 
such letters are ones dated 18 May 1806 and another 
of 7 June 1806. Eugene, Memoires. II. 398-399, 427- 429. “
42^ Napoleon, Correspondance. XII. 173, Napoleon to Eugene, 9 March 1806; 283-264, Napoleon to Eugene, 14 April 1806.
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recognized the public debt of the Kingdom of Italy and
43refused to recognize the public debt of Venetia. At
a later date the Emperor allowed the Italian government
44to collect Venetian revenues for the Italian treasury, 
but he never rescinded his refusal to recognize the 
Venetian debt•
The shaky condition of Italian finances in 1805- 
1806 presented problems demanding attention to detail 
for which Eugene's career as a soldier in a minor com­
mand had not prepared him. Yet by a careful husbanding 
of resources, he surmounted the problems presented in 
the field of finances.
In the budget controversy it can clearly be 
seen that Napoleon intended, and Eugene understood, that 
the state should be administered in dictatorial fashion. 
The desires of Italian officials to order their own 
affairs were disregarded and Italy was brought into 
orderly existence.
^Ibid., 296, Napoleon to Eugene, 21 April1806.
44 .Eugene, Memoires. II, 228-229* Napoleonto Eugene, 14 April 180&.
CHAPTER VI
SECURING THE STATE
Eugene's first step in the organization of a 
fighting force in Italy was to reorganize the former 
Presidential Guard, which had been renamed the Royal 
Guard* When the kingdom was born, the Guard consisted 
of a general staff, one regiment of line infantry com­
posed of two battalions, one regiment of cavalry com­
posed of two squadrons, one company of light artillery, 
and one service train company. The number of troops 
in the Guard totaled 1,919 men.
By a decree of 20 June 1805, Napoleon set the 
composition of the Guard at four companies of Honor 
Guards, twelve companies of Royal Velites, ten compa­
nies designated as the Royal Line Guard, and one light 
artillery company.1
The four companies of the Honor. Guards were to
Beauhamais Archive, Report of the Minister of War. 1 January 1805 - 1 July 1807 . #he Presidential 




be composed of 100 men each* In each company forty
troops were to be foot soldiers, and the remainder
were to be mounted. Three companies of the Honor
Guard bore the names of the principal cities of the
kingdom, Milan, Bologna, and Brescia, while the fourth
bore the name of Homagna, an old Papal State which had
been seized by Bonaparte in 1300. The only persons
eligible to enter the Honor Guards were young men
eighteen to twenty years of age from families wealthy
enough to pay an initial fee of 400 livres into the
company treasury and dues of 600 livres annually there- 
2after. Upon completion of two years* service the 
members of the Honor Guard could transfer to the Im­
perial Guard if an opening existed. After the same 
term of service a mounted Honor Guardsman was entitled 
to enter a line regiment of infantry in the regular 
army as a second lieutenant, and the dismounted Honor
Guardsman was entitled to enter a line regiment of the
■3regular army as a sergeant.
2Eugene, Memoires. I, 143-145* Uapoleon to Eugene, 14 June 1805* The franc and livre were syn­
onymous from the time of Henry III. The sou was a prewar bronze coin equivalent to l/20 of a franc.The denier was a minor coin equal to 1/12 of a sou. Eouveau Larousse (2 vols.; Paris: Bibrairie Barousse,nTdl)1 I.
*2Eugene> Memoires. I, 143-145* napoleon to Eugene, 14 June 1^05.
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Each of the twelve companies of Eoyal Velites 
consisted of 100 men, with the twelve companies divided 
into three "battalions of four companies each* Like 
the Honor Guard, Eoyal Velites were to be composed of 
eighteen-to twenty-year-old men, but their initial 
entry fee amounted to only 200 livres and their yearly 
dues were 300 livres. After two years of service in 
the Eoyal Velites a member could also transfer to a 
line regiment of the regular army with the rank of a 
second lieutenant, but it does not appear that the 
Eoyal Velites were eligible for transfer to the Imperial 
Guard.^
The ten companies designated as the Eoyal Line 
Guard were to be composed of 100 men each and were to 
be organized into two regiments of five companies each. 
Finally, Hapoleon eliminated the artillery service 
train company, while retaining the light artillery 
company consisting of sixty-four men. By such re­
organization, ordered by a decree of 20 June 1805, the 
personnel of the Eoyal Guard was increased to 2,664 
men. The reorganization made necessary the discharge
4Beauhamais Archive, Beport of the Minister of Var. 1 January 1805 - 1 January 1807*
^Ibid*; Supra. 101•
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of a number of veterans of the infantry line regiment.^
In essence, The Royal Guard constituted a 
private army for Eugene, and from the beginning of his 
government he alone commanded it. With the exception 
of the addition of a fifth company to the Honor Guard 
from Venice on 2 August 1806, two health officers per 
company on 1 December 1805, and one veterinarian per 
company on 12 October 1806, the composition and number 
of the Royal Guard remained the same throughout the 
existence of the kingdom.
Italy had practically no state defenses when 
the kingdom came into existence. Her small army 
suffered chronically from a lack of supplies. The 
fortresses of the state at Mantua, Rocca d'Anfo, Verona, 
Pizzighettone, and Peschiera lacked personnel and pro­
visions. The French army which remained after the re­
creation of the Republic following the campaign of 
1800 provided the only practical defense the Italians 
enjoyed. Along with the duty of overseeing the reor­
ganization of the government, then, Eugene received 
the task of developing and organizing a defensive 
system for the state. This task required a number of
6 »Eugene, Memoires. I. 147, Eugene to Na­
poleon, 15 June 1865* Tf was necessary to discharge infantry personnel because of the new age limit in 
the Royal Velites and the Honor Guard.
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years, for as the state grew with, the addition of the 
Venetian departments in 1806, and the further addition 
of the Papal Legations in 1808, the defensive demands 
of the state increased.
The King instructed Eugene to take personal 
command of the cavalry and infantry at Milan and to
make it the nucleus of the Italian army. Napoleon
told Eugene that he must do for Italy what the Great 
Elector had done for Prussia. The King felt that with 
the embryonic army commanded by the lieutenant of the 
King, a better type of man might be attracted to it.'
This directive pleased the Viceroy, who often complained
of not being used in the capacity for which his training 
and talents qualified him, and he attacked the assign­
ment with a will. He organized a new cavalry unit and 
proposed to call it the "Josephine Dragoons," but Na­
poleon gently told him this just could not be—  a unit 
with a woman*s name would soon be the butt of the army, 
and suggested instead that it be designated as the 
"Queen's Dragoons." Eugene complied with Napoleon's 
suggestion.8
At the same time, the Viceroy busied himself
7'Napoleon, Correspondance. X, 553, Napoleon to Eugene, 21 June 180*>.
Q __Ibid., XI, 2, Napoleon to Eugene, 3 July1805.
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with the organization, of other units. He organized 
the pontoon companies into one unit and brought them 
together. He reduced the number of sapper companies 
from nine to four, and also brought these troops to-
qgether in one unit. He later added a company of 
bombardiers to each regiment.
For purposes of administration the Viceroy 
organized the Italian army in the same manner as the 
French army. It had its own general headquarters, 
chief of staff, general staff, and comptabilite.
Though the kingdom had a Minister of War and Marine, 
it appears that it did not have a Minister Director 
of Administration of War, but instead depended upon 
the Minister Director of Administration of War of the 
French Empire. The Italian army had its own ordon- 
nateur en chef .^paymaster. and inspectors of reviews.
At the time of the erection of the Kingdom of
q • ,■̂ Eugene, Memoires, I, 126-127, Eugene to Na­poleon, 21 June 1 6 6 5.
^Napoleon, Correspondance. XI, 59-60, Na­poleon to Eugene, 4 August 1805• Bombardiers were mortarmen.
^Beauhamais Archive, Report of the Minister 
of War* 1 January 1805 - 1 July 1807. The comptabilite was the accounting department of the Italian army. fEe ordonnateur en chef was the chief bursar. He was under 
the direction of the Director-General of the Adminis­tration of War.
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Italy, Marshal Jourdan had command of the French army 
providing its defense, Adolphe Thiers maintains that 
Jourdan served as the military mentor of the Viceroy, 
for Eugene had never commanded an army. This con­
tention is vigorously denied "by. Du Casse in his role 
as editor of Eugene's Memoires, It is useless to 
argue the point, for Eugene did not enjoy even nominal 
command of the army when he became viceroy, and though 
made commander-in-chief of the Army of Italy in December 
1805, he did not exercise command in the field until 
1809. Whatever the truth of this argument might be, 
upon Jourdan*s removal from command of the army in 
September 1805 and the assignment of the command to 
Marshal Massena, the letters written by Eugene to 
Massena strongly indicate that Eugene understood that
Napoleon expected him to observe the famous Marshal's
14-methods *
12Thiers, Consulate and Empire, I, 673; Eugene, 
Memoires, I, 254, n. 1.
13Napoleon, Correspondance. XI, 147, Napoleon 
to Eugene, 27 August 1805; 157, Napoleon to General Duroc, 28 August 1805: Moniteur. 30 Fructidor. Year 
XIII (17 September 1805).
"^See Eugene's letters to Massena, Beauharaais 
Archive, September 1805*
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Because the Italians did not have sufficient 
martial fervor, Eugene utilized the conscription of 
twenty-year-old men to build the army* The con­
scription law had been in effect during the life of 
the Italian Republic, but enforcement had been lax. 
After 1805 the government of the Viceroy enforced the 
conscription laws. Napoleon, by a decree issued 24 
June 1805, set the conscription for the year 1806 at
6,000 men. The decree called 3,000 men to active duty 
and placed 3,000 in the reserve.1'*
Expansion of the French Empire in 1805 brought 
in its train the threat of war. Therefore, Eugene 
worked feverishly in the summer of 1805 to develop the 
Italian army and had the Queen's Dragoons ready to take 
the field at the end of August, though lack of heavy 
cavalry equipment meant they were merely hussars. He 
reported to Napoleon that the war scare in Italy in 
1805 had sent the cost of forage for horses from 
twenty-three to thirty-five sous daily.1  ̂ Later the 
same day Eugene reported that he had ordered the
17Queen's Dragoons to Bologna, and then to Descara.
15Moniteur, 22 Messidor, Tear XIII (11 July
1805). .
' ••‘V
^Eugene, Memoires. I, 261-262, Eugene to Na­
poleon, 30 August 1805.
1*̂Ibid.. 262-263, Eugene to Napoleon, 30August 1805•
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In addition to the Queen*s Dragoons, Eugene, 
by the end of* August, had organized another regiment 
of cavalry, the "Napoleon Dragoons," composed at that
time of two squadrons dressed and equipped. He in-
18tended to complete this unit within six weeks. He
also organized the Corsican Legion which, Napoleon
19wrote, should make "some good soldiers." ^
The growth of the Italian army in 1805 made 
necessary an increase in the officer corps, and the 
Italians* lack of experience necessitated that the 
officers come from the French army. Napoleon had re­
fused to allow this in 1805; therefore, Eugene wrote 
Berthier in early 1806 requesting him to use his influ­
ence as chief of staff to gain Napoleon*s approval
for the transfer of French officers, two from each
20corps, to the Italian army. Since Eugene reported
18Ibid.. 261-262. Eueene to Nanoleon. 30 August
1805. ”
19̂ Napoleon, Correspondance. H ,  270, Napoleon to Eugene, 1 October 1865.
20Eugene, Memoires. II, 56-57* Eugene to Berthier, 1 February 18(567 There is no answer to this letter in the two thousand-odd letters s^nt from Berthier to Eugene preserved in the Beauhamais Archive. 
Neither Eugene's nor Napoleon's published correspondence indicates the degree of Berthier*s success or even if 
he made an attempt in this direction.
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to the Emperor that he would have an army of 36,000
21ready to take the field by the end of 1806, he must
have received cadre personnel from Prance, Eugene,
by the end of 1805, had organized a force of three
divisions, numbering 17,000 fighting men, with general
22headquarters at Padua. Beauhamais intended to
raise an additional 18,000 troops by calling to duty
the conscriptions of 1804, 1805, and 1806. In addition
to these conscripts, the Viceroy reported that he had
in hand 400 cavalry volunteers at Verona, enough to
form a new regiment of cavalry, which he could use
very effectively to strengthen existing forces if Na-
23poleon so desired. Each regiment needed only the 
organization of a third battalion to be complete.
The Italian army, in 1805, desperately needed 
small firearms. Napoleon, in September, wrote Eugene 
that he had ordered 60,000 rifles to be sent to Genoa,
10,000 of that number being destined for Mantua. He 
warned the Viceroy that he should take every precaution 
to prevent any rifles from falling into the hands of
21Ibid., 87.
22Ibid., 3.
23Ibid., 86-88. Eugene’s arithmetic was bad; 
the 17,000 reported earlier plus 18,000 equal 35,000 not 36,000.
Ill
the peasantry. At this time Marshal Andoche Junot was 
suppressing an uprising in Parma, and Napoleon ap­
parently feared that the peasants of south Italy were
24sympathetic to the movement. The arms the Italian 
army received in September evidently did not satisfy 
its requirements, for in February 1806 Napoleon wrote 
Eugene that he could not send French rifles to Italy 
and advised the Viceroy to ask Italian industry to
2 *5supply the necessary arms. v But the King, in April 
1806, anticipated war and ordered that 10,000 ad­
ditional rifles be sent from the great depot at Ales­
sandria to the forces defending Ancona, and that the 
rifles at the fortress of Mantua be sent .to Piacenza. 
Eugene was to replace the arms from Mantua with 
Austrian rifles taken at Venice. Twenty thousand
Austrian rifles stored at Palmanova made that fortress
26the most significant small arms depot in Italy. Na­
poleon, in the spring of 1807* due to the increase in
24Napoleon, Correspondance. XI, 197* Napoleon to Eugene, 14 September 180£.
25Ibid., XII, 35, Imperial Decision, 12 Febru­ary 1806.
pfiIbid.. 302. Napoleon to Dejean. 22 April1806 .
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the number under arms sent the Italian forces an ad­
ditional 6,000 rifles.2^
The Italian armed forces also needed artillery. 
Napoleon, in January 1806, transferred captured 
Austrian guns to the Italian army. This transfer
greatly increased the firepower of Italian artillery 
28units. To strengthen the garrison at Venice, Na­
poleon sent from Palmanova and Osoppo artillery not
29needed for defense at those two fortresses. But the 
demands of the Grand Army brought the order two days 
later to reduce the cannon in Italy to eighty-two 
pieces and to place the artillery in Italy in three 
parks, one at Palmanova, one at Verona, and one at 
Padua.
Because of the inability of the Italian powder 
plants to provide for the needs of the kingdom in 1805*
2^Ibid., XIV. 552. Napoleon to Eugene, 27 March
1807.
28Ibid., XI, 522-523, Napoleon to Berthier,
3 January 1806•
2^Ibid., XIII, 204-208, Napoleon to Eugene,18 September 1806.
^8Ibid.. 229-231, Napoleon to Bejean, 20 Sep­tember 180F1!
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Napoleon, in 1806, ordered Eugene to put the powder
plant at Monte Chiarugolo, located in Venetia, into
full production at once and to take measures so this
plant could defend itself against attacks from the
31peasantry of the region.
Italian industry produced shoes and uniforms, 
and it appears that in the first stages of army growth
Eugene supplied clothing needs from his own terri-
32tories. As the army grew, however, he had to depend 
more and more upon French producers for items of 
clothing.
As the danger of war increased in the autumn 
of 1805, the Emperor issued orders to the Viceroy to 
put into action the defense forces Eugene was organ­
izing. Napoleon, on 5 September 1805, wrote Eugene to*
order Massena (when he arrived in Italy) to form his 
divisions along the Adige, place artillery in the 
chateau of Verona, and he prepared to fight. At what­
ever cost, Massena should hold Verona and its bridge.^"*
31Ibid., XII, 507, Napoleon to Dejean, 3 July1806.
■^Eugene, Memoires. I, 385, 387, Eugene to Na­poleon, 22 September 1805.
3*' Napoleon. Correspondance. XI. 179, Napoleon to Berthier, 5 September 1805.
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Hostilities would start in. the first fortnight of
Yendemiaire, and Napoleon expected Italy to provide
1,000 to 1,200 conscripts for the Italian division at 
34Boulogne. Eugene also received orders to contribute 
substantially to the column dispatched to march against 
the Kingdom of Naples if his support became necessary.  ̂
Not directly related to Italian action, but as 
a precaution against possible reverses in Italy, Eugene 
received instructions to have all funds held in depart- 
mental treasuries transferred to Milan.
As the possibility of war increased in the 
autumn of 1805, Eugene gave particular attention to 
strengthening the army on the northeastern frontier. 
Following Napoleon’s instructions, Massena organized an
* i *
additional line division of 7*000 infantry, 1,000 ar­
tillery, and 1,000 cavalry. He utilized his heavy
*2 A Ibid., 186, Napoleon to Eugene, 10 September
1805.
35"xbid.. 103, Napoleon to Eugene, 19 August 
1805; 102, Napoleon to Talleyrand, 19 August 1805; 122- 123, Napoleon to Berthier, 23 August 1805; 142, Na­
poleon to Berthier, 26 August 1805; 146-148, Napoleon to Eugene, 27 August 1805; Eugene, Memoires. I, 243- 244, Eugene to Napoleon, 11 August 1805-
Napoleon, Correspondence. XI, 209, Napoleon to Eugene, 16 September 1805.
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cavalry (the cuirassiers and dragoons) as reserve. 
Napoleon ordered Massena to invest the Austrian portion 
of Verona at the end of September and to form a de­
fensive line from the Adige Hiver on his rig;ht to the 
mountains on his left. This maneuver would force the 
Austrian commanders to deploy their troops away from 
Verona, which Massena could then use as a springboard 
to invade Austrian territory at the outbreak of hos­
tilities.^ At the same time Napoleon gave Massena 
command of the Queen's Dragoons. This unit and its 
artillery increased Massena's reserve by some 450
?Qtroops.
Eugene appointed General Dominic Pino, the 
Minister of War, as chief of staff, and General Francois 
Fririon to assist Pino as under chief of staff.
Following French organization, the Viceroy separated 
the artillery and engineering branches of the service, 
with General Jean Sorbier commanding the engineer corps 
and General Buchet commanding the artillery. General 
Louis Partouneaux commanded the first Italian division 
stationed at Mestre and Padua; General Fiorella com­
manded the second division located at Bavenna and
^ I b i d . , 246, Berthier to Massena, 23 Sep­tember 180*5*1
Beauhamais Archive, Eugene to Massena,23 September 1805*
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Piave di Sacco; and General Jan Henryk Lombrowski com­
manded the third division placed at Vicenza and Leg- 
39nago.
In 1805 Napoleon coerced the Kingdom of Naples 
into signing a treaty of neutrality with Prance. When 
war broke out between Austria and Prance in October 
1805» Queen Maria; Carolina abrogated the treaty and 
allowed Russian and English troops to debark at Naples. 
The debarkation of enemy troops at Naples posed a 
threat to the security of EugeneTs southern borders 
As a result, Eugene, acting on his own authority, in 
November ordered Councillor-of-State Guastavillani to 
begin immediately in the southern departments of the 
kingdom the formation of a national guard unit of 
twelve battalions, each of which would have a strength 
of 800. The battalions were to be composed of ten 
companies each, nine of chasseurs and one of grena­
diers. The members of the units were to be harangued 
with the idea that now was the time for them to show 
their devotion to the Emperor, and that their efforts 
would save Italy even if the British should gain a 
foothold.
59 .^Eugene, Memoires. II, 3#
40Infra. 187.
41Beauhamais Archive, Eugene to' Councillor- 
of-State Guastavillani, 20 November 1805. x
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In addition to ordering the formation of a 
national guard unit, Beauharnais made the following 
disposition of troops between 20 November and 26 No­
vember. He ordered General Grouvion St.-Cyr to Bologna 
with all the infantry and cavalry that could be spared 
as soon as he could leave Venetia, if Massena, who was 
St.—Cyr*s superior, approved; he mobilized the national 
guards of the cities of Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla; 
he called the cavalry of the Hanoverian Legion, the 
60th line infantry regiment, and a Swiss battalion from
the 27th military district of Prance and gathered them 
42at Parma. The Viceroy replaced these troops with a 
regiment of militia from Piacenza. He sent the Corsi­
can Legion to Modena from Mantua and replaced it with 
an equal number of national guardsmen. He intended to 
bolster the national guard at Mantua with one-third of 
the garrisons of Peschiera and Legnago.
The arsenal at Mantua provided arms for the 
regiments being raised. Modena received both heavy and 
light artillery. Sugene planned to use a portion of 
the garrisons of Ancona and Livorno for the defense of 
his southern frontiers, depending upon the movement of 
Anglo-Hussian troops. Vith all these troops plus those
42The 27th military district of Prance con­
sisted of Piedmont.
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he hoped to get from St.-Cyr the Viceroy would have 
some 30,000 troops to pit against the 30,000 invaders 
the Russians and English allegedly had debarked.^
Eugene, in the next week, began construction 
of storehouses at Bologna and Modena, established an 
artillery park at Reggio, and made plans for hospitals 
at Modena and Parma
The action taken by the Viceroy had been 
prompted by the belief that a formidable army threatened 
his southern borders, but his information, he reported 
to Napoleon on 6 December 1805, had been in error. A 
letter from Cardinal Joseph Fesch informed him that the 
debarkation at Naples could not possibly number more 
than 20,000, and Fesch begged Eugene not to send an 
Italian army into the Papal States. Eugene told Na­
poleon that he thought it would do no harm to let the 
Cardinal know that he did not intend to send troops to 
the Papal States, but that it would be a good influence 
on the Neapolitans if they believed an army of 30,000 
was marching against them.
^Eugene, Memoires. I, 454-455, Eugene to 
Massena, 26 November 180-5; 461-463, Eugene to Napoleon, 2 Daclsmber 1805. Eugene did not yet know that Mass&na refused the request of St.-Cyr*s troops.
44Ibid.. 461-463, Eugene to Napoleon, 2 De­cember 1805.
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At the time Eugene wrote the letter hie had
been in Bologna for two hours; he thought the spirit
of the people was good, and told Napoleon that the
45national guard at Modena was superb. ^
According to the Moniteur the response to the
call for a national guard at Bologna exceeded the
Viceroy’s hopes. It presently numbered 20,000 and
soon would number 30,000. Eugene reported the volun-
4-6teers in good spirits. It is evident that this an­
nouncement in the Moniteur was largely propaganda and 
should not be taken too literally, for Eugene, ca 10 
December, wrote Napoleon that he had seen the officers 
of four battalions of the national guard at Bologna 
and in an effort to give them heart had told them they 
would not serve for any extended length of time. They 
assured him, he reported, that they were willing to 
stay and serve as long as necessary.^
Eugene felt that the concentration of national 
guard troops at Bologna was greater than that city 
could support and planned to disperse the unit there
4.5̂Ibid., 4-63-465• Eugene to Napoleon, 6 De­cember 1805* Cardinal Eesch was Napoleon*s uncle.
^ Moniteur. 3 Nivose, Year H V  (24 December
1805).
i
47'Eugene, Memoireg. I, 466-467, Eugene to 
Napoleon, 10 December 1865*
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from Rimini to Reggio in cantonments of two battalions
each at Forli, Cesena, Faenza, Modena, Imola, and
Reggio. He would keep eight battalions at Bologna, and
if news came of a movement from Naples against him, he
48could call his units together easily.
During the time of such activity on the part
of the Viceroy, Napoleon, occupied with defeating
Austria and negotiating an armistice, did not find time
to write Eugene concerning the activity of the latter
in southern Italy. In December the Emperor only asked
about the condition of the national guard and ordered
that some of the troops be sent to the Tyrol to police
Bolzano and Trent, which were soon to become a part of 
49the kingdom.  ̂ Napoleon, two days later, ordered Eugene 
to send part of his national guard to Rimini to give 
protection against possible raids by Cossacks and other 
light cavalry along the northeastern Italian littoral.^
4aIbid., 467-468, Eugene to Napoleon, 12 De­cember 1805.
49Napoleon, Correspondance. XI, 486, Napoleon to Eugene, 16 December 1805.
50Ibid., 489, Napoleon to Eugene, 18 December
1805.
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Due to the activity of British, agents and re­
fractory clergy among the Parmesans and the population 
of Piacenza, an uprising occurred there in January 
1806. Eugene promptly put down the uprising with a 
considerable degree of severity.'*1
The Treaty of Pressburg extended Italian fron­
tiers eastward to the Isonzo River, and Napoleon, be­
lieving it necessary to strengthen the armed forces in 
Venetia, sent from Prance to Italy some 6,000 of his 
reserve and allowed Eugene to distribute the reinforee- 
ments as he saw fit.
In the light of difficulties developing over 
the transfer of Dalmatia to the French in 1806,**^Na- 
poleon instructed Eugene to bring his units up to war 
strength, i.e., companies of 100 men, regiments of
3,000 and divisions of 7,000. Napoleon wrote that each
81 # ̂Eugene, Memoires. II, 46-4-7, Eugene to Na­poleon, 4 January ld6&.
82J Napoleon, Correspondance. II, 522-523, Na­poleon to Berthier, 3 January 1806.
83-""The Treaty of Pressburg called for the French to take possession of Dalmatia within forty days follow­
ing Austrian ratification of the" treaty, which occurred on 1 January 1806. The French, then, should have taken possession of Dalmatia by 10 February 1806, but due to 
difficulties of transport and the season failed to do so. It was technically a breach of the treaty, and 
under this pretext the Austrian administrator of Cat taro turned Cattaro over to the Russians. Russian refusal 
to evacuate Cattaro was the reason the Italian army was put on a war footing at this time.
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cavalry regiment must have 660 horses and that a corps 
in the Italian army should number 18*000 men at full 
war strength, Eugene was to reunite the artillery 
then scattered throughout the kingdom.
In July, following the order to keep the 
Italian army on a war footing, Napoleon instructed 
Eugene to keep the 2nd corps of the Grand Army in a 
state of mobility, to see that its two divisions of 
infantry numbering some 13,000 men were fully armed, 
and to keep the cavalry and artillery in condition to 
take the field,^ ,
The French army in Italy under Marshal Massena 
constituted the 2nd corps of the Grand Army, and in his 
capacity as commander-in-chief of the Army of Italy 
Eugene served as the channel through which Napoleon 
issued orders to Massena, Such an arrangement un­
doubtedly had its disadvantages, for Eugene and Massena
66were never on the best of terms,
64 ̂Napoleon, Correspondance. XII, 182-184, Na­poleon to Eugene, 13 March 1806•
Ibid., 537-538, Napoleon to Eugene, 12 July 
1806; XIII, 204-208, Napoleon to Eugene, 18 September1806.
66 ̂  ̂One of the main themes of the commentary con­
tained in Eugene’s Memoires is the attempt on the part 
of the editor to establish the dislike of Masslna and 
Marshal Marmont for Eugene as the result of small souls
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Iii August 1806, further to secure the eastern
littoral of Italy, Eugene received orders to place
mounted troops on both sides of the Po, hussars on the
north, dragoons on the south, and directions that they
should be made to maneuver both on horse and afoot.
To encourage the troops in their work the Viceroy
should announce that Napoleon himself intended to
37visit Italy and would review them in September. Na­
poleon undoubtedly wanted this last announcement to 
reach the Russians, Austrians, and Prussians, leading 
these powers to believe that he planned no movement 
against them in the autumn of 1806. The Emperor,
later in August,; strengthened the cavalry at Ancona by
38adding another battalion of dragoons.
By mid-September the deterioration of Pranco- 
Prussian relations and the attitude of Austria, plus 
hostilities with Russia, caused Napoleon to place the 
Viceroy in command of all troops in Italy, including
on th%ir part, and ‘their damning judgment of his mili­tary abilities as the result of jealousy for the pre­ferred position he held with Napoleon.
37^'Napoleon, Correspondance. XIII, 85-86, Na­poleon to Eugene, 20 August 18b6.
38Ibid., 116-119* Napoleon to Eugene, 30 August. 180£TI
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the corps stationed in Friuli, making a force of 
36,000.59
During the autumn of 1806, Eugene was able to 
strengthen his forces with additions from the Neapoli­
tan army.^ From Dalmatia he received 12,000 troops 
which General Marmont sent to Caraiola, ̂ and from
France he received 20,000 conscripts in November and
62December. Eugene sent numerous units to the Grand 
Army, but in spite of this some 60,000 men made up the 
military force under the Viceroy*s orders at the end 
of the year 1806.^
Eugene received orders to be prepared to take 
the offensive on 1 December if the Austrians moved, 
and he had full authority to take whatever action he 
deemed necessary for the defense of the s t a t e T h i s
^9Ibid., 204-208, Napoleon to Eugene, 18 Sep­tember 1806.
^ Ibid.. 408-409, Napoleon to Eugene, 25 Oc­tober 1806; 476-478, Napoleon to Eugene, 4 November1806.
^Ibid., 476-478, Napoleon to Eugene, 4 No­vember 180£T
62Ibid., XIV, 8-9, Napoleon to Eugene, 1 December 1806.
C-ZIbid., XIII, 476-478, Napoleon to Eugene,4 November 1806.
64Ibid«» 254.
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represents one of the rare occasions when Napoleon did 
not insist upon directing the movements of his armies 
himself•
Along with the addition of units to the Italian 
army, in order to strengthen its administration, General 
Henri Charpentier replaced General Pino as chief of
staff, and General Francois Lery "became commaruler-in-
65chief of the engineers. Field command of the 2nd 
corps of the Grand Army went to General Louis Baraguey-
d'Hilliers, and General Marmont received command of the
66Dalmatian forces.
Thus was the Army of Italy built. The erection 
of the army cannot be credited solely to Beauharnais, 
for it contained elements which the Emperor had trans­
ferred from other areas to Eugene's command. The 
organization of the armed service, however, was Eugene's 
alone. He was responsible for its supply and for 
training its troops. In the areas which were ex­
clusively his, Eugene did an excellent job. Napoleon 
rarely complained of his Italian contingents, and when 
he did, it was only concerning their uniforming, which 
often was incomplete. In the Prussian campaign in
^Eugene, Memo ire s. Ill, 29-30.
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1806, the campaign against the Russians in 1806-1807,
and the peninsular campaign, Napoleon reported him-
6 7self well pleased with his Italian troops.
In addition to raising and training an army, 
Eugene had to repair the existing fortresses of Italy 
in order that nonperishahle foodstuffs and defensive 
materials could he stored at these strong points. 
Portresses utilized for this purpose were located at 
Mantua, Rocca d’Anfo, Legnago, and Peschiera. The 
Viceroy, due to the deterioration of relations with 
Austria in 1805, took rapid action to provision and 
arm the existing forts.
Eugene, in the summer, autumn, and winter of 
1805, confined work on fortifications mostly to pro­
visioning and arming the strong points and limited 
labor on defensive works to repair of existing earth­
works. He did not begin a significant program of ex­
tending defensive works until the spring of 1806.
Many details of the work done in fortifications 
are missing, for orders from Paris did not always come 
to the Viceroy. The first mention of provisioning 
forts is contained in a letter from Napoleon to Eugene 
written at Fontainebleau, 14 July 1805, in which
67Ibid., 250-251, 255-256, 268-269, Napoleon to Eugene, 6 January 1807; 14 January 1807; 14 Febru­ary 1807; IV, 248, Napoleon to Eugene, 16 December1808.
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Napoleon stated that he had ordered biscuit for pro­
visioning legnago, Verona, Peschiera, and Bocca d ’Anfo. 
Napoleon did not indicate how much biscuit he had 
ordered, but he did make it clear the provisioning 
should be done with care, for he did not wish to alarm 
Austria unduly lest she move before he was ready. In
the same letter he ordered that Eugene concentrate all
68armaments at Verona and Bocca d*Anfo by 1 August.
A letter which Eugene wrote nine days later 
indicated that the provisioning ordered by Napoleon 
must have included guns and that there had been a 
previous unrecorded order for the placement of guns in 
the forts. The Viceroy informed Napoleon that the 
Minister of War had reported a need for some 5,000,000 
francs to complete the defensive works ordered at the 
fortresses, which included both guns and earthworks.^ 
The same day Napoleon wrote that he was sending 
a decree for the provisioning of the military posts in 
Italy and added that he "imagined" the Viceroy had
68Napoleon, Correspondance. XI, 17, Napoleon to Eugene, 14 July 18d>5s Eugene.""Sfemoires. I, 196, Napoleon to Eugene, 14 July 1805.
6 ̂Eugene,. Memo! re s. I. 208-210, Eugene to Na­poleon, 23 July 18^5.
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carried out the measures he had suggested for various 
70forts*' It would he most helpful to know what Na­
poleon* s suggestions for the forts were* A letter of 
Eugene*s, partly reproduced here, gives some clues to 
the Emperor*s desires:
Sire: I have the honor of informingYour Majesty that in virtue of the 
different decrees or private orders 
I have caused the Minister of War to take all measures that they ^decrees or private orders^ may he executed 
punctually. Eocca d*Anfo will he 
armed ahout August 5* with the ten 
pieces ordered hy Your Majesty.Ahout the middle of August, the hiscuit will he entirely finished, 
and divided; in the following manner:100.000 rations at Mantua, 50,000 at Legnago, 50,000 at Verona, 50,000 at 
Peschiera, 50,000 at Eocca d*Anfo,50.000 at Pizzighettone. There are 
ahout 900,000 pounds of powder in 
the magazines and powder factories, and we will have 300,000 or 400,000 
more hy the end of the year. At 
this time there are at Mantua 164 
siege pieces of various calibres,
27 mortars, 30 howitzers, of which sixteen are field cannon; 430,000 
pounds of powder, and 1,747,205 cartridge halls*
At Peschiera, 25 pieces, 7 mortars and 2 siege howitzers, 2 field 
pieces and 3 howitzers, 92,635 pounds of powder, and 490,000 cartridge halls* At legnago, 20
70Napoleon, Correspondance. XI, 30, Napoleon to Eugene, 23 July 1865*
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pieces, 4 mortars, and 1 siege howitzer, 44,450 pounds of powder, and 200,640 cartridge halls.
' At Ferrara, 2 mortars, 6 fieldcannons, 2 field howitzers, 20,830 
pounds of powder, and 25,725 cartridge balls.71
The lack of adequate cannon at the fortresses
was met hy ordering six twenty-four pounders and sixty-
7 2two mortars cast at the arsenal at Mantua.
Eugene later reported that he had obtained all 
the hiscuit and ahout half the other provisionings 
ordered and that he had instructed the Minister of War 
to complete the provisioning of forts hy 12 September 
at the latest. Mantua had received its artillery hut 
had not placed it. In addition, warehousing did not 
exist there for perishable goods.^^ It would he neces­
sary to erect warehouses.
The Viceroy, on 4 September, reported that in 
accordance with Napoleon*s orders Mantua would receive 
beef for 7»000 men for a year, legnago and Reschiera 
would each have provisions for 2,000 men for six months, 
and Rocca d*Anfo would receive enough to support 500
"^Eugene, Memoires. I, 221-223, Eugene to Napoleon, 28 July 1865*
7 2 Ibid.. 234-236, Eugene to Napoleon, 3 August
1805 .
7 3 Ibid.. 265. Eugene to Napoleon. 31 August1805.
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men for six months. The same report carried the obser­
vation that defensive works were far behind schedule, 
especially at Eocca d'Anfo where the gun carriages for 
artillery were too high and too large, Eugene had 
sent these back to the arsenal at Mantua, The biscuit 
for Bocca d*Anfo was still in warehouses at the foot of 
the mountain. He stated that to expedite things he 
intended to visit the forts.*^
Eugene apparently left Milan immediately after 
making his report of 4 September, for he wrote the 
next day at midnight from Peschiera that he had ar­
rived there at 10s30 the night of the fifth, having 
spent half the fourth and most of the day of the fifth 
at Eocca d'Anfo, which he had found in a better state 
than he had expected from the reports on it. He re­
ported that Rocca d’Anfo would be in condition to de­
fend itself within ten days, and should have eight and
75possibly all ten of its guns in position by that time,'
76Back at Monza' on 18 September, Eugene reported
^ Ibid., 346-347* Eugene to Napoleon, 4 Sep­tember 180FT
75 Ibid., 348, Eugene to Napoleon, 5 September
1805.
76Ibid., 374-375, Eugene to Napoleon, 18 Sep­
tember 180^ Monza was the location of the palace 
which the Viceroy used as a summer residence.
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that lie had received orders for arming and provisioning
Pizzighettone and Urbain and that he would follow them
out for Pizzighettone. However, the fort at Urbain was
in such a state of disrepair that it would he impossible 
77to use it. In answer to this report, Napoleon ordered
Eugene to destroy completely the works at TJrbain to
78prevent an enemy using them if invasion occurred.'
Eugene reported that by the end of September he would
have a reserve of a dozen pibces of horse-drawn ar-
7Qtillery and six or eight mountain pieces.'*
The summer activity had been expensive for the 
state. Eugene reported to the Emperor that defensive 
needs had forced him to give the engineers an extra­
ordinary sum of 100,000 livres for the months of August 
and September, and that by 10 October he would provide
that division with an additional 450,000 francs for
80defensive works.
77Ibid.
78Ibid., 377* Napoleon to Eugene, 25 September
1805«.
7QIbid., 390-391* Eugene to Napoleon, 26 Sep­tember 180!TI The mountain pieces were to be three 
pounders *
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In early autumn 1805 Eugene confined his ac­
tivities in provisioning and arming the forts largely 
to the areas near the eastern and southern borders of 
Italy; but when danger passed with the negotiation of 
the Treaty of Pressburg, he turned his attention to 
the interior forts and those along the northern border 
of the kingdom.
Eugene went to Munich in January 1806 to be 
marridd. While there he apparently received orders 
from Napoleon personally for the provisioning of Pal- 
manova and its armament, for he wrote in the second 
week of February that he was taking the measures Na­
poleon had ordered for the provisioning of that fort. 
The foodstuffs, he reported, would come from his siege 
supplies, mostly from Pizzighettone, to be transported 
to Palmanova by water. In addition to provisioning
Palmanova, he had begun there preparation of sites for
81storehouses and hospitals.
Fifteen days later he reported he was due to 
receive engineering plans for the defense of Palmanova 
and promised to send the plans on to Napoleon when
_ __Napoleon, Correspondance. XI, 529, Napoleonto Eugene, 3 January 18()6; feugene, Memoires. II, 67-
69, Eugene to Napoleon, 10 February 1806. 'Eugene, inJanuary 1806, was married to Princess Augusta Amelia,
daughter of King Maximilian I of Bavaria.
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they arrived* Chief of Engineers General Frangois 
Chasseloup planned Ba system of fortifying three points, 
running water through the ^draihage^ ditches of the 
town into a small nearby stream.® There was much ac­
tivity in the preparation of barracks; he had barracks 
for 2,000 and hoped to add enough to house 3,000 men* 
Workers were constructing a 400-bed hospital and pre­
paring stables for 600 horses. In a short time they
82would erect storehouses.
Following Hapoleon*s orders, Eugene had ar­
ranged for the transfer of Austrian guns at Venice to 
Italy, and reported that the number of cannon at
Qp Eugene, Memoires. II, 94-96, Eugene to Ha­poleon, 25 February 1806.
®^Ibid., 172-173, Eugene to Hapoleon, 18 March
1806. Though Austria ceded Venice to France by the 
Treaty of Pressburg and Hapoleon gave administration of the area to Eugene in December 1805, Venetia did 
not legally become a part of the Kingdom of Italy until 1 May 1806. Early in February 1806 Hapoleon told Eugene that all the guns captured at Venice during the 
campaign had not been transferred to France by the 
terms of the treaty. However, a number of guns 
captured at Vienna had been transferred to France by the terms of the Treaty of Pressburg. Hapoleon ordered 
Eugene to arrange with the Austrian government to ex­change non-transferred guns at Venice for those trans­ferred and still remaining in Vienna. Such an arrangement would prevent the expense and trouble of 
transportation of guns from Vienna. Though the guns would legally belong to France, they were to be trans­
ferred to the Italian army and were to be considered 
as Italian artillery.
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Venice amounted to some 400. Of this number, he in­
tended to provide ammunition for 180 and send them to 
84-Palmanova.
Early in May the Viceroy reported that the 
Austrian guns were of different calibres than Italian 
guns and though he had some usable ammunition on hand, 
it was not sufficient for the defense of Palmanova.
He had placed an order for additional ammunition at 
Ponte-Vico but could not complete provisioning Pal-
«emanova until later in the summer. J
Napoleon, in August 1806, ordered an increase 
in Palmanova*s defensive power by the addition of new 
counterscarps and lunettes, which he ordered finished 
by the end of 1806. He also ordered Eugene to repair 
barracks and to construct shellproof powder magazines 
there.®^
The erection of a palisade was accomplished at
o7Palmanova by November, and in December Eugene reported
M ibia.
85Ibid., 370, Eugene to Napoleon, 5 May 1806.
86Napoleon, Correspondance. XIII, 53, Na­poleon to Dejean, 7 August 1806•
87Eugene, Mfemoires. Ill, 207-208, Eugene toNapoleon, 15 November 1806>.
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the nine lunettes almost completed and the connecting 
chemin couvert finished. The construction of the lu­
nettes was such that six soldiers could defend each 
one, and each defender could view three lunettes at a 
glance. In addition to the earthworks, Palmanova was 
well armed, artillery was plentiful, and the calibres 
of the guns were regular. Eugene did not make mention 
of gun sizes. Troop housing was shortj and barrack and 
hospital facilities existed for only one-third of the 
garrison* If the storehouses remained as they were in 
December, Eugene reported, an active enemy probably could
38burn them. Eugene eventually solved the problem of 
powder magazines by acting on a suggestion made by Na­
poleon that the caves at Palmanova would make good 
shellproof shelters.®^
Napoleon, in 1808, ordered Eugene to repair the 
counterscarps of two lunettes at Palmanova and to spend 
the money earmarked for a third lunette to erect
Ibid., 228-230, Eugene to Napoleon, 19 De­
cember 18057 The lunette was simply a curved trench with earthworks thrown up before it. The chemin 
convert was a connecting trench protected by a series 
of earthen elevations in front.
®^Ibid*. 212. Nanoleon to Eugene. 29 No­vember 18057"-
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masonry redoubts at the end of the chemin couvert con-
qonecting the lunettes.
To defend the northern border better, Hapoleon 
ordered the construction of a masonry escarpment and 
a series of counterscarps on the hills at Peschiera. 
Such a system would make Peschiera too strong to at­
tack from the north and east and would force an attack­
ing body of troops to attempt the south, where further 
construction (not specified) would bring them under a 
cross fire. Hapoleon developed this plan in Paris,
for he did not like the defenses planned by General 
qiChasseloup.
Eugene discovered that not only Prenchmen were
capable of peculation, for he informed the Minister of
War that the company of Radailli and Campionni of
Brescia had supplied guns and cannon balls which did
not meet the specifications stated in their contract
q pas furnishers, and that this abuse must stop.
Other abuses in the services appeared from time
qoHapoleon, Correspondance. XVII, 157-158, Ha­poleon to Eugene, 18 May 1868.
^1Ibid., XII. 307-308, Hapoleon to Eugene,
25 April 18357
02Beauhamais Archive, Eugene to the Ministerof War of the kingdom, 14 October 1805•
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to time* Napoleon, in May 1806, wrote that he had 
learned the "biscuit was bad at Palmanova and it ap­
peared the war commissar and the supplier were partners 
in conniving to bilk the government, Napoleon ordered 
the replacement of the war commissar and an investi­
gation of his activities. The Emperor complained that 
construction of defensive works at this fort had not 
begun and rather brusquely asked Eugene if he wanted
Q 'S tto lose the state as a result of negligence.
It is possible that the Emperor's critical
attitude toward Eugene stemmed from the efforts of the
other Bonapartes to undermine Napoleon's confidence in
his stepson. The Emperor's family had opposed his
marriage to Josephine. Eugene was the first of the
Imperial Family to be given the rule of a state. This
evidence of the Emperor's favor rankled Napoleon's
94-brothers and sisters.
Though hampered by expense and corruption in
93Napoleon, Correspondance, XII, 352, Napoleon to Eugene, 6 May 180'5’I
^^Eugene, Memoires. I, 314; Adolphe Thiers,The History of the Consulate and the Empire of France. trans, by 3). Forbes Campbell and John Spebbing (.12 
vols.; Philadelphia: J, B. Lippincott & Co., 1893-
1894), IV, 167. (Hereafter cited as Thiers, Consulate and Empire (12 vols,)),
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the work of fortifying Italy, Eugene persevered and 
told Napoleon that Osoppo, a fort in the Venetian 
territory, would he able to defend itself hy September 
1806, and that work on other areas in Venetia was pro- 
gressing satisfactorily. The defensive works at 
Palmanova were not yet complete due to scope and ex­
pense, hut from the standpoint of strong defensive 
points ringing the realm, Italy had far greater se­
curity against land attack at the end of 1806 than she 
had prior to becoming a kingdom.
Although Eugene had reported that Osoppo would 
he able to defend itself hy September 1806, Napoleon
ordered Jean Dejean to send him the defense plans drawn
96by the engineers. Apparently the plans for Osoppo’s
defense did not satisfy the Emperor, for in January he
wrote Eugene that at Osoppo he wanted a fortification
which could be held by five or six hundred men but
which could accommodate from five to six thousand
97troops if necessary. A few months later the Emperor
95 <^Eugene, Memoires, III, 159-160, Eugene to Napoleon, 21 September 1^06.
96Napoleon, Correspondance. XIII, 76.
97 Ibid., XIV, 216-218, Napoleon to Eugene,20 January 1807•
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wrote that reinforced redoubts and a bridge over the 
Tagliamento at Osoppo would be the best type of de­
fense, for it could be held with a minimum number of 
men. The next year the Emperor ordered that Eugene 
place guns on the mountain above Osoppo and construct
QQa system of trenches and a moat before the fort® ^
In 1809 Napoleon ordered the establishment of 
a defensive line along the Adige, with the main de­
fensive points at legnago and YerOna, and a bridgehead 
at Eonco and Alberedo. The waters of the Adige and 
the Brenta rivers should be turned into the marshy 
area separating Venice and the Adige so that an enemy 
could not capture Venice until he had crossed the Adige. 
Such a line would give the Viceroy a strong defense for 
central Italy, with Palmanova, Verona, and Mantua to 
fall back upon if necessary. The forts would force the 
enemy to leave large contingents of troops before them, 
and by the time the Italian army had retreated beyond 
the Adige, leaving only skeleton forces to defend the
QgIbid., XV, 146-148, Napoleon to General Lery, 24 April 1807.
•^Ibid.. XVIII, 29-31, Napoleon to Eugene,29 October 1868.
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forts, the invader would be so weakened that he could 
he defeated piecemeal.^®
While preparing the land defenses of the king­
dom, Eugene did not neglect the water approaches to
Italy. Late in July 1805 he reported to Napoleon that
101he had taken steps to put a flotilla on Lake Garda. 
Though he did not mention that he experienced diffi­
culty in manning the boats there, supplying crews must 
have presented a rather difficult problem, for late in 
August Napoleon wrote that Eugene should use the troops
stationed at Rimini to arm the flotilla since they were 
102doing nothing. With the development of events that 
led to war in the autumn of 1805, Eugene sent a con­
tingent of 100 sailors to Lake Garda to man the little 
fleet; presumably he withdrew the soldiers.
In September Eugene reported that arming of
^ ^ Ibid.. XVIII, 213-218, Napoleon to Eugene, 14 January 186$.
^■^Bugene, Memoires. I, 225-227, Eugene to Napoleon, 30 July 1865.
102Napoleon. Correspondence. XI, 148, Na­poleon to Eugene, 27 August 1865.
103Ibid., 188, Napoleon to Eugene, 11 Sep­tember 1805.
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boats on lakes Majeur, Lugano, and Como would begin 
that same month, and that lake Idro already bad two 
boats armed with one gun each* The flotilla on lake 
Garda by this date consisted of five boats, one with 
four cannon, and the Viceroy reported that within 
fifteen days he would add two more craft to his north­
west water defenses* On the Po River at Mantua he 
planned to have six gun boats, four of which he in­
tended to arm with one twelve—pounder and two three- 
pounders, and the other two either with a field gun
104 .or a howitzer, the size of which he did not indicate*
Eugene intended to utilize the northwest flo­
tillas to aid in preventing the escape of army deserters 
and to prevent the passage of contraband, while the 
flotilla at Mantua apparently was to patrol the Po 
River*
By October the boats on the lakes were under 
the command of a naval lieutenant and a few ensigns 
from Toulon* Eugene believed the lieutenant and 
ensigns would perform the duties required of them on 
the lakes even though they were Italians and, the 
Viceroy believed, unfit to sail at sea* He told
10^Eugene, Memoires* I, 385-388, Eugene to
Napoleon, 22 September 1605*
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Napoleon that the Italians expressed gratitude at
105being allowed to serve in this capacity. By the 
end of 1805 the Viceroy had secured his inland water 
frontiers.
In all matters pertaining to state security 
Napoleon clearly determined action and policy. With 
the exception of the action taken in the erection of 
the national guard in the autumn and winter of 1805, 
Eugene took no truly independent action. It is true 
that he suggested the formation of a few new units for 
the army, and he appears to have taken the initiative 
in the formation of flotillas along the inland water 
frontiers. In most instances, however, he seems to 
have been only the instrument through which Napoleon 
labored, Eugene faithfully followed the directives 
issued and provided a strong buffer between Napoleon 
and Austria— *not strong enough to challenge Austria, 
to be sure, but strong enough that Austria could not 
move a cannon without considering the possibility of 
either an invasion through the Tyrol or a crossing of 
the Isonzo,
Ibid., 416-417, Eugene to Napoleon. 11 October 18051 Beauhamais Archive, Eugene to the Minister of War of the kingdom, 22 September 1805.
CHAPTER YII
EXPANSION OP THE KINGDOM OP ITALY
When Napoleon became King of Italy the new 
kingdom's eastern boundary was the Adige River. To 
the east lay Tenetia, which Austria had retained 
following the campaign of 1800. But following 
Austria’s defeat in 1805 at Austerlitz, Venetia and 
the so-called Venetian countries were ceded to Italy, 
though they were not made a part of the kingdom at 
that time•
During the campaign of 1805 Marshal Massena 
gave the Venetian territories a provisional military 
organization and administered the conquered territories 
while serving as commander of the military forces 
stationed there. Subordinate generals served as gover­
nors of the Venetian provinces.
With the signing of the Treaty of Pressburg, 
Napoleon gave administration of Venetia and the Ve­
netian countries to Eugene.1 The Viceroy ordered the
Napoleon, Correspondence. XI, 466, Napoleon 
to Eugene, 9 December 1805; see also, Moniteur. 9 January 1806.
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provisional governors to retain Massena*s governmental
organization until a thorough study of Austrian ad-
2mini strative policies had been made.
Both Italians and Venetians complained to Eugene 
about the rapacity of French units under Mass&na*s com­
mand. The Viceroy, making an effort to halt the loot­
ing, ordered the commanders of the military units in 
Italy and Venetia to give a strict accounting of the 
funds in the treasuries in their areas and of what had 
been paid in extraordinary levies since the occupation 
of the territories by the French army. He further 
ordered that no future payments should be made or col­
lections attempted without an order signed by him or
3the army bursar whom he would appoint.
Ten days later Beauhamais ordered the Italian 
Minister of War to have an accounting made of the ma­
terials of war left in the magazines of Venetia. The 
inventory was to indicate clearly what goods were of 
Austrian manufacture and what had been taken into Italy 
by the French. Ho material should be allowed to leave
2Eugene, Memoires. II, 149-155* Eugene to Na­poleon, 11 March 1806; Napoleon, Correspondence. II, 
529-530, Napoleon to Berthier, 7 January 1&06.
3Beauharnais Archive, Eugene to GeneralsKolbert, Chailan, Duhesme, Testi, and Magny, 18 De­cember 1805*
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the magazines -without an order signed by the Viceroy, 
the chief of staff, or the bursar/ Eugene further or­
dered a report to he made every Saturday on what requi­
sitions had been made, how much had been delivered 
during the preceding week, and whether the deliveries 
had been paid for.
In addition, probably to avoid any possibility 
of a clash between the French and the withdrawing Aus­
trian forces and to prevent the possibility of war sup­
plies falling into Venetian hands, Eugene ordered that 
convoys intended for points beyond Udine and Palmanova 
should halt and await further orders before proceeding 
to their destinations
Eugene had reason to take precautions against 
arms falling into Venetian hands. Venetians were not 
particularly happy with French domination. Eugene re­
ported that considerable opposition existed; he hastened 
to add that the opposition was not so great as the sup­
port Napoleon might expect to gain in the future.
^Beauharnais Archive, Eugene to the Minister of War of the kingdom, 28 December 1805*
^Moniteur, 9 January 1806.
^Beauharaais Archive, Eugene to the Minister ofWar of the kingdom, 28 December 1805•
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The Viceroy mentioned in the same letter that 
Massena had stripped the country of ready cash, and 
that only valueless paper money remained* It would he 
some time before the territory would show a profit, and 
he requested subsidies from the French treasury in 
order that the Kingdom of Italy might not be impover­
ished by the new acquisition* The Yieeroy complained 
that if he had to use his state treasury for Venetian 
purposes, it would be impossible for him to pay for the 
requisitions collected by Massena in Italy
On 31 December 1805 Eugene received a letter 
from Alexandre Berthier, chief of staff and Minister 
of War of the French Empire, stating that Napoleon 
wanted all contributions collected by Massena in the 
Venetian countries to be deposited in the bank of the 
Messrs* La Bouillerie* To this Eugene replied that he 
could do nothing about the contributions already made, 
for the monies collected had been spent or carried off 
by Massena* In response to a request from Berthier to 
report the amount of contributions remaining to be col­
lected, the Viceroy wrote that he had as yet no idea 
of the amount due but would report it as soon as he 
knew* He requested Berthier*s aid in obtaining funds
'Eugene, Memoires, II, 32-36, Eugene to Na­poleon, 29 December 1805-
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from the imperial treasury to provide for the needs
gof his army in Venetia* Eugene hoped that Berthier 
would have greater influence with the Emperor than any 
other in matters concerning the welfare of the army*
On the same day Eugene reported that the Minis­
ter of Finance was working on the financial organi­
zation and promised Napoleon that he would send him 
the organizational plans (plans for departmental di­
vision) of Venetia the next day. Eugene requested a 
report on the income from Venetian tariffs and customs* 
From this report he intended to have drawn a detailed 
graph which would show at a glance the trade "balance
Qof Venice.
The continued reiteration on the part of Eugene 
that there had "been misuse of the funds collected in 
Italy and Venetia by the armies under Massena*s command 
caused Napoleon to order General Jean-Baptiste Solignac, 
one of Massena*s aides, to Paris to give a detailed ac­
counting of Venetian finances* The results of the in­
vestigation were the destitution of Solignac for his
8Ibid., 38-39» Eugene to Berthier, 31 December
1805*
QIbid* * 40, Eugene to Napoleon, 31 December1805.
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part in the maladministration and an order to Massena 
to return some 3,000,000 francs he had misappropri­
ated.10
Venetian finances, however, continued to 
plague the Viceroy. As a result Eugene received a di­
rective from Napoleon that a receiver-general of fi­
nances should he appointed for the area and that the 
Venetian treasury and the treasury of Italy should 
never he joined.11 Three weeks later Count Jacques
Dauchy, former administrator of Tuscany, became the
1?Administrator-General of Venetian finances.
In the meantime, to provide for governmental 
needs, Beauharnais negotiated a loan of some two 
million francs from Venetian hankers. He thought this 
sum would see him through February, when tax col­
lections should become great enough to allow the govera-
13ment to operate from its own revenues. Without
Napoleon, Correspondence. XI, 529-530, Na­
poleon to Berthier, 7 January 1866; Eugene, Mlmoires,
II, 125, 149-155, Eugene to Napoleon, 11 March 1806.
i:iNapoleon, Correspondan.ee« XI, 544-555, Na­poleon to Eugene, 19 January 1806.
12Moniteur. 22 February 1806.
1*5 #Eugene, Memoires, II, 53-54, Eugene to Na­poleon, 28 January 1806.
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■benefit of advice from a director-general of finances, 
Eugene ordered a reorganization of banking in Venice, 
and the work went forward with, considerable zeal.1^
Although Venetian commerce increased after the 
end of the war, Eugene noted that the Venetians them­
selves did not really expect much in the way of trade
H5until a general peace had been made. v Whatever hopes 
the Venetians had for a return of trading prosperity 
diminished as a result of a decree, dated 6 February 
1806, forbidding all English goods within the new 
territory. Eugene, in Venice at this time, ordered 
that the decree not be published until he had taken 
his leave.
From the beginning of his administration of 
the Venetian countries Eugene had been pressed by Na­
poleon for an estimate of the revenues that could be 
expected. On 8 February he reported an initial esti­
mate that Venice would have a revenue of some twenty- 
three million Milanese francs, which he thought would
•^Moniteur. 20 February 1806.
1 5 IJbid.
^ Ibid.. 27 February 1806; Eugene, Memoires.II, 62, Eugene to Napoleon, 6 February 1806.
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not quite meet the expenses of the state and the "burden
17of the French army stationed there,
late in March 1806, Napoleon issued a decree 
which provided for the annexation of Venetia to the 
Kingdom of Italy on 1 May 1806. The fundamental law of 
the land should he the Code Napoleon, and the relation­
ship of the church to the state should he the same as 
in Italy under the concordat. The decree provided also 
for the establishment of the duchies of Dalmatia, 
Istria, Friuli, Cadore, Belluno, Conegliano, Trevino, 
Feltre, Bassano, Vicenza, Padua, and Rovigo. The 
duchies were to he sinecures, and one-fifteenth of the 
revenue of the provinces collected hy the Italian 
government should he paid to the holders of the fiefs. 
In addition, some thirty millions of the revenue from 
the national domain in the provinces should he ear­
marked for them. Also, 1,200,000 francs were ordered 
set aside for bonuses to generals, officers, and 
soldiers. Until Italy had an army, a French army would 
remain in Venetia, supported hy the Italian treasury; 
the Venetians would pay 2,500,000 francs monthly to 
the imperial treasury for a period of six years. This
IV'Eugene, Memoires. II, 64-65, Eugene to Na­poleon, 8 February 1806.
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sum represented the Venetian contribution to the up—
TOkeep of the imperial army.
Eugene announced the coming union of Venetia 
with Italy by a proclamation issued at Milan 25 April
iq1806.  ̂ Annexation did not mean for the Venetians that
they were the equals of either the Italians or the
French in the eyes of Napoleon, for Napoleon had
written Eugene that he would not recognize the national
debt as the Venetians requested. He would recognize
and pay only the items recognized and paid by their
20former oppressor, the Austrian Emperor. In addition, 
he told his stepson that he would not reimburse the 
initial 2,000,000 franc contribution that Venice had 
paid, for the Venetians were a conquered people and 
should expect to be treated as such. The only con­
sideration they would receive from him would be that
he would be a good sovereign as long as they were good
21subjects.
18Moniteur. 1 April 1806.
^9Ibid., 5 May 1806.
20Napoleon, Correspondance. XII, 296, Napoleon to Eugene, 21 April 16(56.
21Ibid., 296-297* Napoleon to Eugene, 16 April1806.
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Though formal expansion of the Kingdom of Italy
southward did not occur until 1808, the preliminaries
to expansion at the expense of the Papal States began
in December 1805 with the dispatch of troops under the
command of General Gouvion St.-Cyr to the borders of
22the Kingdom of Naples. A part of St.-Cyr*s command 
occupied the port city of Ancona on the east coast of 
the Papal States.
Napoleon, in May 1806, informed the Yieeroy 
that General Jean Lemarois had been ordered to take 
command of the port of Ancona and the eastern coast of 
the Papal States from Rimini to the frontier of Naples. 
Napoleon intended lemarois to close the coast to the
English and to stop English communications with the
25Russians at Corfu.
The military occupation of the Papal territory 
remained the same for the next several months, and not 
until July of 1807 did Eugene receive orders for 
further military operations in the Papal territories. 
Napoleon, on 29 July, told the Yieeroy to reinforce
22Ibid., XI, 474, Napoleon to Cardinal Fesch, 13 December 1805.
25 Ibid., XII, 357$ Napoleon to Eugene, 6 May1806; 427, Napoleon to General lemarois, 1 June 1806.
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the forces at Ancona "by some 2,800 troops, ostensibly 
for the purpose of more effectively preventing the 
entry of British goods into the area.2^ On 4 August 
Hapoleon instructed Eugene to gather troops at Bologna
and told him that if the Pope acted impudently, the
2 5Papal States would he seized. J
The next day Napoleon sent Eugene instructions 
to feel out the populace of the duchy of Urhino and 
the marches of Ancona and Permo on the possibility of 
Prench annexation of the areas. Napoleon felt, he 
wrote the Viceroy, that these three areas should be 
annexed to the Kingdom of Italy in order that Italy 
and Naples might have contiguous boundaries. He asked 
Eugene for a report on the revenues of the three areas, 
the wealth of the population, and whether or not they
p gcould pay a greater contribution than Romagna.
On 16 August Napoleon wrote Eugene to send
2 4 Ibid., XV, 450, Napoleon to Eugene, 29 July.
1807.
25•'ibid.. 475, Napoleon to Eugene, 4 August
1807.
26Ibid., 478, Napoleon to Eugene, 5 August1807. Romagna, northernmost of the Papal States, had been incorporated into the Italian Republic in 1800, and was part of the Kingdom of Italy from the time of 
its foundation. There is no answer to this letter re­produced in Eugene’s Memo ires or in the Beauhamais Archive• S4
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troops stationed at Bimini to Pesara, Fano, and Ancona
to confiscate all English goods to he found in those 
27places,
Napoleon, in October, ordered Eugene to send 
General Lemarois to take possession and command of the 
duchy of Urbino, the march of Ancona, and the provinces 
of Macerata and Permo. Lemarois should take command 
of all Papal troops and establish his headquarters at 
Ancona. To prevent local governmental opposition to 
the action, Napoleon ordered the establishment of a
28provisional government under the control of Lemarois.
Papal opposition to Napoleonts high-handed 
tactics and the French occupation resulted in a letter 
from Napoleon to Beauharnais in "which the Emperor wrote 
that Rome must accommodate itself to the facts; there 
could be no question about who should govern the areas 
seized by the French. If the Papal court did not make 
the required adjustment, all Roman provinces would be 
seized.
27Ibid., 502, Napoleon to Eugene, 16 August
1807.
no ___Ibid.. XVI, 64, Napoleon to Eugene, 3 Oc­tober 1807.
29Ibid., Ill, Napoleon to Eugene, 23 October1807.
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Due to chronic slowness in payment of as­
sessments for the construction of defensive works at
Ancona, the Viceroy sequestered all hank funds in the
30area controlled hy General Lemarois. Napoleon, when 
he learned of this unauthorized action on the part of 
the Viceroy, ordered that Lemarois should use the se­
questered funds to pay his men and to pay for defensive
31works at Ancona.
The sequestered funds of the hanks of the
province of Ancona did not produce enough revenue for
Lemarois* needs, and with the Viceroy's approval
Lemarois increased taxes hy two-thirds. Eugene asked
for Napoleon's approval of this action and requested
the appointment of a director-general for Ancona if
32the Boperor did not approve the increase in taxes.
Other than the facts that a director-general for Ancona 
was not provided and that Eugene did continue adminis­
trative control, there is no indication that Napoleon 
either approved or disapproved of the Viceroy's action 
in this instance.
*50Eugene, Memoires. IV, 65-66, Eugene to Na­poleon, 10 February 1868.
31Ibid.. 69. Napoleon to Eugene, 17 February1808.
^2Ibid.. V, 79-80, Eugene to Napoleon, 25February 1808•
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Early in 1808 the Viceroy wrote Lemarois to 
abolish all local treasuries and to centralize his 
revenues at Ancona. Lemarois was to send Eugene a 
treasury report weekly and report monthly, one month 
in advance, on items the government of Ancona would 
need and what the cost would be; he would receive
50,000 francs monthly for the purpose of deepening and 
widening the port of Ancona, and this work should be 
started immediately.-^
Napoleon, in early spring 1808, determined to 
annex Ancona and ordered Eugene to draw up a plan for 
the organization of the Papal Legations into prefec­
tures and sub-prefectures and to arrange for the ap­
pointment of justices of the peace. The Viceroy 
received a directive to make his choices for prefects 
in the proposed organization. He should make plans 
so that when he received the order for the annexation, 
everything could be accomplished smoothly and within
*54.forty-eight hours.
Napoleon, on 25 March 1808, wrote Eugene that 
as soon as Lent was past, he intended to annex the
77Beauhamais Archive, Eugene to General Lemarois, 22 February 1808.
34.Napoleon, Correspondence. XVI, 4-27-428, Na­poleon to Eugene, 20 March 1808.
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four legations to the kingdom• The King ordered that
2,000 Italian infantry, a regiment of Italian cavalry, 
and the French troops at Ancona he used for the seizure 
of the areas* He again asked for Eugene’s nominations 
for governors of provinces, prefects, and other adminis­
trative officials* The nominations were to he pre­
sented in the form of decrees needing only Napoleon’s 
signature to he effective. The coming annexation
should he advertised in order that it not take the
55populace hy surprise» v
The decree of annexation was to have heen issued 
on 20 April 1808, hut on 2 April Napoleon wrote Eugene 
to delay publication until 30 April* The Emperor ex­
plained that he had issued to Pius VII an ultimatum 
demanding that His Holiness join the Kingdom of Italy 
and the Kingdom of Naples in an offensive and defensive 
league to provide adequate defense for the Italian pen­
insula* The King, to give the Pope time to decide be­
tween acceptance or rejection of the ultimatum, ordered 
Eugene to delay publication of the decree. In addition, 
Napoleon thought the extra ten days would give Eugene 
time to perfect his plans for the annexation* In the 
event that the Pope accepted the ultimatum, Eugene
•^Ibid.* 433. Napoleon to Eugene, 23 March1808.
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would be informed by the charge d1affaires in time to
•ZCstop the process of annexation. On 3 May Napoleon
wrote the Viceroy to hold his publication of the decree
37of annexation of Ancona for an additional ten days, 
Following the annexation of Ancona on 13 May 
Napoleon ordered that the concordat be published and
the laws governing the church in Italy be enforced in
*58the new departments,
Ancona bade fair to be a lucrative addition to 
the kingdom, and Napoleon expressed his pleasure at 
learning that the departments of Ancona would return 
some 8,000,000 francs yearly to his war chest,"^
Apparently Eugene feared that Ancona might be 
attacked by sea, for Napoleon wrote that he did not 
fear such an attack. The King felt, however, that 
Ancona should be guarded by three or four strong de­
tachments in the event of attack or rebellion. He
•ZCEugene, Memoires. V, 103, Napoleon to Eugene,2 April 1808; Napoleon, Correspondence, XVI, 469, Na­poleon to Eugene, 2 April 1808,
37Napoleon, Correspondence. XVII, 57, Napoleon to Eugene, 3 May 18057
70Ibid., 140, Napoleon to Eugene, 16 May 1808.
^Ibid., 151-153, Napoleon to Eugene, 17 May1808.
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ordered a map of the city and port of Ancona which
would include the territory surrounding the city for 
4.02,000 yards. Some 300,000 francs should he spent 
there on fortifications and the harbor should he 
dredged and enlarged in order that it might handle not 
only a larger volume of shipping hut also men-o*— 
war.^
The area newly annexed to the Kingdom of Italy 
became three new departments: Metauro, with its capi­
tal at Ancona; Musone, with its capital heing Macerata;. 
and Toronto, with the capital at Permo. The population 
of the area totaled 700,000, giving the kingdom a popu­
lation of approximately 6,600,000.
Eugene lost no time in organizing the new de­
partments. He appointed General Lemarois governor, and 
two councillors-of-state. The governor and the council­
lors were charged with the promulgation and the imple­
mentation of the laws of the realm concerning domains, 
ecclesiastical corporations, the constitutional
4-0Ibid., 14-0, Napoleon to Eugene, 16 May 1808. 
^ Ibid.. 151-153, Napoleon to Eugene, 17 May1808.
4-2 .Eugene, Memoires. IV, 5*
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statutes, and the concordat. In addition, Eugene es­
tablished a tribunal of appeal for the three new de-
43partments at Ancona.
On 22 May the Viceroy reported to the Emperor 
that he had taken all necessary steps so that the laws 
of the kingdom, the concordat, decrees, etc., would be 
put into force in the departments. Eugene had ordered 
the Minister of the Interior to make reports monthly on 
the progress of public works. The Viceroy had repri­
manded the Minister of War for his unsatisfactory re­
ports and had given him detailed instructions on the 
form the reports should have. And he had ordered the 
bishops of the departments to present themselves at
Milan during the month of June to take the oath to the
 ̂ 44Emperor required under the terms of the concordat.
In July 1808 Eugene visited the new depart­
ments and reported himself well satisfied with what he 
found there. The people expressed some dissatisfaction 
with the idea of a direct impost which most of them 
felt was heavier than the previous indirect taxes under 
which they had labored. In a proclamation, Eugene 
pointed out that the single direct tax did not consti­
tute so heavy a burden as the multiple Indirect
43Ibid., 5-6.
44Ibid., 145-146. Eugene to Napoleon. 22 May1808.
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taxation to which they had been subject. In this 
instance he failed to point out that the populace 
would also be subject to the requisition system for 
the support of armies.
Included in the proclamation was the assertion
that only by means of the conscription to which they
also objected could the people find the answer to
4-5their nationalistic aspirations. ^
In this fashion the Kingdom of Italy, under 
the direction of the Viceroy, enjoyed expansion south­
ward. The area under Eugene’s administration increased 
significantly. More important, new areas for Napole­
onic exploitation were added to swell the flow of money 
and goods into the imperial treasury. Though mutter- 
ings of discontent gave evidence of possible overt 
opposition, Eugene, by the use of tact tempered with 
firmness, avoided serious, open rupture.
^ Ibid.. 152-159; Mon.iteur. 16 August 1808
CHAPTER YIII
THE ITALIAN NAVY
The defeat of the French fleet at Trafalgar in 
October 1805 made necessary a Herculean attempt to re­
place the lost ships, and all parts of the Empire con­
tributed to the effort. In February 1806 Eugene wrote 
Napoleon that he had started construction of a brig and 
a frigate at the shipyards in Venice for two reasons. 
The first, he said, was that he thought this was what
Napoleon wanted, and the second was to give employment
1to the mass of unemployed shipwrights there.
Later that month Napoleon replied that while 
he approved of Eugene*s actions, the latter had acted 
too hastily. In his eagerness to serve the Emperor 
well Eugene had ordered the construction of the two 
ships begun even though plans for the ships were not 
on hand. Such action, Napoleon felt, could only be
pwasteful both of labor and money. The same day, but.
"̂Eugene, Memoires. II, 60-62, Eugene to Na­poleon, 6 February 1&06. v
2Napoleon, C orr espondance. HI, 99-100, Na­
poleon to Eugene, 25 February 1806.
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in a different, letter, Napoleon told his stepson to 
maintain the Venetian navy in the same condition and
size it formerly had unless Napoleon first ordered a
3change or approved proposals for its enlargement®
Not until 3 March 1806 did Napoleon give in­
structions for the type or number of ships Eugene 
should fit out at Venice. The King wrote the Viceroy 
to fit out two frigates, the Adria and the Aquila. plus 
two brigs, the Pollex and the Orion, which Eugene 
should send to sweep the English corvettes and brigs 
from the Dalmatian coast® As an added observation, Na­
poleon wrote that he felt the addition of the Austria, 
rechristened the Austerlitz by Eugene, would strengthen 
the Viceroy's naval power to the point that the British 
would not be able to blockade successfully any point 
along the coast without considerably strengthening 
their forces in the Adriatic®^
In the same letter Napoleon demanded that the 
Viceroy keep him informed on English naval activity in 
the Adriatic, and late in the month of March Eugene
3Ibid®, 104® Napoleon to Eugene, 26 February 1806. There is no indication of the size or condition 
of the Venetian navy in Napoleon's letter or the other sources used for this work®
^Ibid., 128-129* Napoleon to Eugene, 3 March1806.
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wrote that two British frigates, one Russian frigate, 
and two brigs of unspecified nationality had been 
sighted on 15 March, and that since 20 March ships on 
mission had nearly all returned to the anchorage at 
Venice. Since that date, only small boats had put out, 
and had reported no enemy naval activity. In spite of 
this, Eugene ordered that all ships sent out in convoy 
avoid the enemy if possible.
Though there is no evidence in Eugene*s Memoirss 
or in his correspondence with his cabinet and Prench 
officers contained in the Beauharnais Archive to in­
dicate that the Viceroy sent the fleet on any particu­
lar mission in early spring 1806, he must have done so, 
for on 20 April 1806 Napoleon wrote Eugene criticizing 
him for sending the fleet into the Adriatic. Napoleon 
told the Viceroy that unless he had numerical and naval 
fire cannon superiority, the fleet at Venice should not 
fight the British. Only against the Russians, from 
whom Napoleon apparently feared little, if any, damage, 
would such activity be allowed. The Bnperor told the 
Viceroy that Venice could be too easily blockaded if
5 *Eugene, Memoires, II, 198, Eugene to Napoleon,28 March 1806.
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£the French navy in the Adriatic suffered defeat. It 
would seem that if the fleet could not leave Venice 
for fear of heing defeated, and that such a defeat 
would bring on a blockade, the port already was ef­
fectively blockaded.
Napoleon*s rather contemptous evaluation of 
the Russians as sailors seems justified by a report 
made by Eugene on 10 May 1806 in which he told Napoleon 
that the Italian Royal Navy gunboat the Commacchiere 
had encountered and fought a Russian corvette and had 
won the day. The Russian Ohip was not sunk and the 
Venetian naval commander asked for permission to send 
sloops and gunboats after it. Eugene refused this re­
quest, he told Napoleon, and added that the encounter 
would be written up in the Milan paper to show the 
Italians how well one of their ships had done.^ In 
response, Napoleon extended his congratulations to the 
Italians, but again warned Eugene not to let his 
frigates venture beyond the entrance of the port of 
Venice unless against decidedly inferior forces. In 
order that the Viceroy might not misunderstand his
^Napoleon, Correspondence. XII, 295* Napoleon to Eugene, 20 April 180e>.
nEugene, Memoires, II, 385-386, Eugene to Na­poleon, 10 May 180 (■> •
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instructions, Napoleon explicitly stated that if a 
single corvette "insulted" Venice, two frigates should 
chase it away. He asked Eugene for the number of gun­
boats and other light boats available to go to Tarento 
to aid in an invasion of Sicily in the event the
ORussians left the Adriatic.
The first report of a ship launching at Venice 
is that of the brig the Sparaviere, carried in the 30 
June 1806 issue of the Moniteur*. The Venetians cele­
brated the event with a ball, and affectionately 
called the addition to the fleet the Princess Augusta,
qwhich pleased the Viceroy.
Though Eugene had begun naval construction 
early in 1806 and had launched a brig, major con­
struction did not start in the Venetian shipyards until 
late summer and early autumn of that year. In August 
Napoleon sent a Dutchman to direct the construction of 
ships of seventy-four guns.' In the letter announcing 
the appointment of the'Dutchman, Napoleon wrote it was 
his intention to build eight men-of-war and two 
frigates at Venice, and the Emperor requested a report 
on items the Venetians needed to build them. Of these
Q __Napoleon, Correspondence. XII, 376-377, Na­poleon to Eugene, 16 May 1866. "
QMoniteur. 30 June 1806.
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ten ships, eight -mere intended for France and two for
Italy. Napoleon told Eugene that not only would such
construction add to the defensive power of the state,
but that it would have a good effect upon the Italian 
10economy. Though the Emperor announced his intentions 
in August, not until November did he give the order to 
the French Minister of Marine, Vice-Admiral Denis 
Deeres, to order the construction of eight men-of-war 
at Venice. Napoleon hoped they would be completed by 
November 1807® He added that sufficient wood for ship 
building existed in Germany along the Elbe near Hamburg, 
and ordered that Deeres send engineers to survey the 
trees and choose those best suited for the purpose
Late in November 1806 Eugene visited Venice®
He informed Napoleon that he had reviewed the maneuvers 
of gunboats, and in general the performance of twelve 
new crews pleased him. He noted, however, that the 
signal reading was poor and that both officers and men 
needed work to be effective sailors. The Viceroy felt 
that his navy had nothing to fear cruising outside the 
port and ordered it to do so to give the naval recruits
^Napoleon, Correspondence. XIII, 74, Napoleon to Eugene, 14 August 1866.
^Ibido, 470, Napoleon to Vice-Admiral Deeres,4 November 1806.
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training. At the time the Viceroy reviewed the gun­
boats, the frigates were at anchor off Chiogga and 
could not leave because of a contrary wind, but Eugene 
felt confident that with a little practice in the art
of sailing they could hold their own with ships of the
12same classification.
By 1807 Eugene reported the navy increased to
the extent that the addition of two officers to the
naval staff had become a necessity, and asked for a
naval commander at Venice and a commander for naval
soldiers. He asked Napoleon for ship-of-the-line
Captain Gaspard-Balthasar-Melchior Moras to command
the navy and frigate Captain Montcabrie to command the
15naval soldiers. Whether he got them is not recorded.
Whether from lack of able aides or not, the 
work in the Venetian shipyards did not progress as Na­
poleon intended, and he wrote Deeres in January 1807 
to get things moving at Venice. Of the ten ships 
ordered in 1806, only two were under construction, and
12Eugene, Memoires, III, 213-214-, Eugene to Napoleon, 29 November 1806.
^ Ibid.. 252-253, Eugene to Napoleon, 7 Janu­ary 1807. The naval program at Venice had become too large for a commissioner to handle alone. Therefore, 
Eugene was asking for a commander for his naval di­vision and for a commander for naval infantry, which 
correspond to the United States Marines.
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Napoleon reminded Deeres lie wanted to launch ten ships
there within the next two y e a r s A t  the same time
Napoleon asked Deeres whether it would he possible to
build a ship of seventy-four guns armed with bronze
cannon and which would draw only sixteen to twenty feet
of water. If it could be done, Deeres should order
15construction of two such ships at Venice. ^
In February Eugene answered Napoleon's com­
plaint to Deeres about the lack of activity in the 
shipyards at Venice. The Viceroy reported five seventy- 
four gun ships, two forty-four gun frigates, and two 
brigs armed with sixteen carronades under construction 
at Venice. He admitted construction of the vessels 
had not got under way until 1 February due to a short­
age of material. He added that two additional brigs 
and three heavily armed schooners which had been built
since November 1806 would be ready for launching within
16the next week. But Napoleon was still dissatisfied
14Napoleon, Correspondence. XIV, 203, Napoleon to Vice-Admiral Deeres, 16 January 1807* In. November 
1806 Napoleon had stated he wanted to launch ten ships 
by November 1807* The slowness of the Italians ap­parently caused him to revise his goal.
^ Ibid.. 204-205, Napoleon to Deeres, 16 Janu­ary 1807.
"^Eugene, Memoires. Ill, 266-267, Eugene t oNapoleon, 6 February 18O’/.
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with the program at Venice, and wrote Deeres in April
to organize the Italian navy to the advantage of Prance
and to propose an honest man for land, sea, and civil
17administration of the city.
Perhaps to allay Napoleon’s displeasure, the 
Publiciste. under a Venice dateline, reported that the 
Viceroy had reviewed gunboats at maneuver in spite of 
foul weather and had inspected the fleet. The report 
noted that Eugene pronounced himself satisfied with
18what he found. The report appeared in the Moniteur.
In May 1807 Eugene wrote Deeres to the effect
that since the Italian navy was beginning to get on its
feet, he needed French naval officers to train his
sailors. The Viceroy warned Deeres to be sure to gain
Napoleon*s approval before sending any officers to
Italy. Beauhamais told the Minister he thought the
Italians would learn their trade faster under French
19officers than under any others. ■
Regardless of Eugene*s reports and announce­
ments issued in journals, Napoleon continued to be
17'Napoleon, Correspondence. XV, 4, Napoleon to Vice-Admiral Deeres, 1 April 1807*
^®Moniteur, 28 April 1807*
19Beauhamais Archive, Eugene to the ItalianMinister of Marine, 5 May 1807.
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unhappy with, the slowness of* construction at Venice.
The King, on 4 July 1807, wrote Deeres that since the
continental war was now over, the war on the sea must
he pushed with renewed vigor. The Emperor expressly
ordered Deeres to hurry the construction of the ships 
20 ■at Venice. The same day, the Emperor wrote Eugene 
to press the completion of warships under construction 
at Venice, regardless of whether the ships finished 
were for Prance or for Italy. It was of utmost im­
portance to get two ships into the water at once. Ha- 
poleon felt that two more ships in the Adriatic would 
give France command of that sea, since the English had 
only frigates there. At the same time, he wanted to
know when the seventy-fours would toe ready for launeh-
. 21m g .
As a result of this letter Eugene ordered his 
own Minister of War and Marine to finish the ships at 
Venice as quickly as possible. In addition Eugene 
asked for a report on the number of English and other 
enemy ships in the Adriatic and the number of ships 
the Minister thought it would require to wrest control 
from the British. He told the Minister that Mapoleon
20 __Napoleon, Correspondance« XV, 382.
21Itoid., 385, Uapoleon to Eugene, 4 July 1807#
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thought it could be done with two ships added to ex­
isting French and Italian forces. In addition, Eugene 
asked the Minister for information on the number of 
sailors available, the amount of wood for building,
22and the number of cannon available to arm the ships.
Napoleon, in August 1807, informed the Viceroy 
that he intended to begin construction of three more 
seventy-four gun ships in 1807, two to be charged to 
France and one to be charged to Italy. This would put 
eight ships of this classification on the blocks at 
Venice. Four days later the Emperor asked Eugene 
whether the new pass which would allow the seventy- 
four gun ships under construction at Venice to reach 
the sea had been completed. '
Because of the difficulty in putting to sea 
from Venice, Napoleon, in November 1807, ordered that 
the Viceroy send two frigates to Cattaro to make their 
home port there since the harbor at Cattaro could
22Beauhamais Archive, Eugene to the Minister 
of War and Marine, 19 July 1807* If Eugene reported 
to the Emperor on the number of English ships in the 
Adriatic, his letter is not reproduced in his Memoires. The report of the Minister of War and Marine is not in Eugene's correspondence with his cabinet.
23Napoleon, Correspondence. XV, 477, Napoleon to Eugene, 5 August 1807.
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easily be entered and sailed from under almost any 
wind*
The letter also carried an order for a full
A Jreport on French and Italian naval construction. Na- 
poleon did not remark on the report made by Eugene on 
the Italian naval construction until May 1808, and on 
the sixteenth of that month Napoleon recorded his dis­
satisfaction with Eugenefs naval reports* His letter 
reads in part s
My Son, I received your report on the 
constructions for the first of May. It is full of incoherencies. For example, 
in the column "Ships Under Armament", your report states that the corvette the 
Carolina had been put in the water in 
December 1807, then it states that it is 
in the 21/24 /stage of construction/, but if it had been put in the water in December 
it was then 24/24 of construction. Ex­plain that •
I see that my five war ships are not ad­
vancing. The Bivoli is still only in the 8/24, it therefore will be impossible to put it in the water in August. It is of 
the utmost importance that these works be 
pushed with all haste. The Bellone is carried as being put in the water in mid- 
May, however it is only in the 15/24-1=Is the Courrone in the water or not?
24.Ibid., XVI, 142, Napoleon to Eugene, 6 No­
vember 1807T
2^Ibid., XVII, 141-142, Napoleon to Eugene,
16 May 1808. For report purposes French naval con­
struction was divided into twenty—four stages. With­
out going into great detail Napoleon could know how 
nearly a ship was finished by reading that a ship was
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In early 1808 Eugene continued to propagandize 
the size of the works at Venice, announcing that the 
Venetian shipyard was very busy constructing a number
of ships of the line and that several frigates also
P6were under construction*
Napoleon fretted because of his decidedly in­
ferior naval position. Though Eugene kept him informed 
monthly on the state of the construction at Venice, the 
Emperor wrote in February 1808 demanding to know if the 
frigate under construction at Venice was nearing com­
pletion or had been launched, if the works for en­
larging the pass at Venice progressed, and if the works 
on the port at Ancona made any headway. It was im­
perative, he told Eugene, that these two harbors be
27able to accommodate men-of-war. Five days later 
Eugene reported that the frigate the Corona had been
in the first twenty-fourth, and so on up the scale. 
Napoleon was perhaps a bit more harsh than necessary, 
for often at Venice ships were launched before decking, 
superstructure, masts, cannon carriages, compartments, 
and crews* quarters were complete to make way for new ships to be laid down.
26Moniteur, 29 January 1808.
27Napoleon, Correspondance, XVI, 347* Napoleonto Eugene, 18 February 1&08.
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launched, though much work remained to he done before 
she could put to sea. He hoped that it could be 
finished by the first of June, The corvette the 
Garolina which Napoleon had launched while in Venice 
in December 1807 would be completed by the end of
April, The small corvette the Carlotta was at anchor,
28and Eugene asked permission to send it to Ancona,
On 2 July 1808 the Moniteur announced that on 15 June
the Venetians had launched a corvette, but did not
oqindicate which one. *
The slowness of the dredging at Venice taxed 
Eugenefs patience to the limit, and he inspected the 
works in June 1808. In reporting the inspection to Na­
poleon, the Viceroy wrote that he was extremely dis­
satisfied with the work. The Venetians told him the 
slowness was due to the fact that plans had not been 
returned from Paris, This, Eugene wrote, was only an 
excuse. The real trouble lay in a squabble over the 
allocation of funds which he had put to rest by trans­
ferring control of funds from the municiualite to the 
chief engineer. The chief engineer assured him that
28Eugene, Memoires. IV, 78, Eugene to Napoleon,23 February 1808.
^ Moniteur. 2 July 1808.
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the works would near completion by winter.
Concerning shipbuilding, Eugene reported that
the Carolina would be able to sail in less than a
month, the frigate the Corona would sail by the end of
September, and the Bivoli, one of the seventy-four gun
ships under construction, would be launched in October
1808. The Viceroy informed the Emperor that the budget
for shipbuilding would need to be larger if Italy was
30to accomplish anything significant.
Though Eugene had announced to the Emperor in 
February 1808 that the brig the Carlotta was ready for 
action, he apparently had been unable to utilize it or 
it had suffered losses in engagements at sea, for he 
wrote the Minister of War of the kingdom late in October 
to complete her crew and the crew of the corvette the 
Aquila immediately. The Carlotta needed twenty-five 
men and the Aquila needed twenty. At the same time 
Eugene ordered the manning of two new packet boats, the 
Gazelle and the Diligent. The addition of these two
50Eugene, Memoires, IV, 185-186, Eugene to Na­
poleon, 14 June 1868. The Moniteur reported on 6 
October 1808 that Eugene watched the launching of a frigate, two brigs, and two smaller craft. It may be that the frigate was the Corona.
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small "boats raised the total of such craft in the
31Italian navy to five.
The operation of the Italian ships in the Adri­
atic was not without risk, and in autumn 1808 Eugene 
lost the Hortense and the Pe.iche. "both classified as 
sloops. He ordered them replaced immediately. To in­
sure that the replacements were better sailers than 
the Hortense and the Pe.iche he gave instructions that 
their armament should consist of two eight—pounders 
fore, four eight-pounders port and starboard, or two 
twenty-two-pounders and six: twelve-pound carronades.
In this letter Eugene did not designate the shipyard
32where the ships should be built.
Ships built in the Venetian shipyards could not 
be stationed there due to the difficulty of sailing 
from Venice. To overcome this disability, Napoleon 
wrote Eugene to provision the Carolina with a six 
month’s supply of food and a four month’s supply of
31Beauhamais Archive, Eugene to the Minister of War of the realm, n.d. The letter appears between letters dated 23-29 October 1808. The packet boats were used in communication with Dalmatia. They were 
very fast sailers and could run from Venice or Ancona 
to Zara and Corfu overnight.
32Ibid., Eugene to the Minister of War of the 
kingdom, n.d. The letter appears between letters 
bearing dates of 31 October 1808 and 18 November 1808.
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water and send it from Venice to Ancona in the company 
of two "brigs and a gunboat, if the latter was availa­
ble. The Princess Augusta and the Jena, both stationed 
at Ancona, should be placed under the command of the 
captain of the Carolina to form a naval division 
charged with sailing against the British fleet then 
blockading Trieste. In addition to this duty, the di­
vision could be utilized to convoy supplies to Corfu
*2 •Tand Cattaro from Ancona. Following this advice, the
Yiceroy sent the frigate the Carolina and the brigs
the Lepanto and the Mameluke to Ancona, where they
were joined by two unspecified frigates and a few tin-
specified brigs from Corfu. The new frigate the Corona
also was stationed at Ancona, increasing French naval
■54-strength in the Adriatic.
In the spring of 1809 Eugene told the Italians 
that his navy could hold its own with the British and 
that a flotilla of frigates, corvettes,and armed sloops 
would put to sea to give battle to English warships
33Napoleon, Correspondence, XVIII, 200, Na­poleon to Eugene, 12 January 1809.
34Ibid.. 298, Napoleon to Eugene, 1 March1809.
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7 clurking off* the coast at Venice* This was primarily 
propaganda, and in April Napoleon exposed it as such 
by sending Rear-Admiral Carentin-TJrbain-Jacques 
Bertrand-de Leissegues, who had the rank of captain of 
a warship, three frigate captains (unnamed), eighteen 
lieutenants, and one hundred seventy-seven sailors to 
Venice to aid in its defense. Rather than ships,
Eugene ha;d to use rafts and boats armed with cannon to 
make the defense of Venice in 1809*^
The campaign of 1809 crowded thoughts of the 
navy into the background during most of that year. As 
a result, the completion of the frigate the Rivoli was 
delayed. A second frigate, the Regenerat ore * was al­
most complete in early 1810, and another, the Favorite, 
was started*
Napoleon again told Eugene it was important 
that the British not be able to blockade the gulf, and 
ordered Eugene to send the two frigates, when finished, 
to Ancona with a Russian frigate stationed at Trieste. 
This addition to the naval strength of the port of 
Ancona would make it impossible for the British to
^^Moniteur. 2 April 1809.
7 rNapoleon, Correspondence. XVIII, 442, Na­poleon to Eugene, 6 April !L6£>9.
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maintain naval superiority on the Adriatic without the
37addition of a few men-of-war. Napoleon*s reference 
to the addition of a Russian frigate to Eugene*s naval 
force elicited from the Viceroy the statement that 
Russian ships ceded to the Kingdom of Italy were practi­
cally worthless. Only three of seventeen were sea­
worthy, and Eugene recommended that the others he
■2 0scrapped or sold.
In addition to Venetian shipbuilding in 1810, 
Marshal Marmont built a fleet of small boats at Tri­
este. ̂
During the years 1809 and 1810 the importance 
of Ancona as a home port for French and Italian shipping 
in the Adriatic increased. As a result, Napoleon, in 
July 1810, wrote the Viceroy it was his intention to 
increase the capacity of the port of Ancona from four 
men-of-war and six frigates to nine men-of-war and six 
frigates. In addition he intended to extend the sea
37Ibid., XX, 257, Napoleon to Eugene. 8 March1810.
70Eugene, Memoires, VI, 326-327, Eugene to Napoleon, 12 April 1810.
39̂Beauhamais Archive, Marmont to Eugene, 7July 1810.
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wall there by 150 yards to give greater protection to
Rivoli and Regeneratore would be finished early in 
1810, slowness on the part of the French treasury in 
paying a 1,700,000 franc credit which Italy had on the 
French navy delayed the project. In reporting this to 
Napoleon, Eugene remarked that the launching of the 
two frigates at Venice could not be accomplished until 
March 1811 because the dredging of St. Mark's canal 
had been slowed as a result of hard dirt.^1
Napoleon, for he ordered that the Rivoli, the Regenera- 
tore, and the Mont-Saint-Bernard be launched in Febru­
ary and sent to Ancona to be armed. They should be 
under the escort of five frigates. At the same time 
the Emperor ordered that two more frigates be put on 
the blocks and demanded to know why two more previously 
ordered were not under construction.^
ships riding at anchor.
In spite of Eugene's expectations that the
This report did not particularly impress
4-1 ,Eugene, Memoires. VI, 372-376, Eugene toNapoleon, 2 September j.810.
42 ___Napoleon, Correspondence, XXI, 190, Napoleonto Eugene, 6 October l6l6•
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Napoleon, in April 1811, wrote Eugene that he 
had received his "state of the navy," and noted that 
the Rivoli and the Regeneratore would he complete by 
August. He ordered the Viceroy to send them to rendez­
vous with the escort ships the Boulogne and the Uranie 
at Malomocco. Prom that point the ships should proceed 
to either Ancona or Pola to he armed.^ Rue to the 
shallowness of the Venetian pass it would he necessary 
to utilize piontoons to float the ships over the bar.
By July the vessels lay in the water, and Napoleon re­
peated the order.^
In July 1811 there were three ships under con­
struction at Venice, each in the 3/24th stage of com­
pletion. Resperate for shipping, the Emperor ordered 
work stopped on two ships and all efforts concentrated
on the third. The same order carried instructions to
43complete three additional ships by the end of 1812. v 
To this order Eugene replied on 24 July that 
such an amount of building could not be done at Venice 
because of a shortage of labor. Napoleon rejected this
1811.
1811.
43Ibid., XXII, 55, Napoleon to Eugene, 11 April The Boulogne and the Uranie were French ships.
44Ibid., 332-333, Napoleon to Eugene, 15 July
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complaint. He wrote the Viceroy that labor could be
gained by conscription if necessary. The real problem
4-6would be obtaining iron and wood. Eugene*s feeling 
may have been more correct than Napoleon’s, for in 
spite of the fact that naval construction personnel 
was gained in Italy through conscription, Napoleon 
sent men and officers from Toulon, the Roman depart­
ments of the French Empire, Illyria, and Tuscany in
order to place crews on the Rivoli and the Mont-Saint- 
4 7Bernard. '
Though Napoleon and Eugene had thought the 
Rivoli, the Regeneratore. and the Mont -Saint —Be m a r  d 
would be in action in mid-summer of 1811, they were 
still at Venice at the end of the year.^® The Rivoli 
did not leave there until early 1812. The time was 
inauspicious, and this ship, a precious seventy-four 
gun addition to the French battle fleet, was captured 
by the British while sailing for Pola to be armed. 
Napoleon laid the blame for the loss of the ship 
squarely on Eugene, accusing him of negligence in not
4 6 Ibid., 359-360, Napoleon to Eugene, 29 July1811.
^ Ibid., 362, Napoleon to Eugene, 31 July 1811.
4 8  '___Ibid., XXIII, 131, Napoleon to Eugene, 29 De­cember 181X7
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going to Venice to oversee the sailing, not waiting 
for reports from couriers to Pola and packet boats, 
and in sending the ship alone. He frostily demanded
AQthat Eugene read his mail more carefully. In another
letter of the same day Napoleon wrote his stepson not
to be discouraged by the loss of the Rivoli, but to
send the Regeneratore, the Mont-Saint-Bernard. the
Castiglione. and the Princess of Bologna to Malomocco,
and to build more pontoons in order to be able to send
more than one ship at a time out of the Venetian
harbor. He added this note:
When the time comes to send these 
vessels to Ancona, I will send a 
division of vessels which will render me master of the Adriatic.
While awaiting it, the English 
will be obliged to hold a few vessels in the Adriatic.50
The last announced launching at Venice occurred 
on 2 August 1812, with the launching of the Castiglione. 
the Reale Italiano. and the Piave. The first two were 
men-of-war and the last was a brig.'*'*'
^Ibid., 281, Napoleon to Eugene, 3 March 1812. 
80Ibid., Napoleon to Eugene, 3 March 1812.
81Moniteur, 11 August 1812. This announcement indicates ihat Napoleon was thinking far in advance of 
realities in March when he wrote the Viceroy to send the Castiglione to Malomocco.
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The effectiveness of the Italian naval effort 
is extremely difficult to determine. The announcements
of naval affairs carried in the Moniteur all smack of
52propaganda, and one should hesitate before placing 
much faith in them.
Between 1806 and 1812 the Venetian shipyards 
provided at least seven ships of the line, eight 
frigates, six brigs, two corvettes, two sloops, five 
packet boats, and an undetermined number of gunboats 
and other small craft. The determinable total of 
fighting ships produced at Venice thus stands at twenty- 
five. Eugene's naval power, however, was not great 
enough to sweep the British from the Adriatic. Indeed, 
the evidence indicates that the Viceroy found it diffi­
cult to hold his own and protect his shores and 
shipping. Napoleon found it necessary to send sorely 
needed French ships to the Adriatic. After 1812 the 
Italian navy became increasingly insignificant• As a 
result, invasion of Italy by British-transported 




Though Italy made substantial contributions to 
the campaigns fought by Napoleon in 1806 and later, her 
contribution to the campaign of 1805 was not great, for 
to all intents and purposes there was no Italian army 
at that time. The army commanded by Marshal Massena 
in Italy and Austria consisted primarily of French 
units, though there were a few scattered Italian con­
tingents serving under his command.1 A few Italians
also made the campaign in Germany with Napoleon, but
2their number was negligible.
Italy*s greatest contributions in 1805 con­
sisted of the reports made by the Yiceroy to the 
Emperor concerning Austrian movements and troop numbers
1Eugene, Memoires. I, 276 ff.
2Napoleon, Correspondance♦ XI, 70, 151-152, 
169-170, Napoleon to Eugene, 7 August 1805? Napoleon 
to Berthier, 28 August 1805; Napoleon to Eugene, 31 August 1805.
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3on the Italian frontiers, and the formation of a 
national guard to protect Italy from a possible in­
vasion in December of that year*^
During the next year Italy became more valuable
to Napoleon* In 1806 Eugene continued to provide
einformation on the movements of Austria, and his de­
velopment of fortifications between the Isonzo and the 
Mincio rivers provided a buffer zone which would hold 
an invading army from the eastern boundaries of France
gno inconsiderable length of time. In addition the 
conscription of the year 1806 provided Italian soldiers 
for the battlefield, and the training directed by the 
Viceroy made Italian troops capable of holding their 
own in a campaign*
■^Eugene, Memoires. I. 202, 241-242, 246, 254- 
257, 589, 422-427, 451-U4, 446, 447, 450, 452, Eugene to Napoleon, 17 July 1805; 9, 17, and 24 August 1805;24 September 1805; 18, 19, 20, and 25 October 1805; 2, 
4, 6, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 19, 20, and 22 November 1805*
^Supra, 116*
5 *^Eugene, Memoires, II, 225, Eugene to Napoleon,11 April 1806; III, 35-45, 228-230, Eugene to Napoleon, 19 December 1806; Napoleon, Correspondance, XI, 560, 
Napoleon to Eugene, 27 January 1806* Ihecited letters 
of Eugene are only representative of the reports made by the Viceroy in 1806,
^Supra, 126 ff.
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When Napoleon moved against Prussia in October
71806, Italian units served in every major engagement. 
After initial Prussian defeat in October, French, occu­
pation forces at Berlin had Italians in their midst. 
But King Frederick William III of Prussia refused to 
accept the defeat of Prussian arms in October as a 
final action in the defense of his realm. He there­
fore withdrew his remaining forces into East Prussia 
and continued the hopeless struggle. Italian units
participated in the campaign in East Prussia and
8 9Poland, and aided in the capture of Danzig.
n'Eugene, Memoires, III, 165, Eugene to Napoleon, 9 September 1806; Napoleon, Correspondence, XIII, 162, Napoleon to Berthier, 10 September 1866; 166-68, 231-
232, 264, Napoleon to Dejean, 10, 20, and 24 September 1806; 301, Napoleon to Berthier, 1 October 1806; 383, 
Napoleon to Dejean, 22 October 1806; 408-409, 448-449, Napoleon to Eugene, 5 and 31 October 1806; 479-480, 
Napoleon to Lagrange, 5 November 1806.
8Eugene, Memoires. Ill, 200-201. 216-217, 230-233, Eugene to Napoleon, II November 1866; 4, 21, and
25 December 1806; Napoleon, Correspondence, XIII, 476-478, Napoleon to Eugene, 4 November 1806; XIV, 8-9,
154-155, 160-161, Napoleon to Eugene, 1 December 1806;
6, 7 January 1807; 150-151, Napoleon to Dejean, 5
January 1807; 573-575, Napoleon to General Lacuee,30 March 1807; XT, 40, Napoleon to Marshal Adolphe 
Mortier, 6 April 1807; 197-199, 216, Napoleon to 
Eugene, 6 and 10 May 1807; 220, Napoleon to General 
Henri-Jacques-Guillaume Clarke, 14 May 1807.
^Napoleon, Correspondence. XIV, 185-187, Na­
poleon to Berthier, 13 January 1807; 193-194, 304, Napoleon to Eugene, 14 January 1807; XT, 166-167, 169- 170, Napoleon to Berthier, 29 April 1807; 221, Napoleon 
to Marshal Jean Lannes, 14 May 1807; 355, Napoleon to General Clarke, 21 June 1807.
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Though. Eussia in 1805 had been a member of the 
Third Coalition, for all practical purposes she had 
withdrawn from it following the defeat at Austerlitz.1^ 
However, in the- summer of 1806 Eussia and Prussia con­
cluded a defensive a l l i a n c e F r e n c h  action against 
Frederick William III drew Eussia into the war- Eus- 
sian involvement with Turkey prevented Alexander I 
from sending troops to succor the Prussian king until 
after Napoleon had advanced into Poland. The Eussians, 
in November 1806, crossed the Niemen Eiver. This
action on the part of Eussia led to a winter campaign
12which lasted into the next year.
In 1807 Italian cavalry and infantry con­
tributed heavily to the forces which defeated the
10Eose, Napoleon I . II, 38; Geoffrey Brunn, Europe and the French Imperium (The Else of Modern Europe1 ed. William L. hanger/New York* Harper”&
Eow, 1938^), 119- (Hereafter cited as Brunn, French Impe riumT.
■'"̂ 'Brunn, French Imperium, 122; Eose, NapoleonI, II, 86.
12Brunn, French Imperium, 123-125. But see Eose, Napoleon I. II, 83. Eose contends Eussia was slow in coming to the aid of Prussia because Alexander I had no confidence in Frederick William III.
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Russians at Prussich-Eylau and Friedland. The victory 
at Friedland led directly to the negotiation of peace 
between Napoleon and Emperor Alexander I of Russia. 
Italian forces were present among the troops of the 
Grand Army while the Emperor negotiated the Treaty of 
Tilsit ending the campaign of 1806-1807.^
In addition to serving in the Prussian and 
East Prussian campaigns, many Italians, in 1806 and 
1807, served under the command of General Jacques Law 
Lauriston, General Gabriel-Jean-Joseph Molitor, and 
General Marmont in the effort made by the French to 
force Russia to evacuate the mouth of the Cattaro River 
on the Dalmatian coast. Italian troops also aided in 
the seizure of the Republic of Ragusa.1^
Besides providing troops in 1806 for Napoleon's
13Napoleon, Correspondance. IV, 331, Napoleon to Marshal Lannes, 13 June 1807; 340-341, Bulletin of the Grand Army, 17 June 1807. Prussich-Eylau was a Pyrrhic victory. Napoleon claimed the victory solely 
because Russian forces withdrew from the field during the night. Both sides suffered heavily.
^ Ibid., 375-376, Napoleon to Eugene, 27 June 1807; Moniteur. 27 July 1807.
^Napoleon, Correspondance. XII, 491, 501-502, 521-523, Napoleon to Eugene, and’ 28 June 1806; 8 July 1806; Eugene, Memoires, II, 418-420, Eugene to Napoleon, 3 June 1806.
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armies in Germany, Poland and Dalmatia, Eugene had at 
Naples a considerable detachment of troops which from 
time to time required replenishing. The Viceroy also 
provided the infantry and cavalry occupation forces for 
the island of Elba.1^
The need to keep these units up to strength, 
plus Napoleon’s demands for men drained Eugene's man­
power pool, and on one occasion the Viceroy reported to
Napoleon that 600 conscripts could not be sent to the
18Grand Army simply because they were not available.
By the end of the year Eugene had to send ad­
ditional cavalry units to bolster the forces of the 
Emperor in East Prussia. Unable to meet the Emperor's 
demands from his own units, the Viceroy took cavalry
from the 2nd corps of the Grand Army, which was
19stationed in Friuli as a corps of observation.
Napoleon, Correspondance♦ XII, 52, Napoleon to Eugene, 19 February 1806; 249-^50, Napoleon to 
Joseph, 31 March 1806; XIV, 35, 42* Napoleon to Eugene, 5, 7, December 1806.
1 7Eugene, Memoires. II, 266, Eugene to Na­poleon, 30 April 1806. ~
18Ibid., III, 216-217, Eugene to Napoleon,4 December 18b£.
■^Napoleon, Correspondance. XIV, 190-191, Na­poleon to Dejean, 5 JanuaryI867; 194-195, Napoleon toEugene, 6 January 1807.
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During the Peninsular war Italian units served
with French forces in Spain until the French were forced
20out of that country in 1813.
During all the campaigns mentioned above, Eugene 
remained in Italy administering the state and providing 
for the state*s defense by provisioning forts and organ­
izing additional units. The lack of military activity 
during these years irked the Viceroy, and he often com­
plained to Napoleon about being confined to his office. 
Nevertheless, he accepted his role, however reluctantly, 
and continued with less glorious, albeit just as im­
portant, tasks. The Viceroy provisioned his forts, de­
veloped a navy, and established a viable transportation 
system.
Not the least of Eugene*s duties in 1808 and 
early 1809 was the gathering and reporting of information 
on the activities of Austria. For some time the Viceroy 
had been convinced that the pretensions of Austrian 
friendliness were unfounded in fact and reported his
20Eugene, Memoires, IV, 226-228, Eugene to Na­
poleon, 24- October 1808; V, 397-398, Eugene to Napoleon,
26 September 1810; Napoleon, Correspondance«.XVII« 326, 
435* Napoleon to Eugene, 20 June 1808 and 10 August 1808; 
XVIII, 128-129, Napoleon to Eugene, 16 December 1808;XXI, 161-162, Napoleon to Eugene, 1 October 1810; Beauhamais Archive, Eugene to the Minister of War of 
the empire, 5 July 1808 and 23 September 1808; Eugene to 
Berthier, 30 July 1808; Eugene to the Minister of War of 
the kingdom, 19 January 1809.
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21feelings to the Emperor* When his suspicions were 
proven true in 1809 , he received the reward for which 
he had yearned so long— active command in the field in 
the support of his stepfather*
Napoleon, in making preparation for the campaign 
of 1809, warned the Viceroy to make his troop dispo­
sitions carefully and quietly lest Austria become 
alarmed at the preparations being made on her south­
western border. Eugene suggested gathering his troops 
and going into camp in March, but Napoleon vetoed this 
suggestion* He told the Viceroy it was too cold, and 
besides there was nothing to fear as yet; April would be
soon enough. Eugene demurred’, but accepted and followed
22the Emperor's directions*
As a result of Eugene’s following the Emperor’s 
directives the Italian army was badly scattered early 
in 1809* In order not to alarm Austria the permanent 
Italian summer training camps along the Italo-Austrian 
border were manned by normal peace-time garrison 
numbers. This number, approximately 900 men per bat­
talion, was only half of normal war strength. In
^Eugene, Memoires, IV, 355-356, Napoleon to Eugene, 1 March 1809*
22Napoleon, Oorrespondance. XVIII, 292, 298- 
299t Napoleon to Eugene, ^7 February and 1 March 1809; Eugene, Memoires. IV, 365-366, Eugene to Napoleon, 8 
March 1809.
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addition Eugene gathered his cavalry some seventy-five
miles west of the Italo-Austrian-"border "behind the 
23Adige Elver. In the event of attack, which Eugene 
feared, his inadequate infantry forces would "be at a 
distinct disadvantage, for they would "be pitted against 
vastly superior numbers supported by cavalry. Should 
the Viceroy*s units break under an Austrian onslaught, 
without cavalry to provide a screen and reconnaissance 
duty, regrouping would be almost impossible.
The Viceroy spent most of the month of March 
1809 ahorse visiting the eastern borders and directing 
troop encampments.. Early in April, still unprepared to 
face an attack, Eugene left Milan to take command of 
the army in the field
While making his own preparations, Eugene di­
rected the preparations of General Marmont*s troops in 
Dalmatia. The Viceroy warned Marmont to exercise un­
common care to avoid giving Austria alarm for the safety 
of her borders touching Dalmatia. Italy supplied the 
Dalmatian forces with artillery, ammunition, and the 
necessary manpower so that Marmont, acting in concert
2^Eugene, Memoires. IV, 298-299.
2^Ibid.. 300-301; Beauharnais Archive, Marmontto Eugene, 19 March 1809.
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with Eugene's own forces, would he able to force Austria
25to disperse troops over as great an area as possible.
The spring of 1809 was an unusually wet one, 
and cavalry contingents west of the Adige were ef­
fectively cut off from the Viceroy's infantry when the
Austrians invaded Italy on 10 April under the command
2 6of the Archduke John. The Viceroy was at Udine when
the invasion occurred, and he immediately began ordering
2 7the dispersed Italian units to the rear. This move­
ment cost him time and territory. Hot wanting to give 
up the Piave River, Eugene gave battle to the Austrians 
at Sacile on 16 April and suffered defeat. His troops
2 8left the field in complete disarray and disorganization. 
Ten days later Eugene fought again, but this
2 5  __Napoleon, Correspondance. XVIII, 552, 356-
358, Napoleon to Eugene, 14 and 16 March 1809; Eugene, Memoires, IV, 274, 420, 446-449» Eugene to Napoleon,3 and 12 April 1809; Beauhamais Archive, Marmont to
Eugene, 24 and 29 March 1809.
2 6 Beauhamais Archive, Eugene to Marmont,18 April 1809.
2^Ibid., Eugene to Marmont, 11 April 1809*Eugene, Memoires, IV, 441-442, Eugene to Napoleon,
10 April 1809.
2 8Eugene, Memoires. V, 134-138, Eugene toNapoleon, 14 and 17 April 1809*
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29time lie had his cavalry with him and he won the day.
The forces commanded by the Viceroy consisted of some
60,000 men. Approximately half of the Viceroy’s forces
were Italian, and the remainder were French. They were
30well horsed, well clothed, and well supplied. After
the initial debacle, which cannot be laid to a lack of
valor on their part, the troops commanded by Eugene
fought well and, in the main, successfully.
By 3 May Beauhamais told Marmont, who had been
active on the Dalmatian border, to take the offensive 
31in that area. Marmont*s entry into the campaign was 
more impressive than Eugene’s; his. men captured 500 
prisoners on the first day they crossed the Austrian 
frontier.^
During the month of May the Viceroy’s troops 
fought their way through the Camic Alps and made 
junction with the. Grand Army late that month. Eugene’s
29Ibid., 149-153; Beauhamais Archive, Eugene 
to General Clarke, 23 April 1809; Eugene to General 
Baraguey-d’Hilliers, 23 and 25 April 1809.
30Ibid., IV, 9, 368; Napoleon, Correspondance, XVIII, 356-358, Napoleon to Eugene, 16 l̂ arcii 1809.
31Beauhamais Archive, Eugene to Marmont,3 May 1809.
32Ibid., Marmont to Eugene, 5 May 1809.
Marmont*s figures should not be taken too seriously. Like the other generals, he often padded his figures 
unless directly under Napoleon’s observation.
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forces then made up the right wing of the Grand Army-
33and moved into the Hungarian plain.
In Hungary Eugene was still faced "by the
Austrian Archduke John, whose troops were by this time
sadly depleted. While Eugene pursued Archduke John,
Napoleon seized Vienna, and Archduke Charles prepared
to give battle to the French. John attempted to come
to Charles* aid. In an effort to prevent John from
joining Charles, Eugene forced a battle at Saab, and 
34won. John, unable to cross the Raab River, retreated 
down the Danube toward Komorn, where a bridge provided 
facilities for crossing to the north side. If John 
crossed the Danube at Komorn, he could shortly join 
Charles north and west of Vienna. Eugene, in an effort 
to destroy the bridge and thus prevent John’s crossing, 
floated millwheels and boats laden with rock against 
the bridge piling and bombarded the bridge with heavy 
artillery. The Viceroy failed, and John crossed at 
Komorn. If Eugene had succeeded, John would have been 
forced to cross the Danube at Euda, a far greater 
distance from Vienna.
33Napoleon, Correspondance. XIX, 47-49, Na­poleon to Bernadotte, 27 May 1809; Napoleon to 
Josephine, 27 May 1809; Napoleon to Eugene, 27 May 1809.
54Ibid., 70, 80-82, 84, 98-99, 115-116, Na­poleon to Eugene, 3, 7, 11, and 16 June 1809.
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Eugene remained at Raab, reconnoitered the
country, and established a strong defensive line 
35there. While he was at Raab, Napoleon called him to
*56Vienna. The Viceroy arrived just in time to partici­
pate in the battle of Wagram. The Italian army arrived 
at the battle scene on the night of 4 July at 11 p.m. 
and took part in the crossing of the Danube which oc­
curred at 2 a.m., 5 July. In the fight at Enzerdorf, 
where the crossing of the Danube was made, Eugene per­
formed adequately, and the next day at Wagram his army
formed the second line of attack behind Marshal Louis-
"57Nicholas Davout's corps. Following the battle of 
Wagram Napoleon used Eugene's cavalry to pursue the 
Austrian army along the March River, and Eugene had oc- 
casion to visit the battlefield at Austerlitz.
While Napoleon negotiated peace with Austria
35Ibid., 173-176, 186, Napoleon to Eugene, 25, 
26, and 28 June 1809; Moniteur. 2 July 1809.
2  fTNapoleon, Correspondance. XIX, 186-187, 195-197, 203-204, 211, Napoleon to Eugene, 28 and 29 June1809; 1 and 3 July 1809.
^ Ibid.. 205-208, 217, Napoleon to Josephine,7 July 18097
58Ibid., 221, 224-234, Napoleon to Eugene, 7and 9 July 18i)9. The pursuit did not begin until theday after the battle. Eugene’s cavalry had no sig­nificant brushes with the enemy.
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after tiie battle of Wagram, the Italian army occupied
Carinthia and Carniola and engaged in putting down an
uprising in the Bavarian Tyrol. Laibach, Klagenfurt,
Graz— all the strong places of the former Austrian
39territory— felt the tread of Italian soldiers. After 
the peace of Schonbrunn, which ended the campaign, the 
Viceroy became the administrator of the areas ceded to 
Prance by the treaty.
Buring Eugene*s absence from Italy the ad­
ministration of the kingdom was in the hands of his 
wife, Augusta-Amelia, and according to the editor of 
Eugenefs Memoires she accomplished the task with 
ability.^ The only area in which she had no control 
was the administration of the army. In June, after the 
junction of the Italian and French armies, General
Francesco Caffarelli was sent to Milan by Napoleon to
4-1administer the Italian army.
The years 1810 and 1811 were quiet ones for
•^Ibid.. 241, 245, 262, Napoleon to Eugene, 
13, 14, and 17 July 1809; Eugene, Memoires. VI, 40,49, Napoleon to Eugene, 13 and 24 July; 5T, Eugene to 
Augusta, 15 October 1809.
^Eugene, Memoires. V, 133, 303-304, Eugene 
to Augusta, 12 April 1809*
^ I b i d . .  303-304; Napoleon, Correspondance,
XIX, 125, Napoleon to Caffarelli, 17 June 1809; ^26,
Napoleon to Eugene, 9 August 1809*
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the Viceroy as far as military action was concerned*
The only Italian units which saw active fighting duty
1 Q
were those in Spain. But early in 1811 Napoleon in­
structed Eugene to prepare to take the Italian army to
43Germany by May if necessary. The Emperor also in­
structed the Viceroy that his active army should total
50,000 men plus 30,000 infantry which should remain in 
Italy.^
It did not become necessary to take Italian 
troops to Germany, but the attitude of Russia caused 
the Emperor to plan action against Emperor Alexander I. 
As a result, 1811 and early 1812 were months of feverish 
organizational activity in Italy. The army the Viceroy 
prepared in 1811 did not consist entirely of Italians; 
as a matter of fact, it was two-thirds non-Italian.
The non-Italian units were largely French, but contained 
some Spanish units, some Hanoverian troops, a regiment 
of troops from Illyria, and two Croatian battalions.^
42 __Napoleon, Correspondance. XXII, 294, Na­poleon to Eugene, 29 June 1811.
^ Ibid.. 77, Napoleon to Eugene, 17 April 1811.
44 __Ibid.. XXIII, 86-88, Napoleon to Eugene,16 December 1811.
*5Ibid.
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Napoleon, in December, told Eugene he should 
reach the Vistula with 38,000 fighting men. Service 
troops would swell that number to 50,000.
At the same time Napoleon informed the Viceroy 
that it was necessary to number the divisions of the 
Grand Army and designated Eugene*s divisions as the 
13th, 14th, and 15th divisions.^ If it did nothing 
else, this administrative reform made it much easier 
for the Department of War to keep track of troops in 
action.
A short while later the Emperor told the 
Viceroy it would be necessary to buy a "great quantity" 
of hard liquor to be stored at Magdeburg. He told 
Eugene to buy 1,500 thirty-gallon barrels of liquor 
and send it to the central storage point. The 9th 
transport was to haul 1,200 barrels of the liquor and 
Italian civilians the rest. The liquor would be trans­
ported from Magdeburg to the Vistula by canal. In the 
letter Napoleon asked if Italian liquor was as good as 
French cognac, how plentiful it was, how much it cost, 
and above all how much could be bought in Italy. At 
the end of the letter he noted that there was much 
foreign foodstuff in Milan and asked if it might not be
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possible to hire the wagoners who hauled in foodstuffs
47to haul liquor back to Germany.
The movement of the army toward Russia began
in the third week of February 1812, and the Brenner
48Pass had to be cleared of snow by the sappers. The
Viceroy did not accompany the army when it left Italy,
and Marshal Junot commanded in his absence.
Napoleon ordered the Viceroy to spend a month
in Paris and join his troops at Glogau at the end of 
49March.  ̂ After his arrival at Glogau, Eugene was at
the head of his wing of the invading army. From the
plains of Poland to Moscow, the Viceroy commanded the
left wing of the Grand Army.^ Napoleon added the
troops of the Bavarian army to Eugene’s command, which
then consisted of the 4th and 6th corps of the Grand
51Army, totaling some 80,000 men.
47Ibid., 132, Napoleon to Eugene, 29 December1811.
^Ibid., 197, 215-216, Napoleon to Eugene,29 January 1812; 8 February 1812.
^ Ibid.. 219-220, Napoleon to Eugene, 10 February 1812.
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possible to hire the wagoners who hauled in foodstuffs
47to haul liquor back to Germany.
The movement of the army toward Russia began
in the third week of February 1812, and the Brenner
48I&ss had to be cleared of snow by the sappers. Eugene
did not accompany the army when it left Italy, and
Marshal Junot commanded in his absence.
Napoleon ordered the Viceroy to spend a month
in Paris and join his troops at Glogau at the end of 
49March. J After his arrival at Glogau, Eugene was at 
the head of his wing of the invading army. From the 
plains of Poland to Moscow, Eugene commanded the left 
wing of the Grand Army. Napoleon added the troops of 
the Bavarian army to Eugene's command, which then con­
sisted of the 4th and 6th corps of the Grand Army, 
totaling some 80,000 men.^1
^ Ibid.. 132, Napoleon to Eugene, 29 December1811.
48Ibid., 197, 215-216, Napoleon to Eugene,29 January 1812; 8 February 1812.
^ Ibid.. 219-220, Napoleon to Eugene, 10 February 1812•
50Ibid.. 481-483, Napoleon to Eugene, 10 June1812.
51Ibid., 346-347.
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Eugene's Italians fought well in the one major 
battle on the route to Moscow. There is nothing to 
indicate their collective behavior in Moscow. However, 
on the retreat from Russia, Eugene's forces fought
savagely at Smolensk, Viasma, Krasnoi, Malo-Jaroslavetz,
53and the Beresina.
As the rest of the Grand Army in Russia, the
Italians froze, starved, and were killed. Eugene and
his men went where they were ordered to go and did what
they were ordered to do. Most of them died doing their
duty; he brought back to Smorgoni approximately 5»000
of the 50,000 men he had led from Italy. Of the Italian
54-contingent, there remained 121 officers and 112 men. 
After the retreat from Moscow in 1812, the Italian army 
(with the exception of the troops left as a defense for, 
Italy in case of need) to all intents and purposes no 
longer existed.
Peeling his services no longer needed, Eugene 
requested on 5 December 1812 that he be allowed to
•^Sloane, Napoleon. Ill, 344-.
53Ibid., 362.
3^Weil, Eugene et Murat. I, 2-3.
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CCreturn to Italy. Napoleon refused the request, ^placed
Joachim Murat in command of the remnants of the Grand
56Army, and left for Paris to raise another force.
Murat, soon overcome by the hopelessness of the situ-
57ation, deserted his command and returned to Naples.
Thereupon Napoleon appointed Eugene commander of the 
58Grand Army.
As commander of the Grand Army, the Viceroy
fought a masterly retreat across northern Germany in
January and February 1813. Every foot of territory he
gave up was gained by the enemy only after a stubborn
contest, and each day Eugene delayed the descent of the
Russians and Prussians upon west central Europe gave
Napoleon another desperately needed twenty-four hours
59to gather his new army.
Napoleon returned to the Grand Army with fresh 
soldiers in April 1813. Eugene commanded a portion of
■^Napoleon, Correspondance, XXIV, 338-339, Napoleon to Eugene, 5 December 1812.
56Ibid.
57̂'Ibid., 430, Napoleon to Eugene, 23 January
1813.
58Ibid.
*̂ Weil, Eugene et Murat, I, 2.
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the new army and contributed significantly to the 
victory at Eutzen in early May. But the eastern flank 
of Prance was now exposed to possible invasion, and
Napoleon ordered the Viceroy back to Italy to build a
. 60 new Italxan army.
Manpower did not constitute the only contri­
bution made by the Kingdom of Italy to Napoleon's 
military adventures. Wars are not fought by men alone—  
money and supplies are also needed. This portion of 
Italy's contribution to the military effort is more 
difficult to determine than her contribution in the 
form of soldiers and officers, but it is possible to 
make some observations.
Italy contributed 50,000,000 livres annually 
to the upkeep of the Grand Army. This amount alone 
represents a significant sum; additional contributions 
from Venetian cities make Italy's monetary support very 
important
The value of supplies furnished to the Grand 
Army by Italy is even more difficult to determine. 
Eugene's letters to Napoleon contain scattered refer­




armies, but such, references are confined to the early 
years. For example, in 1806 Eugene reported to the 
Emperor that in the previous campaign Italy had sup­
plied all the replacement gun carriages for the Grand
Army and had supplied six million artillery cartouches
62while France had supplied only two million. In 
addition, Italy supplied all the food and shelter for 
the Army of Italy in the campaign of 1805 and was re­
sponsible for all hospital services for the French in 
Italy.63
Though the evidence is scanty, it indicates 
that Italy was important to Napoleon for reasons other 
than the number of men she could put in the field. It 
is simply another indication that the wars in which 
Napoleon engaged cost the satellite countries heavily. 
According to M. H. Weil, Italy was more important to 
Napoleon than any of the other countries with which he
6?Eugene, Memoires. II, 250-252, Eugene to Napoleon, 25 April 1806. While cartouche translates as 
cartridge, the artillery cartouche was not a cartridge 
or shell in the normal sense of the word. The cartouche was a bag of powder, pre-measured at the point of manu~ 
facture in the correct amount to propel a given pro­
jectile a given distance. The infantry received such measured amounts of powder for muskets also.
£•2Ibid.. 149-155. Eugene to Napoleon, 11 March 1806; Eugene~?Tarle, Le blocus continental et le royaume 
dfItalie (Pariss Librairie Felix Alcan, 1928), 27. 
(Hereafter cited as Tarle, le blocus continental).
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surrounded himself* She provided more men for his
armies, more cash for his war chest, and a greater
degree of security for France than any other single
64Napoleonic state.
^Weil, Eugene et Murat, I, 1-5
CHAPTER X
CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT
Educational reform was one of the important 
policies of the French in Italy, and under Napoleon*s 
direction Eugene "began to apply the French system of 
education in the kingdom,, Napoleon instructed Eugene 
to transform the University of Pavia into a military 
school and to organize it in the same fashion as the 
military school at Fontainebleau. Also, the uni­
versities of Pavia and Bologna should each have a chair 
of military engineering, fortification, and tactics.
The holder of the military chair would have the function 
of an adjutant-major. Napoleon further instructed the 
Viceroy to form a student battalion at the University 
of Pavia, to be composed of two companies consisting of 
one sergeant major, four sergeants, eight corporals, 
and eighty soldiers. Napoleon gave Eugene the authority 
to name a battalion commander who would have the re­
sponsibility of policing the battalion. Each military 
student would enroll in a company, and all military 
students would wear a uniform prescribed by the govern­




the university to offer one hour of calisthenics daily 
and each military student to spend four hours each 
Sunday on military exercises*"*"
On 13 June 1805, Eugene wrote Napoleon that he 
had given the Minister of Education, Pietro Moscati, 
orders to present plans for the reorganization of 
Italian schools* Moscati had expressed the desire to 
go to Prance to study the system of public instruction
in order to bring Italy*s public instruction into line
2with that in Prance* Napoleon refused to approve this 
request of Moscati, telling Eugene that Moscati could 
get all the information he needed from the Bulletin des 
lois and that he could come to Prance at a more oppor-
3tune time* Whether Moscati ever made the trip to 
study the French education system is not recorded*
Public schools and certain technological insti­
tutions were established in 1805* A veterinary school 
and a school of "equitation" were founded in Milan in 
August of that year* The latter was for the benefit of
^Napoleon, Correspondance * X, 517, Napoleon to Eugene, 12 June 1805•
OEugene, Memoires. I, 139-140, Eugene to Na­
poleon, 13 June 1865•
3̂Napoleon, Correspondance« X, 526-527, Napoleonto ̂ Eugene, 14 June 1865•
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officers and noncommissioned officers then serving in
the army, and the course of instruction was to last
4eighteen months.
The only other reform in public education ac­
complished in 1805 was the state assumption of the cost 
of public instruction.
While at Bologna to review the national guard 
being formed there, Eugene visited a school for girls 
operated by Mme. Laugers and was so impressed with the 
founder and the work she was doing that he named the 
school the Maison Josephine and endowed it with 2,000 
livres from his personal funds. The school was to use 
1,800 livres as scholarships for two poor but deserving 
girls, and 200 as a prize in the form of books for the 
best behaved and most able students.^
After the annexation of Tenetia to Italy, Eugene 
apparently restricted the University of Padua rather 
severely, for the Emperor wrote the Viceroy not to de­
stroy the university but only to pare away its luxuries.
^Moniteur, 26 Thermidor. Year XIII (14 Ausust
1805).
^Ibid., 28 Pructidor, Year XIII (15 September1805).
^Ibid., 3 January 1806.
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In the same communication Napoleon told his stepson
that he was occupied with the reorganization of public
instruction in Prance and that much of the new French
7educational program would be applicable to Italy.
The government established a conservatory of 
music at Milan on 1 April 1807, and later in the year 
the announcement appeared in the Moniteur that the 
state would establish another music conservatory in the 
suppressed Convent of the Passion. This conservatory 
would accept eighteen male and six female students, all 
of whom Eugene would choose, and supplies would be free. 
The director of the school would be the music director
Oof La Seala Opera House in Milan.
Perhaps the most important special school in 
Italy was the school of civil engineering established 
in 1807.9
The reform of public education seems to have 
achieved its greatest proportions in 1807° An an­
nouncement in April stated that Italy had established
7'Napoleon, Correspondance. XII, 454, Napoleon to Eugene, 10 June 1806•
oEugene, Memoires. Ill, 360; Moniteur. 16 Oc­tober 1807.
qMoniteur. 28 January 1807.
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eight new lycees. Six of the new schools were located 
north of the Po; one each at Milan, Bergamo, Mantua, 
Venice, Verona, and Novaro, and two south of the Po,1^ 
the locations of which were not given in the announce­
ment •
Eugene, in 1808, established three additional
lycees in the newly annexed Papal Legations, one a
resident school at Urbino and the other two non-resident
schools at Fermo and at Macerata. The Viceroy also
11established a special school at Macerata.
Apparently there were no more schools es­
tablished in Italy until 1811 when the Viceroy author­
ized the municipalite of Trevino to establish three 
secondary schoolso It appears that the establishment 
of the schools did not appeal too greatly to the popu­
lation there, for the announcement of the establishment 
of the institutions also carried the notice that parents 
had received assurance that the promotion of children 
from the elementary schools to the secondary level would
enable the students to do more easily the work demanded
% IPin the lycees, colleges, and universities.
10Ibid., 1 April 1807; Eugene, Memoires, III,360.
^ Moniteur. 10 July 1808.
12Ibid., 23 January 1811.
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In 1811 Eugene established a free school of
design in Milan. Students for the school came from the
'• ■./public and private schools, and although merit consti­
tuted the only requirement for attendance, the Minister
13of Interipr appointed six students.
Thq final action in the field of education 
taken by Eugene occurred in August 1813 when he es­
tablished a school of applied chemistry at Milan and 
named the chemist at the lycee in Urbino as Professor 
of Chemistry.1^
It is impossible to determine the number of 
students who took advantage of the educational oppor­
tunities in Italy or to assess the impact of increased 
educational opportunity on the state. There.can be 
little doubt that the public educational system in Italy 
suffered from state control and poorly trained in­
structors, for the only persons with teaching experience 
were the clergy, who were barred from teaching in the 
public schools.
The primary schools taught reading, writing, and 
arithmetic. The colleges offered classical languages 
and the first principles of history and science. The
•^Ibid., 22 January 1811
^ Ibid., 8 August 1813.
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curriculum of the lycees consisted of classical 
languages, history, rhetoric, logic, elementary mathe­
matics, and physical sciences. Private institutions 
instructed on the same level and within the same cur­
riculum as the colleges. The universities offered ad­
vanced learning; the course of instruction was heavily 
loaded with the sciences, hut not to the exclusion of 
the arts. It was at the university level that bacca-
laureat degrees, licentiates, and doctoral degrees were 
ISconferred. ^
In applying the educational system of Prance to
Italy, Eugene, in 1808, ordered the organization of a
National Institute in Milan. The Institute was to be
composed of the faculties of the academies of Pavia,
Bologna, Yenice, and Padua. Por membership in the
Institute a candidate was required to gain the support
"L6of three-fourths of the academies. Two years later 
the name of the National Institute was changed to the 
Institute of Sciences, Letters, and Arts. The new 
organization was located at Milan, with branches at 
Yenice, Bologna, Padua, and Yerona. The membership of 
the Institute was set at sixty. It had a general
15Ibid., 19 March 1808.
-|g
Napoleon, Correspondence, XVII, 156-157*
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secretary who had his residence at Milan and who corre­
sponded with the Institute’s branches on all items con­
cerning the work of the Institute. He also corresponded 
with Italian and foreign learned societies. The consti­
tution of the Institute required it to publish its acts 
and provided that it hold a general assembly every two 
years at Milan. The Institute resident in Milan met
once monthly, and the member branches met every six 
17months. At the same time all other learned societies 
received the order to reorganize in such a fashion that 
they would be represented by only one society in any 
given town.
There is evidence that Eugene encouraged Italian 
scientists to make efforts to advance Italy in a number 
of fields. In 1811 Giovanni Amici, an algebra teacher 
at the lycee of Panaro, built an eight foot telescope, 
which he presented to the Palace of Arts and Sciences 
in Milan. The instrument was of exceptional quality, 
and the Viceroy was so impressed with what he learned 
of the instrument that the builder received a govern­
mental subsidy to finance the building of a larger one. 
Eugene hoped this development indicated that Italy would
17Moniteur, 15 January 1811.
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no longer “be dependent upon Germany for optical equip-
18ment and astronomical instruments. By December of 
1811 Amici had completed the project subsidized by the 
government. The telescope presented in December was 
seventeen feet long and eleven inches in diameter. 
Italian astronomers announced that the polish of the 
tube left nothing to be desired. The astronomers re­
ported they had been able to read the finest of charac­
ters at a distance of 700 feet and that the marks
iqbetween letters were quite clear.
Air science did not escape the attention of
Italian scientists during the viceroyalty. In August
1808 a pair of intrepid balloonists, Pasquale Andreoli
and Brioschi made an ascent at Padua and observed their
reactions. When the mercury stood at fifteen inches,
Brioschi noticed a stronger heartbeat than usual; he
fell asleep when the mercury stood at twelve inches.
When the mercury measured nine inches, Andreoli reported
that he experienced a feeling of total inflation and
lost the use of his left arm. With the mercury at eight
and one-half inches the balloon burst and made a quite
20rapid descent. Both of the occupants escaped injury.
18Ibid., 26 May 1811.
^Ibid., 29 December 1811.
20Ibid., 6 September 1808. According to
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In May of 1812 a Bolognese balloonist made an
ascent of one and one-half miles and descended safe and
sound. In this flight the crowd of onlookers lost sight
21of the balloon for half an hour. In September of 1812 
Count Francesco Zambeccari announced that in the near 
future he intended to direct a balloon while in flight. 
The count had intended for some time to make the flight, 
but it appears Italian balloonists had made certain 
criticisms of his machine, for the count reported that
he had read the criticisms that had been made and had
22corrected the "faults" of his apparatus. Grood as his 
word, the count attempted the flight on 25 September 
1812, but his luck was bad. On the first attempt at 
ascent a leak developed in the balloon and delayed the 
flight. Having repaired the leak, he attempted the 
flight a second time, but due to the wind and apparent 
failure of his guidance apparatus the balloon drifted
Dr. Hulen B. Williams, Head of the Chemistry Department 
at Louisiana State University, a measurement of eight and one-half inches would indicate an ascent of about seven and one-half miles.
21Ibid., 18 June 1812.
22Ibid., 25 September 1812. The nature of the "faults" and objections is not indicated in this report. The Moniteur mistakenly refers to the balloonist as 
Count Zambinari in this issue.
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into a tree. His unnamed companion grabbed a tree 
branch and abandoned the balloon, but Zambeccari, re­
fusing to disappoint his public, remained in the basket 
of the balloon. The impact of the collision with the 
tree broke the alcohol reservoir, and the burning alco­
hol poured down upon Zambeccari. According to the re­
port, he fell from the balloon without benefit of 
parachute, and burst when he landed. He lived about
p1?eighteen hours after the fall. A little over a month 
later an ex-monk claimed that he had discovered a method 
to direct the ascent or descent of a balloon without the 
use of valves or fire. Marcheselli of Bologna intended 
to use the method in his next ascension.^ There is no 
available record of this flight.
The Continental System introduced by Napoleon 
in his attempt to destroy English commerce demanded 
that certain products formerly supplied through foreign 
trade be produced upon the European continent. Napoleon 
hoped that at least two of the items could be produced 
in Italy, and in 1810 the Emperor established a fund of 
150,000 Italian livres to encourage cotton culture in
^ Ibid.. 9 October 1812; Enci 'edia Italiani 
(36 vols.; Giovanni Treccani, 1929), ', 875.
24Moniteur. 8 November 1812.
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Italy. The program of increasing cotton production in
Italy came under the direction of the minister of the
interior. It appears that Napoleon’s program did not
2C5meet with too great success.
Italy experienced a greater degree of success 
in a program of agricultural and scientific experimen­
tation designed to discover a means of producing sugar. 
Italians first experimented with fruits, particularly 
raisins, in their search for a new and better source of 
sugar. In an effort to encourage experimentation, Na­
poleon established a prize of 50,000 Italian livres to 
be divided between the four establishments which pro-
pgduced the most sugar from the raisin. By December
1810, J. B. Sommariva of Milan perfected a method of
extracting a syrup, rather than sugar, from the raisin.
Sommariva claimed that the syrup was clear, odorless,
and of excellent quality. The success of the method,
the Moniteur reported, was so great that the Viceroy
intended to introduce it throughout the kingdom, and
Sommariva intended to continue experiments with other
27fruits such as figs and apples. ‘ In September 1811
^ Ibid.. 30 September 1810.
26Ibid.
^Ibid., 5 January 1811.
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the report came from Sinigaglia that researchers there 
had perfected a method of manufacturing sugar from
apples and pears which could he utilized for confection-
28ary purposes and for the manufacture of liqueurs.
In spite of the success the Italians reported 
in the manufacture of sugar from fruits, the sugar beet 
became the principal source of sugar production. Re­
searchers perfected the refining process at Verona, and 
established a water-powered refinery there. The plant 
was capable of processing 1,000 kilograms of sugar 
beets in half an hour, and the sugar was of quality
29equal to that derived from the cane of the islands.
As a reward for sugar production, Eugene decreed a 
prize of 50,000 francs to be divided between the four 
manufacturers who produced the most sugar from sugar 
beets. The prize was to be divided in proportion to 
the amount of sugar produced. In order to be eligible 
for the prize a processor must process more than 4,000 
pounds of sugar.
28Ibido, 25 September 1811.
29Ibid., 9 September 1811.
Ibid., 13 October 1811. The prizes established 
by Napoleon and Eugene for the production of sugar are identical with the exception of the amount of sugar re­
quired to be eligible for the Viceroy’s prize.
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late in October 1811, Dr* Duigi Sacco, an emi­
nent Italian physician, announced that he had discovered 
a plant indigenous to Italy that produced a high-quality 
sugar and yielded a very fine white flour in addition* 
According to the doctor, the sugar yielded was superior 
to any yet produced from any other vegetable source and 
had the advantage of not requiring the addition of 
foreign substances in the manufacturing process* He re­
ported that the plant could be produced any place in 
agricultural Italy and that the manufacture of sugar 
from the plant was neither expensive nor difficult• He 
intended to make the name of the plant known to the 
public in short order* His discovery created a great 
deal of interest because of his devotion to truth and 
public service. The name of the plant, if Dr. Sacco 
ever divulged it, did not gain publicity in the journals 
of the French Empire.
The sheep raising industry also received at­
tention. In 1810 the Moniteur announced that wool pro­
ducers of the districts bordering on Switzerland had 
imported the merino sheep and had greatly increased wool
Z^id *, 16 November 1811; Enciclopedia Italiani* XXX, 394. The Enciclopedia does not mention the searchfor sugar in its article on Dr. Sacco.
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production as a result. In addition, they had intro-
32duced Spanish rams into their herds.
Evidence as to Eugene’s interest in public 
health is more indirect than direct. The Er. Sacco 
mentioned in connection with the production of sugar 
introduced the practice of vaccination against smallpox 
in Italy and successfully rendered that service to each 
of the Viceroy*s children within a few days after 
birth.33
In 1809, in an effort to curb the incidence of 
yellow fever and malaria, Eugene restricted the planting 
of rice near cities and communes. According to the 
decree, rice fields must be at least 8,000 meters from 
Milan, 5*000 meters from communes of the first class 
and forts, 2,000 meters from second class communes, and 
500 meters from third class communes.3^
Though Eugene’s letters to Napoleon give no indi­
cation of his interest in scientific advance, journals 
of the day often carried announcements of his visits to 
fairs and exhibitions. Typical of such reports is one 
in the 28 August 1810 issue of the Moniteur announcing
32Moniteur, 7 July 1810.
33Ibid., 2 June 1807; Enciclopedia Italian!, XXX, 394. “
3^Moniteur, 4 March 1809,
223
that on 18 'August Eugene -visited the Palace of Arts and 
Sciences with the Minister of Interior to see the ex­
hibits. While there he examined in detail all the items 
produced by Italian manufacturers and expressed his 
satisfaction with progress made. Certain unspecified 
items drew his particular attention, and he placed 
orders for a number of articles for his own use.
One of the advances made in the Prench- Empire 
in which Eugene showed particular interest was the tele­
graph system introduced by Napoleon as early as 1805*
In 1810 the system connected Venice to Paris by way of 
Milan. Por non-confidential matters the telegraph 
system was a boon to communications. By 1810 Eugene 
received within ten minutes replies to messages sent to 
Turin, and received in one and one-quarter hours replies 
to messages sent to Paris. It required thirty minutes 
to send a message to Venice and receive a reply.J
One item which receives little attention in the 
Memoires of Prince Eugene is his attitude toward the 
restoration of Italian national landmarks, and one must 
again largely depend upon journals of the day for infor­
mation. Only one such item is recorded in the Moniteur.
35rbid., 28 August 1810
3^Ibid*, 23 August 1810
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and that reference is. very short* It appears that in
mid-January 1811 Eugene received a silver model of the
mausoleum of King Theodoric from the commune of Bavenna
37as a result of the Viceroy*s restoration of the tomb*
The church as well as the education system felt 
the reforming hand of Beauharnais. The church in the 
Italian Eepublic functioned under a concordat arranged 
by Cardinal Ercole Consalvi in 1803* The Italian con­
cordat was more friendly to the church than the con­
cordat arranged by Bonaparte while he was Pirst Consul. 
But Vice-President Melzi deprived the church of much of 
the benefit of the Italian concordat by organic articles 
applied soon after the concordat was arranged. Though 
the Italian concordat existed at the time of the es­
tablishment of the kingdom, four days prior to his coro­
nation as King of Italy Napoleon ordered that the Prench
■*qconcordat be extended to the Italian church. It is 
evident that he intended to take from the Italian church 
freedoms not enjoyed by the church in Prance. The 
bishops and archbishops of the Italian church reportedly
^ Ibid., 29 January 1811 .
Eo E. Y. Hales, Napoleon and the Pope (Londons Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1962). 53. (Hereafter cited as Hales, Napoleon and the Pope).
-^Moniteur. 11 Prairial, Year XIII (31 May
1805).
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took on 2 June 1805 at Milan the oath to Napoleon pre-
4-0scribed by the constitution.
Napoleon, on 22 May, issued a decree which 
ordered that all cures, bishops, and archbishops render 
an account of their incomes to the Minister of Religion 
within ten days. The decree provided that if members 
of the clergy falsely lowered their income in the re­
port, they would receive the income they c l a i m e d . I t  
appears that the Minister of Religion made the reports 
on income from vacant bishoprics, for the Viceroy re­
ported to Napoleon in August 1805 that he had these 
reports and recommended that they all be reduced to the 
amount of the lowest, which was 20,000 livres.42
40Ibid., 21 Prairial, Year XIII (10 June 1805). Probably the reference is to the imperial constitution* 
for Italy did not have a constitution. However, accu­racy in all things is not one of the virtues of the Moniteur. and the fact that Italy had no constitution does not necessarily rule out the possibility that the 
article referred to the constitutional statutes. The announcement is not wholly true, for certain bishops 
were arrested and taken to Milan before they took the oath.
4-2 # >.Eugene, Memoires. I, 24-6-24-7, Eugene to Na­
poleon, 17 August 1865 * The bishopric of Udine was one of the vacancies listed, but since Udine was in Venetia and under Austrian control in 1805, it seems unlikely that Napoleon would be receiving a report on the income of that bishopric. Probably this reference is to the bishopric of Urbino.
226
Whether the government received the reports of the 
clergy when ordered is not recorded in either the of­
ficial Correspondence or Eugene*s Memoires, and there 
is no mention of it in the Beauhamais Archive«
One of the innovations introduced into Italy 
provided for ecclesiastical salaries to "be paid twice 
annually instead of each two months as had been done 
under the Italian Republico When this provision ap­
peared in the Law of Finances in 1805, it caused oppo­
sition to the law in the Council of State. Eugene 
wrote Napoleon asking him to pay ecclesiastical salaries 
on a two-month or even a four-month basis rather than 
every six months, stating that payment twice yearly 
would undoubtedly cause hardship at the lower levels. 
Also, Eugene feared that to force such a hardship on
the lower clergy would cause a great deal of resentment
4-5and would lead to unnecessary difficulties. In this 
instance, at least, Eugene exhibited greater statesman­
ship than Napoleon, for the latter insisted that sala­
ries be paid the clergy as he had ordered.
Cardinals who enjoyed Italian citizenship re­
ceived a stipend from the crown treasury, a right 
established by a decree of 12 September 1805. Article
^ Ibid., 147-148, Eugene to Napoleon, 15 June
1805.
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One of the decree reads:
Cardinals b o m  in the Kingdom of Italy 
and recognized as citizens 'who, counting everything, do not have a total income of 50,000 Milanese livres, will enjoy an 
annual salary /traitement/ of 15,000 
livres paid from the treasury of the 
crown* 44-
Cardinals who could claim the stipend were placed on 
the civil list.
The government also reorganized parishes in 
Italy in order to hring "better administration to the 
church and to facilitate supervision. Ten days after 
taking the oath as Viceroy, Eugene sent Napoleon for 
his signature a decree designed to accomplish the reor­
ganization.^ Eugene proposed to decrease the number 
of cures and vicars. Napoleon, in his reply, instructed 
Beauhamais not to suppress the clergy, "but to enlarge 
the parishes and to promote cures to vicars. Upon the 
death of a vicar, a cure should "be promoted to the 
vacancy. Napoleon felt, he wrote, that this method 
would reduce difficulties with the clergy.^
44.Ibid., 417-418, Eugene to Napoleon, 12 Oc­tober 1805.
^ Ibid.. 152, Eugene to Napoleon, 17 June 1805• 
46Napoleon, Correspondance, X, 540, Napoleonto Eugene, 19 June 180^.
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Bishoprics also felt the hand of the government. 
In Italy there existed a number of areas which fell 
under the care of a foreign bishop, a practice which 
Napoleon refused to tolerate. He instructed Eugene 
that any portion of Italy appertaining to a foreign 
bishop should arbitrarily be attached to the neighboring 
Italian diocese. He ordered further that any diocese 
which had its seat in Italy, but a portion of its terri­
tory in a neighboring state, should be reduced to cover 
only the Italian parishes. A case of just this nature 
existed in Verona, and Napoleon made Verona a diocese 
largely because of the fact that a cathedral already 
existed there. When diocesan boundaries finally were 
organized, there should be at least one diocese to each 
department of the kingdom.^
This last provision apparently created a number 
of new bishoprics in addition to those vacant at the 
time of the establishment of the kingdom, for Napoleon 
wrote Eugene to send his recommendations for the persons 
to fill the vacancies. He cautioned the Viceroy to 
nominate only young priests who would support the French
policy for Italy and to avoid old cardinals who would
V.- 48oppose him.
4-7Ibid., 554, Napoleon to Eugene, 21 June 1805.
48Ibid., XII, 60, Napoleon to Eugene, 17 Febru­ary 1806 •
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In reply to Napoleon’s request for nominations,
the Yiceroy listed the following as good candidatess
Francesco G-amboni ^sic/1 who had been appointed Bishop
of Vivegano but had not yet been consecrated by the
Pope; Nava, Napoleon’s almoner and cure of Sant’ Am-
brogio; Zerbini, vicar general of the bishopric of
Modena; and Dallegri, a Councillor-of-State, (auditor)
wholly devoted to Napoleon, Eugene wrote that he also
wished to nominate the vicars of Brescia and Bologna,
but that he did not have their names at the present, and
would send them to Napoleon at a later date. He added
that he would appreciate it if Napoleon named a bishop
4-9as first almoner to his wife Augusta* If Eugene ever 
reported the names of the vicar of Brescia and Bologna 
to Napoleon, the editor of his correspondence did not 
see fit to include the letter*
Napoleon’s religious policy in Italy soon 
brought protests from Pius VII. Napoleon wrote Pius 
VII from Boulogne in August 1805 that the protests 
voiced by the Pope disappointed him greatly, for all 
that he had done only bettered the Church in Italy and
^Eugene, Memoires, II, 99-100, Eugene to Na­poleon, 27 February 1806* This represents only a partial list of Eugene’s nominees. They are ones about 
whom Napoleon had doubts and wanted information. The full list of nominees is not given.
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enriched her. He had organized the church more ef­
ficiently and made it possible for the clergy to give 
its attention to the primary function of the church, 
the saving of souls.J This argument hardly satisfied 
the Roman pontiff, and his irritation with Napoleon in­
creased with the military occupation of Ancona. The 
Pope could only view this action as an invasion of his 
temporal authority, and he protested vigorously. Na­
poleon’s reply to this complaint was that the action 
had been taken only as a protective measure designed to 
prevent the Pope and the Church from falling victim to 
the English, the Greeks, or the Turks. He told the 
Pope that he recognized Pius VII’s right to choose his 
friends as he would, but that he hoped the Pope would
realize the actions which distressed him so had been
31taken for the good of Rome. The same day Napoleon 
wrote his representative at the Roman court, Cardinal 
Fesch, that the Pope could accept his occupation of 
Ancona or suffer the consequences. The consequences 
Napoleon threatened included the appointment of a 
Protestant layman as ambassador to Rome, not allowing
SONapoleon, Correspondence. XI, 99-100, Na poleon to the Pope, 18 August 1805.
•^Ibid.. 527-528, Napoleon to the Pope, 7January 1806>C
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a Russian or Sardinian ambassador in Rome, and reducing
52the Pope to the status of mere bishop of Rome.
One of Napoleon*s major difficulties with the 
papacy was Pius VII*s refusal to invest newly appointed 
bishops unless they journeyed to Rome for their conse­
cration. To prevent the newly appointed bishops from 
being exposed personally to the influence of the Pope, 
the Emperor in May 1806 issued a decree, of which the 
following is Article Ones
No bishop of my Kingdom of Italy will be constrained to render himself to 
Rome to be consecrated. They will con­
form to the custom of the Catholic 
Church of Germany, of Prance, and the 
rest of the Christian world.53
The next reference in letters to consecration 
of bishops is found in Eugene*s correspondence with the 
Italian Foreign Minister, which contains two letters on 
the subject. On 11 November 1806 Eugene wrote Mares- 
calchi that he had received a report from the Minister 
of Religion stating the refusal of the Holy Father to 
give canonical institution to the bishops appointed by 
Napoleon to Italian bishoprics. Eugene sent these ob­
jections to Napoleon, resulting in Napoleon*s making
52 Ibid., Napoleon to Cardinal Peach, 7 January 
1806; Hale, Napoleon and the Pope. 94; Sloane, Napoleon. 
II, 396; 0*Meara, Napoleon in Exile. II, 51*
5 3̂Napoleon, Correspondance. XII, 403-404, De­cree , 26 May 1806.
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new demands on the Papacy to consecrate the "bishops.
Eugene proposed to send the demands through the Foreign
Minister, but Napoleon ordered that they be sent through
the Minister of Religion. Eugene thought this was a
34-breach of diplomatic courtesy. The abrupt departure 
from accepted diplomatic form displeased Marescalchi, 
and Eugene wrote him that if Napoleon accepted and 
signed the nominations he submitted, the Foreign Minis­
ter would present the nominations in the normal diplo­
matic channels regardless of Napoleon*s directives. In 
addition to this, Eugene utilized a different form for 
the presentation of the nominations than had been de- 
manded by the Emperor.
At the time of the controversy over investiture, 
Eugene had to deal with the machinations of the portion 
of the clergy friendly to the Papacy. He wrote the 
Emperor on 29 November 1806 that he had learned of a 
trip made by Cardinal Luigi Braschi to Cesena to a 
meeting of ecclesiastics, who, in Eugene*s words, were 
**not noted” for their attachment to Napoleon. He re­
ported that he had broken up the meeting by the threat
54Beauhamais Archive, Eugene to the Minister of Foreign Relations, 11 November 1806.
55Ibid., Eugene to the Minister of ForeignRelations, 27 November 1806.
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of banishment to a seminary. Though, he allowed the
Cardinal to remain at liberty and to move as he saw fit,
Eugene warned him that it would not be wise to stay
56long at Cesena.
Eugene*s concern about disaffected clergy indi­
cates that he was not insensible to the influence of 
the clergy on the population of Italy, His desire to 
have the clergy accept the regime indicates that he 
understood the state could succeed more easily with 
the support of the priests. It is interesting to ponder 
the effect the Papal position had upon his peace of 
mind as well, for he apparently had genuine respect for 
the Papacy, However, he evidently had greater respect 
for Napoleon than for the Pope, In early 1807 he wrote 
the Emperor that the Court of Rome meddled in Italian 
religious affairs through the device of advising bishops 
not to perform ecclesiastical duties,^
Napoleon informed Eugene on 3 April 1807, that 
while the bishops continued to draw their salaries, 
they would perform their administrative duties regard­
less of whether their consciences would allow them to
56 ,Eugene, Memoires. III, 213-124, Eugene to Na­poleon, 29 November 1806,
57Eugene*s letter to Napoleon is not in his Memoires. but the content is clearly indicated in Na- 
polionTs answer of 3 April 1807, See Napoleon, Corre- 
spondance, XV, 17, Napoleon to Eugene, 3 April 1807,
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perform ecclesiastical duties. In the letter the King
stated that he was enclosing a letter to the Pope. The
Viceroy was to have the letter copied in his office,
sign it, and thus cause the Pope to believe the letter
was from Eugene and that Napoleon had no knowledge of
the whole affair. However, Napoleon must have changed
his mind, for he did not enclose the letter. The King
added a postscript to his letter to Eugene stating that
he would not condescend to argue with such a simpleton
58as Pius VII. Instead, he would ignore him.
By the summer of 1807 Napoleonic treatment of
the Pope apparently had caused such a popular protest
that Eugene became concerned, for he wrote the Emperor
that it would be very easy to make the Pope a martyr 
50in Italy. Eugene appreciated the force of the Catho­
lic conscience more fully than did Napoleon.
Undoubtedly a portion of the difficulties with 
the Papacy in Italy stemmed from the introduction of
the Prench catechism in the late summer of 1806. Even
Napoleon had some reservations about its acceptance in 
Italy; when he sent Eugene a copy and suggested that
58Napoleon, Correspondance, XV, 17, Napoleon to Eugene, 3 April 1807*
•^Eugene, Memoires, III, 375-376, Eugene toNapoleon, 30 July 1807*
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it be introduced in the kingdom, lie advised the Viceroy
to consult his Minister of Religion about proclaiming
it throughout the kingdom as a wholeo If the Minister
of Religion felt it would cause trouble applied on a
national scale, it might be possible to persuade the
60bishops to publish it as a diocesan catechism. For 
almost a year there was silence on the problem of the 
catechism* Eugene apparently had some success in 
getting the bishops to publish the catechism in their 
dioceses. Others, including Pius VII as bishop of 
Imola, did not. Napoleon, on 5 July 1807, wrote the 
Viceroy not to be concerned about the refusal of the
Pope to publish the catechism in his capacity as the
bishop of Imola, since at least some of the other
61bishops had published it in their dioceses. Though
62Napoleon tried again in late August 1807 to reduce 
Papal opposition to the Italian religious policy, he
60Napoleon. Correspondance. XIII, 56, Napoleon to Eugene, 7 August 1806.
61Pius VII apparently remained bishop of Imola
when he became Pope in 1800* The bishops who hadpublished the catechism were those of Bologna, Ferrara, 
Ravenna, Trevino, Venice, Vicenza, and Padua. Na­poleon, Correspondance, XV, 388, Napoleon to Eugene,5 July 180*/.
6?Ibid., 502-503, Napoleon to Eugene, 16 August1807. “
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never did achieve his end. In spite of Papal pleas and 
the Catholic conscience, the new catechism was appliedg 'Z
throughout the newly annexed Papal legations in 1808.
In July of 1808 the government arrested Cardinal
Julio G-abrielli, who was bishop of Sinigaglia, and
brought him to Milan to force him to take the oath to
Napoleon required by the concordat. Napoleon wrote his
stepson to sequester the property of the Cardinal and
distribute half the proceeds to the churches in his
64bishopric and the other half to hospitals.
Unable to enforce changes in the relationship of 
clergy and the state while the Pope enjoyed his liberty, 
Napoleon ordered the arrest of the Holy Father in 1809. 
The Pope was confined at Savona until nearly the end 
of Napoleon1s career. While there the Pope stubbornly 
refused to surrender his spiritual prerogatives to the 
Emperor, and Napoleon had no greater success gaining 
his ends during the period of the Pope's confinement. 
Indeed, the laying of violent hands on His Holiness
63caused the roots of opposition to grow even deeper.
C*ZBeauhamais Archive, Eugene to Councillor-of- State Vaccari, 29 May 1808.
^Napoleon, Correspondance, XVII, 402-403, Na­
poleon to Eugene, 17 June 1808.
63̂Hales, Napoleon and the Pope, 120-127*
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It is true that in 1811 the Moniteur carried 
reports that the bishops of Italy had given Eugene 
their pledges to support the statement of the Princi­
ples of Gallicanism rendered to Napoleon by the ca—
66thedral chapter at Paris on 6 January of that year, 
but the Moniteur is the only place that this claim is 
made, and it is quite probable the statement was in­
tended purely as propaganda.
Religious organizations as well as the church 
in Italy felt the heavy hand of the state, and on 16 
June 1807 the Journal italien announced that all laic 
religious organizations except that of Saint-Sacrement 
were dissolved, and even Saint-Sacrement no longer had 
the privilege of meeting at night. Only one group of 
the allowed order could continue to exist in a parish, 
and it was responsible to the ordinary and the cure.
The above restrictions did not extend to persons em­
ployed in the church itself, though no persons were al­
lowed to subscribe to or support a foreign holy order. 
The order did not apply to any person teaching in the 
church schools
Though the French church accepted Napoleonic
^ Moniteur. 11, 14, 16, and 19 February 1811. 
67Ibid., 27 June 1807.
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domination, the Italian church had no such history of 
relative freedom from direction by Rome as did the 
church in France• TJltramontanism was too deeply rooted 
in the Italian character to be destroyed in nine years. 
It cannot be successfully argued that the collapse of 
the Kingdom of Italy after the downfall of Napoleon 
resulted from the resentment of the Italians over the 
treatment of the Pope and the Church, but that was 
certainly one of the reasons for its failure.
CHAPTER XI
CENSORSHIP, PROPAGANDA AND PUBLIC WORKS
One of the features of the Napoleonic domination 
of dependent countries which has received the attention 
and criticism of scholars of the period is the censor­
ship to which the countries were subject. Italy was no 
exception.
On 11 June 1805 Eugene wrote Napoleon that he 
had ordered the Minister of Interior to resume news­
paper censorship, which apparently had been allowed to. 
expire. The Viceroy added that the government had re­
served the right to punish the author of an article if 
it deemed punishment necessary.^
To this information Napoleon replied that too 
strict a censorship would destroy newspapers in Italy, 
and that Eugene should allow editors and journalists 
freedom to answer ambassadors and to write vague criti­
cisms of certain powers.- In an effort to prevent too 
great a degree of freedom for newspapers, however, the
"'"Eugene, Memoires. I, 124.
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Emperor warned that the Viceroy could not allow in 
Italy the degree of freedom that English newsmen en­
joyed.2
Book publishers as well as newspaper editors 
fell victim to the censor's activity. The program of 
book censorship disturbed Napoleon, and he wrote Eugene 
to stop censoring books since the spirit of the country 
was bad enough without doing anything to make it worse. 
Instead of open censorship Napoleon recommended that 
publishers present to the police for examination a 
printed copy of each publication seven days before 
placing books in the hands of vendors. If the publi­
cation contained anything contrary to the government,
3the government should then suppress it.
As a result of this directive, Eugene es­
tablished a Bureau of Freedom of the Press which, Na­
poleon wrote in March 1806, constituted nothing more 
than a censorship bureau.^" The decree establishing the 
Bureau, reproduced in the 1 August 1806 issue of the 
Moniteur. provided in part:
2Napoleon, Correspondance. X, 512, Napoleon to Eugene, 12 June 18Q!n
3Ibid., 526-527, Napoleon to Eugene. 14 June1805.
4Ibid., XII, 248, Napoleon to Eugene, 31 March1806.
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Any time an author wishes to assure himself that the publication of his work will not expose him to an in­vestigation, he may present the manu­script to the Bureau of Freedom of the Press before having it printed.If the Bureau judges that the publi­
cation is without inconvenience, it 
will return the manuscript to the author after having taken the pre­
caution of causing all the pages of the said manuscript to be counter­
signed by one of the members of the Bureau, as well as returning any notes on it.5
In addition the decree stated that if the work 
contained any items which the Bureau deemed it neces­
sary to suppress, the Bureau should give its objections 
and suggested revisions to the author orally and should 
return the manuscript unsigned. The decree continued:
In the event that any author or 
publisher is prosecuted because of 
the publication of a work the manu­script of which has been read and signed by the Bureau of Freedom of
5Moniteur, 1 August 1806. It is not certain that this decree is the one to which Napoleon made reference in his letter of 31 March 1806. The decree 
in the Moniteur is entitled Un acte de S.A.I. le prince 
vice-roi. dat§ de Monza, le 17 de ce mois. and is a re­print from the Journal italien of 22 July. This does not necessarily mean î hat thedecree was issued in July 
1806, for the editors of the Moniteur give evidence in 
many places that they indiscriminately used material from Italian journals, and even back issues of the Moniteur. for fillers. For instance, the Moniteur carried the announcement of the celebration of Eugene's birthday at the court in Milan on 11 September 1812, and the identical announcement was carried in the 
Moniteur on 24 November 1812.
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the Press, the minister should im­
mediately prevent the sale of the 
said work, hut the author and publisher will be indemnified for all the costs of the printing at the expense of the members of the 
Bureau, against whom any additional measures judged advisable will be 
taken.6
These excerpts from the decree clearly show 
that Eugene did indeed introduce censorship more 
stringent than might appear at first glance. However, 
there is a measure of protection for publishers and 
authors in the requirement that if posterior determi­
nation placed a published work on the proscribed list, 
the government would assess members of the Bureau the 
cost of the publication. In addition, this clause had 
the virtue of causing the Bureau to be careful about 
the books allowed for publication.
The only available reference to an author*s 
feeling the wrath of the government because of a pub­
lished work is contained in a letter from Eugene to 
Francois Antoine Testi. In the letter, written 23 Sep­
tember 1807, the Viceroy informed Testi that the author 
of an attack on the Queen of Etruria had been arrested. 
The same day the Viceroy wrote to Fernando Marescalchi, 
minister of foreign relations of the kingdom, that he 
had reprimanded the Director-General of Police for
6Ibid.
24-3
having allowed a story entitled Courrier /sicZ des James 
to "be published. The Spanish minister at Milan had com­
plained because he thought the story critical of the 
Queen of Etruria. The government had suppressed the 
journal in which the story appeared, had severely repri­
manded the publisher and had threatened him with crimi­
nal prosecution. The Viceroy had told the Spanish 
minister of the government's action, and it was Eugene’s 
wish that Marescalchi inform the Emperor. The Viceroy 
requested further directions if his handling of the af—
nfair did not meet Napoleon’s approval.
In addition to censoring vehicles of public ex­
pression, Eugene directed a comprehensive propaganda 
program. In the program he made use of a number of 
techniques. At various times the Viceroy utilized army 
bulletins, the theatre, proclamations, and of course, 
the news sheets of the time. It is quite probable that 
public schools served as propaganda tools. Even the 
churches from time to time served in this area. The 
bishops and priests, at the behest of the government, 
performed Te Teums after military victories. There was 
no dearth of propaganda vehicles in the Kingdom of 
Italy.
7Beauharnais Archive, Eugene to Councillor-of-
State Testi, 23 September 1807; Eugene to Marescalchi,23 September 1807.
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During the existence of the Italian kingdom, 
Eugene publicized such items as Napoleon’s coronation 
journey, the digging of canals, French legal benefits, 
public schools, military victories, Napoleon’s charges 
against the allies, the Venetian naval program, trade 
conditions, in fact all activity which might cause the 
Italian reading public to look with favor upon his 
government.
Eugene selected news items to be reprinted in 
Italian journals. He read the Moniteur daily, clipped 
what he felt the Italians should read, and sent the
clippings to the editors of Italian journals with in-
8structions to reproduce the items verbatim.
Napoleon used his own speeches for propaganda 
purposes, but he harshly refused to allow the Viceroy
Qto publish his own. Though Napoleon gave no reason 
for this refusal, it may be that he feared that Eugene, 
a stranger to proper techniques, might fail to be con­
vincing. Whatever the reasoning Eugene, in 1806, 
promised Napoleon that no more of his speeches would
QIbid., Eugene to the Minister of Foreign Af­
fairs, 29 September 1807. Citations for propaganda items can easily be extended. I have cited only repre­
sentative reports throughout this chapter.
q ,^Eugene, Memoires. II, Napoleon to Eugene,4 February 1806.
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appear in Italian journals. There is no further mention 
of the subject in letters exchanged between the Viceroy 
and the Emperor.
Immediately following Napoleon’s coronation as 
King of Italy and Eugene*s appointment as Viceroy the 
journals of the kingdom became vehicles for items Na­
poleon wanted the Italians to read. Napoleon had barely 
started his tour of the Italian kingdom before he ordered 
Eugene to place articles about his progress in Italian 
journals. Eugene dutifully followed instructions, and 
such articles appeared in the Italian Journal officiel 
and later in the Moniteur. ^
In addition Napoleon ordered Eugene to use the 
Italian Journal officiel to publicize measures taken to 
improve Italy, such as the canal at Pavia and the sani­
tation program at Mantua, though he told the Viceroy not 
to limit himself to the use of the Journal officiel. 
Napoleon felt that if Italians became aware of the 
French program for bettering Italy, they would not think 
that the only result of French domination was additional 
cost•
Moniteur. 1 Messidor, Year XIII (20 June 
1805); 4 Messidor, Year XIII (23 June 1805); 7 Messidor, Year XIII (26 June 1805). The list could easily be ex­
tended through June and the first week of July. Those 
cited are representative.
^Napoleon, Correspondence. X, 550, Napoleon toEugene, 20 June 1805; Eugene, Memoires, I, 169-170,
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Eugene apparently made an attempt early in his
career to use Italian papers to refute rumors of war.
The Moniteur carried an extract from a private letter
reportedly written from Vicenza that Austrian and French
soldiers attended halls together in that city, and that
the Austrians openly said that if a war came, they could
not win. The same article carried the statement that
around Brescia the general feeling was that if war had
started a few weeks earlier, the French could not have
held their own, hut that now the populace felt abso- 
12lutely secure.
Napoleon, late in July 1805, informed the Viceroy 
that it was not necessary to refute rumors of war, hut 
instead to publish news of Austrian war preparations and 
to make certain the articles appeared in the Journal 
officiel. The Emperor, in September 1805, ordered
Napoleon to Eugene, 20 June 1805* In the Memoires this letter is misdated 21 June 1805 and is designated as a 
letter from Eugene to" Napoleon. This is clearly an error, for Eugene always used the salutation "Sire,tt 
and the salutation in this instance is "Mon cousin.” 
which is the salutation Napoleon used when writing im­perial officials.
12Moniteur, Fourth complementary day, Year XIII, (21 September 1865)• The conflict in dates between this announcement and Napoleon*s letter in the next citation 
is probably due to lateness of reproduction in the Moniteur. It may, however, reflect independent action on Eugene 1s part.
13Napoleon, Correspondence, XI. 44, Napoleonto Eugene, 26 July 1865.
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Eugene to use the Italian papers to publish a procla­
mation informing the Italians of the "treacherous 
/Austrian^ attack" upon Bavaria. The King told Eugene 
to assure the Italians that Austria would be punished.
In addition the Viceroy should inform Italians that at 
all times the Emperor represented the interests of his 
Italian subjects."^
At the same time, but in another letter, Na­
poleon directed the Viceroy to tell the Italian press 
that the Emperor was with the army and was on the move, 
and that the Austrians were already in flight; nothing 
should be reported about hostilities being in progress*
If possible, news of hostilities should be kept from
* 15the Italians until Marshal Massena began his movement.
The next day Napoleon wrote the Viceroy that as 
soon as Austria attacked Italy, he should release news 
of Prussian opposition to Russia. He should let the 
Italians know the numbers of troops contributed to the 
Grand Army by Bavaria, Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt and 
Wurttemberg. In addition the Viceroy should publicize
Ibid.j 261, Napoleon to Eugene, 29 September 
1805; Eugene, Memoires. I, 395, Napoleon to Eugene,29 September 1&05•
15Napoleon, Correspondance. X, 261-262^ Na­poleon to Eugene, 29 September 1^05; Eugene, Memoires,396, Napoleon to Eugene, 29 September 1805*
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the number of recruits taken from Prance. In the letter 
the Emperor told Eugene to relay the above information 
to the Italian army generals, the Archtreasurer of 
Genoa, and the Princess of Lucca so that a comprehensive 
refutation of enemy propaganda might be made.1  ̂ Na­
poleon ordered Joseph to have the Moniteur print news 
of two great victories in which there were no desertions
or losses by death, and that all the Germans were well
17disposed toward the French.
After the outbreak of war on the Italian fron­
tier Eugene utilized the journals to convince the 
Italians that there was nothing to fear. He put a 
notice in the papers that though Austrian armies were 
only forty-five leagues from Milan, there was no panic 
or fear that the Austrians would penetrate Italy 
proper.
Eugene, in November 1805, accused the British 
of starting the rumor that he had experienced diffi­
culties with the Senate and had been hissed by the
Napoleon, Correspondence. X, 268, Napoleon to 
Eugene, 30 September 1805; Eugene, Memoires. I, 401- 
403, Napoleon to Eugene, 30 September 1805.
17'Napoleon, Correspondence. X, 271, Napoleon to 
Joseph, 2 October 1805. See also Eugene, Memoires. I, 
405, Napoleon to Eugene, 2 October 1805.
18Moniteur, 28 Brumaire^ Year XIV (18 November1805).
249
people. He carefully explained to the Italian provinces 
that this simply was not true. He countered the sup­
posed British rumor with the statement that the Italians 
bore the war with good faith and grace, and announced
to the people that even demands for food had "been met
19by the peasantry with cheer. The announcement is
wholly false, and ties in with the Napoleonic program
of "blaming uncomplimentary news upon pro—British rumor 
20mongers.
In reporting to Napoleon on the public spirit 
in Italy, Eugene, in October 1805, wrote that he had 
received Tallyrand’s announcement of the Emperor*s 
first victories and would publicize them in the meeting 
of the Council of State on the morrow. He anticipated 
public joy at the news and told Napoleon that Massena 
and his troops were anxious to join the battle and gain 
military glory. He rather wistfully remarked, **it is
difficult to follow Your Majesty’s movements on maps**
21when he yearned to serve in the field.
^ I b i d  ., 13 Frimaire, Year XIV (4 December 1805)- 
20Bobert B. Holtman, Napoleonic Propaganda (Baton Rouges Louisiana State University Press, 1950),
74, 118. .(Hereafter cited as Holtman, Napoleonic Propa­ganda ) •
Eugene, Memoires.♦ I, 418—419, Eugene to Na­poleon, 15 October 1805•
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When the British and Russian troops debarked at 
Naples Eugene wrote the Emperor that he felt the public 
should be made aware of the debarkation in terms de­
nouncing the court of Naples, for the Italians must be 
excited against that government and be given courage.
To encourage the Italians he had written just such an 
article to be published in Italian journals. Eugene
enclosed a translated copy asking the Emperor's approval
22of both action and motive.
During the course of the campaign of 1805 Eugene 
had the bulletins of the Grand Army posted in order that 
the populace might read them. He ordered that the 
bulletin announcing and describing the battle of Auster- 
litz be read at the Scala Opera House following the 
evening performance on 8 December. According to the 
Moniteur, the Yiceroy had publicized his intentions to 
have the bulletin read after the play, but the crowd 
refused to let the play proceed until the bulletin was 
read. After the reading of the bulletin the crowd dis­
persed, and only about 100 people remained for the
2^Ibid., 460-461, Eugene to Napoleon, 29 No­vember 180*?T
23Moniteur, 18 Erimaire, Year XTV (9 December 1805). Assuming that this report is true, it is safe 
to assume that the opera presented was undoubtedly a 
French effort at propaganda and did not appeal to the Milanese.
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Eugene, on 31 December 1805, issued a procla­
mation stating that Venice liad "been given up by the 
Austrians and was now under French control. He told 
the Italians and Venetians that their days of being 
pawns in continental wars had ended.^
It should be the function of news media to in­
form the populace of all events. However this was not 
the role played by journals in Napoleonic Italy. The 
Emperor allowed the journals to print only items he 
deemed beneficial to French rule. Among such items 
found in the Moniteur is an announcement, taken from a 
Venetian paper, of the occupation of Venice in January
1806. The article stated that the French had been re-
23ceived with joy by the Venetians. In light of the 
Viceroy’s report that the Venetians showed signs of 
opposition to the French, the news report cannot be 
taken as representing the truth to the Italians.
Papers read in Italy also served as vehicles 
for expression of Italian delight and contentment with 
French rule. At the time of Eugene’s marriage, the 
Chamber of Commerce of Milan celebrated the event by
Ibid., January 1806. When Tuscany was an 
nexed, the French there utilized the same technique. See Koenig, "Tuscany," 37 ff.
25̂Moniteur. 30 January 1806.
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establishing forty dowries of 300 Milanese livres each
for deserving Milanese girls. At the same time the
Council of State extended its congratulations and stated
that its members knew that Italian welfare and security
depended upon the wise laws of Napoleon. This body of
august men asserted that only under Napoleon and Eugene
26could Italy be prosperous and happy.
When Eugene and his bride arrived at Verona
late in January, the Moniteur announced that Italian
papers reported that all the principal officers of the
provisional government of the Venetian states were very
well impressed with the new princess. Though only
seventeen years of age she was an accomplished hostess.
Augusta endeared herself to all by speaking to each of
them in his own language. She very graciously accepted
27a gift of hand-painted Venetian silk.
The new Vice-Queen, Augusta Amelia, received 
her introduction to Italian propaganda the first night 
she and Eugene spent in Yenice by attending a play en­
titled "Italy and the Adriatic Delivered and Reunited 
by the Genius of Mars." According to the Moniteur, when 
the royal couple entered Milan, they received the city’s
2^Ibid., 4 February 1806.
2^Ibid., 6 February 1806.
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adulation, and the munic ipalit e of Milan informed Eugene
nohe had heen missed as much as he was cherished. That 
statement might have meant almost anything.
Following the campaign of 1805 and the loss of 
the French fleet at Trafalgar, Italian papers devoted 
much space to French and Italian naval successes. Re­
ports included the success of corsairs, the lack of
29British warships at Venice, and Italian ship movements. 
The publication of Italian ship movements incensed Na­
poleon, who immediately wrote the Viceroy a stinging 
letter telling him that such aritcles were advantageous 
only to the British. The British could read, and the 
publication of ship movements endangered his precious
ships. The King ordered the Viceroy not to allow such
30articles to be printed.
Two items appearing in 1809 are of interest if 
only for the reason that they did not follow the general 
pattern of reporting victories at sea against heavy 
odds, though that aspect was not neglected. The first
28Ibid., 23 February 1806.
29Ibid.. 9 May 1806; 25 July 1806; 18 September 
1808; 26 October 1808; 22 April 1809-
30Napoleon, Comespondance. XII, 511, Napoleonto Eugene, 3 July 1806: Eugene. Memoires. Ill, 53, Na­poleon to Eugene, 3 July 1806.
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is a story about the British capture of an Italian ship, 
the Fortune. According to the report, the prize crew 
placed on the captured Italian ship consisted of a 
young lieutenant who could not navigate and six crewmen. 
Their orders were to sail the ship to Malta. The 
British lieutenant asked the Italian captain to sail 
the ship into a port where two British ships had been 
sighted. Instead of doing this the former Italian com­
mander sailed the ship to Zante, which was under French 
control. The French boarded the ship and made the 
English prisoners. An added fillip to the story was 
that the British had replaced the original cargo of the
Fortune with cotton, a commodity which the Italians
31found very precious in 1809.
The other article carried the extract of a
letter reportedly written by a French soldier being
transported to Corfu. The letter read:
I hasten to give you the news of our happy arrival at this port. Above Cephalonia we met two English brigs 
which were taken by our frigate and 
sunk after a very one-sided fight.
We took their crew and garrison 
aboard. We also stopped a polacre laden with diverse merchandise and left it at Cephalonia, about forty 
miles from Corfu. In our course we were met by two English frigates.After a three hour fight one of
^ Moniteur. 14 April 1809
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these frigates was so badly damaged 
it took flight* Our loss consisted 
of two cannoneers killed. We did not lose another sailor.32
It is rather unlikely that one frigate would 
have been sailing the Adriatic alone after Napoleon’s 
orders that they should venture out only if they out­
numbered the enemy, and less probable that one French 
frigate would be able to outfight two British ships of 
the same class.
Another story the next year told of two English 
ships becalmed two miles off Ancona. The English took
advantage of a sudden wind to escape the Italian navy
33which was bearing down upon them. One might question 
how some ships could sail without wind while others 
stood still, and why the wind which helped the British 
escape could not have aided the Italians to overtake 
them. Perhaps it was simply an ill wind that blew no 
good.
In an effort to convince the Italians that com­
merce was flourishing in the kingdom, Eugene had Italian 
journals report the number of ships entering and clear­
ing Italian ports. Three such instances deserve mention
32Ibid., 2 May 1809. A polacre was a small, square rigged merchant ship used on the Mediterranean Sea.
33Ibid., 5 July 1810.
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because of patent falsity. Italian papers announced in 
% April 1809 tbat in the week of 24 March, thirty-seven 
trading ships entered and left the port of Ancona, and
that in the week of 2 April, thirty-nine had entered and
34cleared the same port. On 19 August 1811 the Moniteur 
carried an announcement that 342 ships from Adriatic 
ports carrying all sorts of goods had entered and
cleared at Venice. Of the 342 ships, 283 had carried
35the products of Italy. And in June 1813 Venice re­
ported that 422 ships entered the port in May carrying 
oil, iron, heating and construction wood, salt, rice, 
and bronze and that 380 left carrying non-prohibited
7 /*goods to Illyria and Apulia. Either historians who 
contend that the Continental System damaged Italy ex­
tensively are wrong, or these reports are absolutely 
false. It is strange that the Italian government would 
issue such claims. Italians certainly recognized the 
decline in trade. They knew the British navy waited 
off Venice and prevented trade. If Eugene expected 
such reports to be believed, he must have expected the 
believers to be non-Italian.
34Ibid., 20 April 1810.
33Ibid.. 19 August 1811.
36Ibid., 29 June 1813.
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Eugene used the papers of Italy extensively to 
publish items about the army as well as the navy, par­
ticularly in the last years of French control. In June 
1810 the Publiciste announced that French and Italian 
troops had been in Venice for some time and had earned 
the admiration of the population of the city for their
good behavior. According to the Publiciste their
37bearing and discipline had been perfect. ' In 1812 the 
role of troops commanded by Eugene at the battle of 
Borodino received wide publicity, and the implication 
was voiced that if it had not been for Eugene1s forces 
storming and holding the center of the grand redoubt,
70Napoleon might have suffered a crushing defeat.
To publicize and commemorate the seizure of 
Moscow, Eugene, in September 1812, decreed that the
37Ibid., 15 June 1810.
^ Ibid., 2 November 1812; Jean Hanoteau (ed.), 
Memoirs of Armand de Caulaincourt (2 vols.; Vol. I,With Napoleon in Russia; Vol. II, No Peace with Na­
poleon! ; New Yorks William Morrow and Company, 1935- 
1936>), I, 99* (Hereafter cited as Caulaincourt, Memoirs). Caulaincourt claims his brother took the 
grand redoubt. But see Rose, Napoleon I, II, 234-235, 
and Mrs. Arthur Bell (trans. and ed.). Memoirs of Baron 
Lejeune (2 vols.; Londons Longmans, Green, and C o ~  1897), II, 181-182. (Hereafter cited as Lejeune, 
Memoirs).
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street named Saint Theresa in Milan, which ran from the
mint to the Tenaglia Gate, would henceforth be called
Moscow Street, and the Tenaglia Gate itself wouid be
knows as the Gate of Victory. J The Italian government
promulgated the decree one day before Eugene fought
desperately at Viasma in support of Marshal Eavout
40during the French retreat from Russia.
In January 1813 the Moniteur carried a letter 
reportedly written by Eugene to General Henri Clarke 
denying that the cowardliness of Eugene's troops had 
permitted Russian General Ivanovitch Platoff to capture 
most of the Viceroy’s artillery on 8 November 1812.
The letter stated that the Viceroy indeed had lost his 
artillery, but that this reverse was due to the loss 
of great numbers of horses from freezing. Eugene's 
troops destroyed the artillery before abandoning it. 
Eugene also refuted the claim that the Russians took 
3,700 of his troops prisoner on 8 November. According 
to the letter, the only troops captured by the Russians
3QMoniteur. 25 October 1812; 12 November 1812. On the day the retreat from Moscow began, a le Eeum 
was sung in Saint Ambrose Cathedral in Milan in praise for the victory at Moscow.
40Sloane, Napoleon. Ill, 360.
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were those who took refuge in villages to escape the
41cold which struck on 7 November. Curiously, this 
letter supposedly written to Clarke on 6 January 1813 
did not make mention of the heroism of Eugene*s corps 
in rescuing Marshal Michel Ney and his division from
Platoff on 9 November 1812 as they struggled toward
42Smolensk. According to an eyewitness Eugene lost his
artillery and his baggage because it became stuck in
43the mud on the banks of the Wop River.
In the dark days of 1813 Eugene utilized the 
news services to bolster the public spirit of the 
Italians. He published the news of troop arrivals in­
tended to strengthen the sagging Italian military force. 
He later published articles which indicated that the
Austrians experienced greater difficulty than the Prench
44in holding their positions.
Eugene, in September 1813, issued a decree 
calling to the army men previously discharged or re­
jected. The decree contained a proclamation which was
41Moniteur, 27 January 1813* It is this writer's opinion that "the letter was written by some person other 
than Eugene for propaganda purposes.
42 Sloane, Napoleon, III, 364.
43Lejeune, Memoirs, II, 215-
44Moniteur, 20. July 1813; 25 August 1813; 11 Oc­tober 1813.
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an impassioned appeal to the Italian people to come to 
the defense of the kingdom, and Eugene hoped it would
45encourage the Italians to make even greater sacrifices. 
In October the Milanese paper, II Corriere Milanese, 
carried yet another appeal in which Eugene attempted to 
stir the nationalist spirit of the Italians. The plea 
made by the Viceroy appeared on 17 October, and on 21 
October the report came from Brescia that the procla­
mation had been well received there and that Bresciafs 
quota would be filled in a short time— indeed, men of 
that area were anxious to take their places under the 
flag. Brescians reported that they remembered a time
when Napoleon could boast of their fidelity, and they
4-6intended to prove the truth of his words.
As fortune continued to turn her face from the 
forces of the Empire in 1813, and it became more and 
more apparent that Italy might be forced to depend upon 
the populace for defense, civic guards were formed over
^Ihid., 21 October 1813.
^ Ibid., 24 and 28 October 1813; Leon Lecestre, Lettres inediies de Napoleon Ier (2 vols.; 2nd ed.; 
Paris: E. PIon, Nourrit et cie, 1897), II, 298, Na­poleon to Eugene, 18 November 1813. (Hereafter cited as Lecestre, Lettres inedites). That the Italian public 
spirit was bad in the autumn of 1813 is proven by Na­
poleon^ letter to Eugene of 18 November in which he 
told, the Viceroy not to be discouraged by a bad public spirit in Italy.
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the realm.. According to the news releases, this program
47met with good response from the populace. Individual 
departments were cited by the government for their ex­
ertions in this matter.
Battles and skirmishes, whether Italian forces 
won or lost, received coverage designed to cause the 
Italians to believe the Austrians always suffered more 
greatly than the army of the Viceroy. If Eugene was
on the site of the battle, his presence was invariably
49reported as being an incentive to the troops. The 
retreat of the army across Italy was reported in matter- 
of-fact fashion, but as each new position was taken, 
Italian papers made it appear that the Viceroy was re­
grouping his forces to take the offensive, and the
50Austrians were pictured as barely holding their own.
In November 1813 the papers announced that French rein­
forcements were at Turin and were advancing to the aid 
of the Italians.^
^ Moniteur, 24 December 1813.
^8Ibid., 2 and 20 January 1814.
49For representative report see Moniteur, 10 
November 1813.
50J For examples of such reports see the issues 
of the Moniteur for October and November 1813, and 
February 1814.
-^Moniteur, 16 November 1813.
262
In the same month the Italian papers also an­
nounced that the Viceroy’s family went to Verona to 
visit him and intended to stay a ’’few days.” One is 
tempted to believe that this announcement represents an 
effort on the part of the government to allay popular 
fears that an invasion of Lombardy proper was imminent. 
The same announcement carried the report that an officer 
from the headquarters of the Italian division in Spain 
had come to Verona and had told the Viceroy and the 
people there that the greatest desire of that division 
was to return to Italy and defend her soil. He reported 
they were overjoyed when they received orders to do just 
that.52
While the papers made the attempt to prove the 
devotion of the Italians to the French, they unwittingly 
indicated that this was perhaps more wishful thinking 
than fact. In October 1813 the papers warned that if 
the Austrians overran Italy, they would show no mercy 
to state functionaries and others who supported the 
Napoleonic regime, and quoted Marie-Louise’s speech to 
the French Senate to prove the point. According to the 
report, Marie-Louise told the French, ”1 know better
52Ibid., 25 November 1813
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than any person what our people will have to suffer if
53they ever allow themselves to he conquered."
To give some indication of Austrian repression
to come, the papers announced in November 1813 that the
Austrians freed criminals and made them officers in the
Austrian army, and that they robbed the inhabitants of
the Tyrol by paying for requisitions with scrip, making
54the specious promise to pay later in cash. In January
1814 the Italians were consoled by the government wj^th
the observation that though the Italians suffered from
55the- war, the Austrians also suffered.
In mid-February 1814 the Italian government 
made a final effort to prove1- the bestiality of the 
Austrians. The government reported that the safety of 
Mantua had been jeopardized by Austrian release of a 
chain gang of prisoners taken captive by an Austrian 
contingent. "This is one of the benefits we owe to the 
generosity of our enemy," ran the report in the Italian 
Journal officiel.3^
53Ibid., 26 October 1813.
54Ibid., 8 and 27 November 1813
55Ibid., 6 January 1814.
56Ibid., 23 February 1814.
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To improve the kingdom, and to convince Italians 
that French control did not mean only exaction, the 
government entered into a comprehensive program of 
public works. The first public works project was de­
signed to control the flood waters of the kingdom’s 
major rivers.
The Po River, which drains the great plain of 
Lombardy, rises in the Cottian Alps southwest of Turin 
and meanders 418 miles to the Adriatic. It is fed by 
the Loria Battea River, which rises in the G-ratian 
Alps; the Agogna River rising in the Pennine Alps; the 
Ticino River, which both feeds and flows out of Lake 
Maggiore and rises in the Lepontine Alps above Locarno, 
Switzerland; the Adda River which rises in the Raetian 
Alps above Lake Como and both feeds and drains that 
lake; the Oglia River, also with its source in the 
Raetian Alps; and the Mincio River born at Lake Garda. 
These rivers all flow almost directly from north to 
south, and each carries a large volume of water in the 
springtime from melting winter snow. The main tribu­
taries of the Po from the south are the Tanaro and the 
Tebbia Rivers, both of which have their sources in the 
Ligurian Alps and likewise carry a large volume of 
water from melting snows. The annual spring thaw of 
the snowcaps fed into the Po by the tributaries make 
the relatively short river a torrent of destruction.
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Almost immediately after his coronation as King
of Italy, Napoleon decreed a levee-building program to
control the spring floods. He recognized that a project
of such an ambitious nature would constitute a task too
great for the communes and villages situated on the Po
to bear, and ordered that the Kingdom of Italy bear one-
third of the cost. The villages located in the flood
area were to share proportionally the remaining two-
67thirds of the cost. In the early stages of con­
struction the need of horses for military transport
58interrupted progress. In times of peace the work
continued, and five years later the only reports of
59flooding came from Pavia and Mantua.
The Sesia River, with its source at the Great 
St. Bernard Pass, also was subject to flooding, and 
Napoleon issued a decree designed to put a program of 
flood control into effect in the department of Agogna* 
This area depended largely upon irrigation, and the 
farmers protested that the flood control project, which
^^Moniteur, 23 Prairial, Year XIII (12 June
1805).
58 ̂Beauharnais Archive, Eugene to the Minister 
of Administration of War, 10 December 1806.
69Moniteur, 14 October 1810. The exact amount 
of work done on the levee along the Po cannot be de­termined from available sources.
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consisted of diverting water to the Ticino, would de­
prive them of their water rights by reducing the flow 
in the Sesia. Eugene reported to Napoleon that the 
farmers had protested against the flood control project, 
but neglected to mention on what grounds the farmers 
made their complaint. Therefore, Napoleon demanded to 
know why the farmers protested, and Eugene instructed 
Testi to survey the area to determine the extent of 
damage the farmers would suffer from the project. Ap­
parently this report was sent to Napoleon, for the King
promised Eugene he would consider the complaints of the
. . 60 proprietors.
To control partially the waters of the Reno 
River, which rises in the Apennines above Bologna and 
flows into the Adriatic about thirty miles south of the 
Po, Napoleon ordered a system of canals diverting water 
to the Po. To provide cheap transportation between 
Pavia and Milan he ordered the construction of a canal 
to link the Adda and Ticino Rivers. The same order 
gave instructions for dredging the Mincio to provide a 
navigable inland river, and made provision for a project
60Eugene, Memoires, I, 175-176, 182, 190-192, 
Eugene to Napoleon, 21 June 1805? Napoleon to Eugene, 25 June 1805 and 4 July 1805? Beauhamais Archive, 
Eugene to Councillor-of-State Testi, 27 June 1805.
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6"Lof cleaning and deepening the lagoons at Venice.
Still another flood control project attempted by the
government was a program of diking the Brenta and
g oBacchilione Rivers located in Venetia.
The funds for the construction of the Pavia- 
Milan canal, provided in the budget of 1806, proved to 
be insufficient, and in 1809 Eugene decreed that the 
Department of Olona and the government would share the 
remainder of the cost. The government assumed four- 
fifths of the cost, for Eugene felt that the state and 
the department should share the cost in proportion to 
the benefit derived from such a project.
Eugene appointed a commission of hydraulic engi­
neers to review the water ways at Venice. The com­
mission consisted of two members from the Department of 
the Adriatic and one member each from the departments
of Adige, Lower Po Brenta, Bacchilione, and Taglia-
fi4.mento. The commission had the task of presenting 
plans for the development of Venetian water communi­
cation, both in the city and in the lagoons, in addition
g “tNapoleon, Correspondence, XII, 369» Napoleon to Eugene, 13 May 1806.
^ Moniteur, 2 August 1811.
^Ibid., 2 August 18Q9«
^Ibid., 25 September 1806.
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to proposing a solution to the conflicting ideas of
Venetians and the people of the surrounding area con-
65cerning the usage of water
Later Eugene appointed two commissions to develop 
a program of "beautification for Milan and Venice. In 
each instance the mayor of the city served as the presi­
dent of the commission aided by members of the faculties
6 6of the schools of fine arts. Work on the program of 
beautification did not get under way at Milan until 
later on in the year (1807).^7 The Milanese beautifi­
cation commission ordered the planting of trees and 
flowering shrubs, and the development of boulevards.
By autumn serious work was under way, and by late Sep­
tember the first stones of Milan's arch of triumph had 
68been laid. While Milan could boast of civic develop­
ment late in 1807, Venice did not get a beautification
cqprogram under way until somewhat later. Mot until 
1811 could Venice report that the beautification program
^ Ibid., 19 August 1806.
66Ibid., 25 January 1807.
67Ibid., 7 October 1807.
68Ibid.
^ Ibid., 2 April 1809.
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had made an appreciable difference in the appearance of 
that city.7*"*
Though the Italian government expended the
greatest effort on beautification and civic improvement
in Venice and Milan, other areas received attention.
Eugene, on 28 November 1806, ordered the Minister of
Interior to provide for the paving of the streets at
Monza. Streets there were so rough and full of holes
that the Viceroy expressed amazement that horses and
71carriages had not suffered damage.
While concerning itself with the development of 
a system of canals and flood control projects, the 
Viceroy's government did not lose sight of the necessity 
to develop a system of roads throughout the realm. On 
12 July 1805 Eugene ordered a highway built between 
Piacenza and Sestri, and at about the same time Eugene 
wrote the Minister of Bridges and Roads to begin plans
70Ibid., 30 April 1811.
71Beauharnais Archive, Eugene to the Minister 
of Interior, 28 November 1806. According to the letter 
of the Viceroy, the order to pave the streets at Monza 
stemmed from the King's visit. If this is true, either the. letter is misdated or Eugene was exceptionally slow in getting anything done, for in November 1806 it had 
been a year and a half since Napoleon last visited Italy. His next visit was November 1807.
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72for a road over the great Simplon Pass. By 21 Sep­
tember Eugene reported to Napoleon that he had es­
tablished post roads from Milan to the western frontiers 
of the kingdom. This would make it possible to send 
couriers either by way of the Simplon or the St. Gothard 
Pass.
The Viceroy sent a representative to the chief
magistrate of the Republic of Valais to arrange for the
passage of couriers through his territory, and hoped
that everything would be arranged with Valais by 29 Sep- 
73tember. Though Eugene made no mention of the success 
of the negotiations with Valais, the fact that one of 
Napoleon*s couriers came to Milan in early October by 
way of the St. Gothard and that Eugene sent him back by 
way of the Simplon indicates the agreement was made.^^
In the second week of October 1805 Eugene re­
ported to the Emperor that he had inspected the road 
over the Simplon and had found it very good. It could
72Moniteur, 14 Thermidor, Year XIII (2 August 1805); Beauharnais Archive, Eugene to the Minister of Interior, n.d. This letter is undated, but it appears between letters of 12 July 1805 and 3 October 1805.
"^Eugene, Memoires, I, 380-381, Eugene to Na­poleon, 21 September 1805.
74Ibid., 405, Eugene to Napoleon, 3 October 1805*
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toe used for the transport of artillery readily during
the spring, summer, and fall, tout lie tliouglit it would
75toe useless during the season of heavy snow.
It appears that the funds appropriated for the 
road from Piacenza to Sestri were insufficient, for on 
22 April 1806 Napoleon decreed the expenditure of 
200,000 francs for the same purpose. Writing in July 
to determine if the project was under way, the King 
suggested that inland Italy toe connected to the sea toy 
a series of roads. Napoleon wrote that he wanted a 
road from Parma to La Spezia, Piacenza to Sestri, and 
Piacenza to La Spezia. He preferred a road which would 
connect with the road from Genoa to Italy since Genoa
7 6served as the gateway for French goods entering Italy.
Later that same summer Eugene issued a decree 
authorizing the construction of a road from Belluno to 
Serravolle. and from the latter place to Cadore. The 
government did not share in the cost of this road, for 
the department through which it would pass had asked 
for permission to touild it. A decree provided for a 
loan of 400,000 livres from the Italian treasury to
^ Itoid.. 416-417, Eugene to Napoleon, 11 Oc­tober 1805*
76Napoleon, Correspondance, XII, 506, Napoleonto Montalivet, 3 July 1806. Jean—Pierre Montalivet wasDirector-General of Public Works.
272
provide funds for building the road with the stipulation
that tolls collected should pay the loan. At the same
time, the Viceroy provided for a road between Ferrara
and Padua and the repair of the road from Padua to
77Fusina and Pont-Longno. While constructing these 
roads Eugene began a road to connect Cenada, Brixen, and 
Belluno. The Viceroy halted this project to begin con­
struction in the Department of Piave on a road con-
78necting Trevino, Belluno, and Feltre. Such a road 
would make possible rapid transport of material from 
Venice to Cadore to supply his army in the event that 
he needed it.
Only two bridges, one at Priula on the Piave 
River and one crossing the Ticino, are mentioned in 
Eugene’s and Napoleon’s letters. Napoleon ordered that 
both should be built with stone and should serve a 
military purpose. The bridge crossing the Ticino should 
be located on the most direct route from Milan to Turin 
and be built so that the right bank should dominate the 
left. The only mention of cost in connection with the 
two bridges is Napoleonfs directive to Eugene that he
^ Moniteur, 19 August 1806.
78Beauharnais Archive, Eugene to Paradisi, Di­rector-General of Waters and Roads, 13 June 1808.
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keep the cost of the "bridge at Priula to less than. 
2,000,000 francs.^
For some reason not recorded, work did not pro­
gress on the public works ordered by Napoleon so rapidly 
as he desired, and in June he wrote the Viceroy a
grumbling letter in which he posed the question, "What
80the devil are you doing in Italy?" He told the 
Viceroy not to retire until he had made certain that 
his orders had been obeyed. Whatever the reason for 
the delay, Napoleon’s bad temper had no effect, and he 
was still writing letters complaining of slow progress
Q"|as late as November 1808.
To remind Italians that they owed independence 
from Austria and existence as a state to him, Napoleon 
ordered the erection of a number of battlefield monu­
ments. Following this order, Eugene erected monuments
79 *'^Eugene, Memoires, II, 182, Eugene to Napoleon, 22 March 1806; Napoleon, Oorrespondan.ee, XVII, 151» Na­poleon to Eugene, 17 May 1808.
80Napoleon, Correspondance, XVII, 340-341, Na­poleon to Eugene, 30 June 1808. The delay in con­
struction probably was due to the fact that in 1807 Eugene had supplied large numbers of horses and men to the Emperor’s army. In 1807 the summer was excessively hot and many people died. The spring of 1808 was un­usually wet. All these factors combined might have caused delay.
QT __Ibid., XVIII, 74, Napoleon to Eugene, 20 No­vember 1808.
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82at Kivoli, Tagliamento, Castiglione, and Lodi. Dedi­
cated on 13 May 1809, the inscription on the monument 
at Lodi read:
16 May. Under the inspiration and 
leadership of Napoleon, the French having crossed the Alps and defeated 
the Austrian armies returned to Italy 
after centuries of inertia and op­pression her energy and freedom.Italy commends her destiny to the courage and devotion of Napoleon. In 
recognition and joy Italy raises this monument:to the glory of the French 
•warriors, conquerors at Lodi under the inspiration and command of Na­
poleon the Great.83
Due to statistical shortages one is hard 
pressed to arrive at firm conclusions as to the effect 
of the above mentioned programs initiated by Napoleon 
and the Viceroy in Italy, but a few tentative con­
clusions may be drawn.
The crushing censorship imposed upon Italy by 
the Viceroy could have done nothing except stultify 
intellectual curiosity and development during the period 
of his rule. It is all the more striking because Na­
poleon issued more or less confusing directives con-
84cerning press censorship in Italy. Though this
82Ibid., XII, 480, Napoleon to Eugene, 21 June 1806; Moniteur, 25 July 1806.
83Moniteur, 29 May 1809.
84Holtman, Napoleonic Propaganda. 80-81.
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program may “be defended on the ground that such activity 
is necessary for the success of a given type of govern­
ment, there is no justification for an attempt to control 
the mind of man.
The effectiveness of the propaganda effort in 
Italy is impossible to determine. In order for written 
propaganda to be effective it must be read, and though 
opportunities for schooling had increased significantly, 
undoubtedly far more Italians were illiterate than 
literate during the life of the Kingdom of Italy. For 
the literate there was no shortage of printed propaganda 
in Italy, as is evidenced by a letter of the Viceroy to 
Fernando Maresealchi in which he stated that unless it 
was the intent of the Emperor to flood Italy with news­
papers, the new Courrier d^talie and the Journal
85italien, both published in Paris, were unnecessary.
Yet both of these papers were distributed in Italy, and 
excerpts from their pages covering Italian news appeared 
in the Moniteur every year from 1807 to 1814.
The public works program which encompassed most 
of the Kingdom of Italy undoubtedly provided employment 
in large areas. The flood control projects which were 
effective in areas where the work was completed made
85Beauhamais Archive, Eugene to the Minister
of Foreign Affairs, 29 September 1807.
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life easier and property more secure in areas formerly 
at the mercy of rampaging rivers. Monuments, though 
dedicated to the French, must have encouraged some hope 
of national recognition.
CHAPTER XII
COMMERCIAL CONTROL AND THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM
Napoleon attempted to make the satellite 
nations economic colonies of Prance. At the same time 
he intended to make of Prance the greatest manu­
facturing state on the continent.'*' To accomplish this 
end, Napoleon placed restrictions on every facet of 
Italian trade and commerce.
The Emperor, in his effort to ensure French 
mercantile supremacy on the continent, established 
ports of entry to control the flow of non-Prench goods
into Prance. The same ports of entry controlled the
2exportation of French products to foreign markets.
Thus in 1805 Napoleon made Lyons an entry point for 
French goods entering Italy, and the next year he
Tarle, Le blocus continental, 20, 119. Tarle contends that Napoleon intended to make Italy an eco­nomic colony of Prance, as well as to make Prance the most important manufacturing country in Europe.
pEugene, Memoires, VI, 380-384-, Eugene to Na­poleon, 11 September 1810.
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established ports of entry to control the importation
3of German merchandise.
The first step in Napoleon's control of Italian 
trade was restricting the export of grain from Italy by 
a decree promulgated 24- August 1805. The decree pro­
hibited the exportation of grain to Yenetia, the Tyrol, 
the Papal States, and Tuscany. He allowed exportation 
at only three points— two along the Po and one on the 
Sesia. Only licensed persons could engage in the ex-
4port trade. Three days later he wrote Eugene that 
Piedmont suffered from a shortage of grain, and that 
the Yiceroy should encourage Italians to send their 
grain there.'’
Due to the war with England, Napoleon inter­
dicted trade, and Italy perforce had to import from 
some other nation. Then in early 1806 Napoleon asked 
Eugene for a project of a decree which would open Italy
rz ___Moniteur, 9 Thermidor, Year XIII (28 July 1805); 23 February 1806.
^Ibid., 28 Fructidor, Year XIII (15 September 1805). Ports of entry are not mentioned by name in this report.
5Napoleon, Correspondence, XI, 14-8, Napoleonto Eugene, 27 August 1805.
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gto French, manufactures. An imperial decree pro­
mulgated the next day prohibited the importation into 
the French Empire of all cotton except cotton yarn and 
raw cotton and established a duty of sixty francs per 
decimal quintal on raw cotton and seven francs per 
kilogram on yarn. The only places where cotton could
enter the Empire were the cities of Antwerp, Cologne,
7Mayence, Strasbourg, Freiburg, and Versoix. Italy and 
other nations under Napoleon’s control would buy the 
finished cotton from French processors.
In order to strengthen the sale of the products 
of French manufacturers in Italy, Napoleon prohibited 
the sale of the goods of satellite nations in the
QKingdom of Italy.
At least in the later stages Eugene must have 
allowed goods to enter from Germany. The author has 
found no letter written by Napoleon in September 1810
gIbid., XII, 87, Napoleon to Collin de Sussy, director-general of customs, 22 February 1806; John 
Baum Harrison, "The Continental System in Italy as 
Eevealed by American Commerce" (Doctoral dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1937), 166. (Hereafter cited 
as Harrison, "Continental System").
7Moniteur. 23 February 1806. A quintal equals220.46 pounds. A decimal quintal, therefore, equals22.046 pounds.
QTarle, Le blocus continental, 129-130.
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complaining about German goods in Italy, but such a 
letter must have been written. Probably the letter was 
very hotly worded, for Eugene stiffly informed the King 
that cotton goods from Switzerland and Germany were al­
lowed to enter the Kingdom of Italy under the terms of
decrees of 10 June 1806, 12 January 1807, and 28 De- 
qcember 1807. In answer to this letter Napoleon merely 
stated that the Ticeroy's assertions needed studying. 
The Emperor told Eugene that foodstuffs and cloth goods 
entering Italy through Prance and from the Duchy of 
Berg should be held in a depot until customs officials 
could determine whether the goods came from Prance, a 
German state, or Switzerland. Eugene had asked for a 
modification in duties, and the King informed him in 
the letter that none could be allowed except at Ver- 
celli and Pavia, though he did not indicate to what ex­
tent duties might be lowered.10
Eugene apparently requested permission in No­
vember 1810 to purchase cotton goods from Germany, for 
in a very blunt letter Napoleon refused to grant this
^Eugene, Memoires, YI, 380-384, Eugene to Na­poleon, 11 September 1810.
10Napoleon, Correspondance. XXI, 146-147, Na­poleon to Eugene, 27 September 1810; Tarle, le blocuscontinental. 24-26.
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request. He told the Viceroy that Italy would have to
obtain her cotton, from France.
A year later the Viceroy allowed Italians to
import German cottons. At this time Napoleon wrote
Eugene an abusive letter telling him it was maddening
that he had allowed German goods to enter Italy on the
strength of a letter from Antonio Aldini. The Emperor
informed Eugene that German goods could enter Italy
only as the result of a decree. He softened the tone
of his letter somewhat by writing that Eugene’s great
error was not in allowing German goods to enter, but
12that he had done so without authorization.
Napoleon wrote Eugene in August 1810 that he 
had learned the Italian grain harvest was light that 
year, and told the Viceroy he should not allow a heavy
1̂ 5exportation of wheat. A month later he instructed 
Eugene to stop all exportation of grain to points out­
side the Empire and to send it instead into Piedmont 
and France' proper. To encourage exportation of grain
"^Napoleon, Correspondance, XXI, 276-277* Na­poleon to Eugene, 15 November 1810.
~^Ibid., XXIII, 302, Napoleon to Eugene, 10 March 1812.;
~^Ibid.* XXI, 81-82, Napoleon to Eugene, 31 
August 181(5! Tarle, Le blocus continental. 18.
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from Italy to Prance the French government removed the■ 
duty on grains entering Prance. Napoleon anticipated 
Italian opposition to mandatory export to Prance. He 
observed to the Viceroy that the needs of the people 
were often at variance with the desires of producers, 
and that Eugene's first duty was to his people. There­
fore, he should deafen himself to the proprietors' 
sophisms which Napoleon expected to follow this di­
rective."*"̂
Rather than encourage the exportation of wheat
to Prance and Piedmont, Eugene issued an order which
prohibited such exportation.. This action brought a
letter from Napoleon in which he told the Viceroy not
to prohibit the export of wheat to Prance— the only
thing Eugene could do would be to encourage the grain
merchants.to send their grain into the interior of the
15realm for sale.
Eugene did not take the directive fully to 
heart. In November he wrote Marescalchi, the Italian 
foreign minister, to tell the Minister of the Helvetian 
Republic that he had given orders to sell necessary
14Napoleon, Correspondance, XXI, 142, Napoleon to Eugene, 24 September 1810.
15Ibid., 289, Napoleon to Eugene. 24 November1810.
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grain to the canton of Tessin to relieve a shortage
there.^ It is evident from the letter written by the
Viceroy that he wanted nothing more to be put into
writing on the subject. Marescalchi received orders in
the same letter to tell the Swiss minister that Italian
troops then in the canton would receive enough grain
17for their own needs.
Though this controversy over wheat indicates 
that in time of need Eugene fought imperial restrictions 
which harmed Italy, the Viceroy did not hesitate to de­
fend the restrictive policy when imperial regulations 
did not harm Italian producers. In 1808, for instance, 
rice growers in Italy complained to the Minister of 
Interior of the Empire, who wrote Marescalchi, and 
Marescalchi reported the complaint to the Viceroy. In 
this instance Eugene replied that the complaints of the 
rice growers had no solid foundation. Tariffs on rice 
were not excessive, and though the situation of rice 
producers had been bad in 1804 and 1805, by 1808 they 
had captured the French rice market normally dominated 
by Americans; the price of rice was good, and the
16Beauharnais Archive, Eugene to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 3 November 1810.
17Italian troops had been sent into Switzerland 
to control smuggling. See below p. 286.
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harvest was plentiful. In 1806 the government gave aid
to this group by purchasing most of the crop, and in
1808 the Viceroy intended to purchase more than a third
of the rice produced in Italy. Eugene emphasized that
he could support his position with facts and figures.
*
Rice complaints do not figure further in his corre- 
spondance
Tariffs, as well as prohibitions against foreign 
imports and Italian exports to countries other than 
France, played a part in the commercial policy Napoleon 
applied to Italy. Whether French tariff rates were ap­
plied in Italy before 1810 is uncertain. However, it 
is clear that after 1810 tariffs in Italy were to be 
the same as those of France, for on 31 August 1810 Na­
poleon informed the Viceroy he should collect the same
iqtariff on colonial goods that France collected. Then 
in October 1810 the Emperor instructed Eugene to apply 
the tariff of 5 August 1810 to all colonial merchandise
18Beauharnais Archive, Eugene to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 9 July 1810. tPhereis no available letter from the Imperial Minister of Interior to Mares­
calchi or from Marescalchi to Eugene. Eugene*s letter states that he had Marescalchi*s letter explaining the 
situation. The contents of Eugene*s letter indicate that Italian rice producers complained of their market.
19Napoleon, Correspondance, XXI, 81-82; Harri­
son, "Continental System, '* 166. According to Harrison 
the tariff of 5 August 1810 caused prices to skyrocket.
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found in warehouses and to deposit the receipts of this 
tariff in a special fund to "be called tlie extraordi­
naire des douanes which should be used exclusively for
20naval construction. Eugene immediately established 
this fund.21
The tariff of 5 August 1810 placed a rather high
duty on Italian silk entering Prance. Eugene, on 14
August 1810, wrote the Emperor that the new tariff
would do irreparable damage to the Italian silk trade
and other export items and would reduce Italy*s ability
to pay her share of the cost of the Empire. He asked
Napoleon to lower the tariff on silk entering Prance.
He noted that the tariff would be very favorable to
22Prance, but very unfavorable to Italy. To this letter
20Napoleon, Correspondancet XXI, 165-166, Na­poleon to Eugene, 2 October 1810; Eugene, Memoires, VI, 
409-411, Napoleon to Eugene, 2 October 1810. The extraordinaire des douanes was simply a special or extraordinary fund raisedfrom the extraordinary appli­cation of the tariff. In essence Napoleon’s directive 
constituted an order to apply the tariff twice or make in retroactive.
Pi Eugene, Memoires, VI, 423, Eugene to Napoleon, 8 October 1810.
22 Ibid., 361-363, Eugene to Napoleon, 14 August1810; Harrison, "Continental System,a 166-167-
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the King replied that Italy would just have to suffer, 
and Eugene must take as his motto, ’France before 
all.”23
The Upper Adige previously had been subject to 
the payment of import taxes, but Eugene removed this 
requirement by a decree which ordered the establishment 
of customs houses along the Bavarian and Austrian 
borders.2^
The application of the tariff of 5 August 1810 
apparently led to much activity on the part of smug­
glers, particularly along the Italo-Swiss border. The
Viceroy, in October 1810, sent troops into Switzerland
25to stop smuggling. The mountainous northwest region 
of Venetia provided good shelter for smugglers, and 
when it became apparent that civil authorities could 
not prevent smuggling along the Venetian border, Eugene
n  rused the army to suppress illicit trade. The Viceroy
23Napoleon, Correspondance. XXI, 60-61, Na­poleon to Eugene, 23 August 1810; Eugene, Memoires. VI, 367-369, Napoleon to Eugene, 23 August 1810.
24Moniteur, 19 July 1810. The Upper Adige was the Italian Tyrol annexed by Italy in 1810.
25̂Napoleon, Correspondance, XXI, 191-192, Na­poleon to Eugene, 6 October 1810.
ncIbid., XXIII, 393, Napoleon to Eugene, 30April 1812.
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acted directly on Napoleon’s orders in sending troops
into Switzerland, but Napoleon told him he should tell
the Swiss that he acted on his own authority, and only
in case of necessity should he appeal to the Emperor
27for support in the action. The King, without stating
his reason, in November 1810 ordered Eugene to recall 
PRthe troops.
Napoleon, in addition to restricting the Italian
export business, extended to the Kingdom of Italy the
policy of excluding British goods. This policy, by no
29means new in 1805, Eugene applied by decree soon after 
becoming Viceroy.^0
When Venetia became a part of the kingdom, the 
Viceroy decreed that the French commercial regulations 
would apply to that state. However Venice, whose ex­
istence depended primarily upon trade, became a free
2^Ibid., XXI, 191-192, Napoleon to Eugene, 6 Oc­
tober 1810.
2 8Ibid., 280, Napoleon to Eugene, 19 November
1810.
29Eli F. Heckscher, The Continental System, An 
Economic Interpretation, ed. “by Harald Westergaard 
(Oxford: At -bhe Clarendon Press, 1922), 78-83. (Here­
after cited as Heckscher, Continental System).
30Beauhamais Archive, Eugene to the Minister
of Finance, 31 July 1805.
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port except for English goods. In addition to pro­
hibiting the entry of English goods at Venice, the 
decree provided that any merchant caught with such 
goods in his possession would suffer confiscation of
the merchandise and a fine equal to one-third of its 
’31value.
Though Eugene, in July 1805, promulgated a de­
cree which prohibited English goods in Italy, the 
Journal italien reported on 20 June 1806 that he had 
issued another decree prohibiting the entry of English 
goods into the kingdom. The announcement went on to
report that Italy was determined to make its way with-
52out the products of English manufacturers.
Six months later the Viceroy decreed that no
saltmeat or fish from England would be allowed in the 
53kingdom. Then in mid-autumn 1807 Eugene announced 
that he intended to carry out a program of inspection 
of goods in customs sheds and private warehouses in 
search of English merchandise„ If the investigators 
should find goods of prohibited origin, such items 
would be sequestered.3^
31Moniteur. 27 February 1806.
32Ibid., 5 July 1806.
33Ibid., 29 January 1807.
34Ibid., 24 October 1807.
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Napoleon1s visit to Italy in November and De­
cember of 1807 and the promulgation of the Milan Decree
35left Eugene in a most delicate position. Hence­
forward the Continental System was to he more strin­
gently enforced. Eugene had to make an effort to 
please Napoleon without alienating merchants who saw
3 6their investments in foreign merchandise confiscated.
Eugene also supervised the enforcement of the 
Continental System in the Illyrian Provinces, and he 
encouraged the Austrians to enforce the.system at Tri­
este, which remained in Austrian hands until 1809- One 
letter written in 1808 by Eugene to Napoleon indicates 
that the Austrians faithfully enforced the system there, 
even to the extent of sequestering goods in Trieste that
Ibid., 18 November 1807. The British, in 
November 1807, issued the famed orders in council whichrequired all ships bound for Europe to stop and allow British officers to search the cargoes they carried;ifor
contraband goods. If contraband goods were found, thecargo and ship were confiscated. If no such goods were 
found, the ship was to be given a license and allowed 
to continue its voyage. The Milan Decree answered this 
policy by declaring that any neutral ship searched by the British and bearing the British license would be 
treated as a British ship when it reached a French port 
and would be subject to confiscation.
^Eugene, Memoires, IV, 13.
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formed, the cargoes of prizes taken by the British on 
37the high seas.
Though in most instances Eugene conscientiously 
attempted to put into operation in Italy the directives 
sent by Napoleon, there is evidence which indicates 
that he did not enter wholeheartedly into the appli­
cation of the Continental System. Napoleon, just be­
fore his visit to Italy in November 1807, told Eugene 
he was pained to learn that the Viceroy allowed English 
products to be sold in Italy. The Emperor ordered the 
Viceroy to stop that practice, to confiscate all English 
goods, to store them in specified warehouses, and to
7g'dispose of them as instructed.
Though there is no direct evidence that the 
Viceroy did not faithfully follow the exclusion policy 
in 1807, in 1808 he deliberately broke the system.
Salt was scarce in Italy by the end of the year, and to 
meet the emergency Eugene ordered that any and all ships 
carrying salt exclusively, whether licensed by the 
British or not, should be allowed to enter Italian ports
37Ibid., 187, Eugene to Napoleon, 20 June 1808.
7QNapoleon, Correspondance, XVI, 160-161, Na­poleon to Eugene, 13 November 1807; Tarle, Le blocuscontinental. 21-25.
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and sell the salt. The Viceroy did this, he said, be­
cause transport from Naples posed difficulties, and he 
gave permission for salt ships to enter Italian ports
during the months of January, February, and March 
391809. EugeneTs violation of the system indicates a 
stubborn unwillingness to adhere to orders which harmed 
It aly.
The importation of goods into the Empire was
controlled by a system of licensing, but Eugene did not
follow the same system as that of France. In 1809 Jean
Champagny, the imperial foreign minister, complained to
Marescalchi, the Italian foreign minister, about Italy1s 
40system. Eugene wrote Marescalchi that his system had 
been approved by the Emperor. The Viceroy admitted 
that the system might not prevent smugglers from ob­
taining licenses, but he pointed out that unless the 
foreign goods a merchant held matched in quantity and 
quality the description of goods registered on the cer­
tificate of entry, government officials confiscated the 
merchandise.^1
39Beauharnais Archive, Eugene to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 20 February 1809•
40Ibid. Champagny1s letter to Marescalchi is not available, but from Eugenefs letter to Marescalchi 
it appears to have been written on 26 January 1809.
41Ibid., Eugene to the Minister of Foreign Af­fairs, 20 February 1809*
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On the same day Eugene told Marescalchi to in­
form Champagny that the government did not allow trans­
portation of colonial goods into Italy unless the 
merchant satisfied the customs inspectors that the mer­
chandise came from an allowed origin. When the customs 
officials were satisfied as to the origin of goods, 
they issued a certificate of entry and permit of transit. 
Such certificates might he sold, the Viceroy admitted, 
but Italy followed a policy of constant inspection which 
could expose such activity.42
Further evidence of less than wholehearted en­
forcement of the Continental System in Italy is con­
tained in a letter from Napoleon to Eugene written in
1810. In the letter, Napoleon ordered Eugene to stop 
the sale in Italy of colonial merchandise without a li­
cense of origin. At the same time he instructed the 
Viceroy to sequester American ships in Italian ports and 
to confiscate their cargoes. At this point Napoleon 
bluntly told Eugene that Holland had lost her inde­
pendence for violation of the Continental System and 
that Italy was not immune to the same treatment.4^
42Ibid.
43Napoleon, Correspondance, XX, 241-242, Na­poleon to Eugene, 24 February 1816; Eugene, Memoires«VI, 317, Napoleon to Eugene, 24 February 1810.
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Apparently suspecting that his stepson -winked 
at violations of the system, Napoleon, in August 1810, 
instructed Eugene to send a list of ships which had 
cleared Italian ports in 1810. He further requested a 
report on the cargoes carried and the price of coffee, 
sugar, wheat, cotton, and indigo.^ Napoleon received 
no reports of importation into Italy after this letter, 
and in December wrote the Yiceroy that he could not 
conceive that Italy had imported nothing since 5 August, 
but that this was the only conclusion he could draw 
since he had received no reports on tariffs collected.
In the same letter Napoleon told Eugene that certifi­
cates of entry from Hamburg sent to Napoleon by Eugene 
were worthless because they lacked authorization and
would allow German goods to enter without the importer’s
45paying the French tariff.
It is impossible to determine whether the lack 
of reports indicates Eugene’s method of avoiding contro­
versy over his failure to enforce the Continental System
^Napoleon, Correspondence, XXI, 24-25» Na­
poleon to Eugene, 6 August 1810.
^^Ibid., 325» Napoleon to Eugene, 18 December1810; Harrison, "Continental System," 167-
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or an actual decline in trade due to a tariff decreed 
on 5 August 1810.
Apparently Napoleon's letter of February 1810
had little effect, for in September 1810 he wrote the
Viceroy that he could allow no colonial merchandise in
Italian ports except that taken as prize at sea or that
which had been confiscated. The Emperor told Eugene
that items such as coffee and cocoa not produced in
Italy should be purchased from Turkey, and that certain
Turkish ships should be licensed to deliver them. All
other Turkish ships as well as ships of other registry
trading in colonial food items should be sequestered.
Napoleon extended the sequestration order to French
46ships that had been stopped by the British.
In Italy as in Switzerland and Venetia, French 
commercial policy and the Continental System were en­
forced by the army. All merchandise of prohibited ori­
gin found by searchers was to- be confiscated. At first 
the army sold the confiscated merchandise at auction 
and used the proceeds for the benefit of the unit 
making the confiscation, one-half going into the unit's
46Napoleon, Correspondance. XXI, 132-134, Na­poleon to Eugene, 19 September 18l"0.
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treasury and the other half being put in a special ac-
47count at Milan.
Beginning early in 1808 receipts from confis-
48cated goods were remitted to the French government.
After 1810 British goods confiscated anywhere were to 
49be burnt. Except for cotton, which was sent to
50Prance, merchandise taken from prize ships was sold.
Acting on his own authority, Eugene authorized the sale
at Ancona of cotton taken on prizes if the purchaser
intended to ship the cotton to either Prance or Italy,
but ordered that authorities making the sale attach a
certificate stating the prize from which the cotton was 
51taken. This precaution protected the purchaser from 
having his cotton confiscated because he lacked a cer­
tificate of entry.
Eugene, Memoires. Ill, 415, Napoleon to Eugene, 26 September 1807; 421-422, Eugene tc Napoleon, 
,2 October 1807.
48Beauharnais Archive, Eugene to Dauchy, Ad­
ministrator-General of Tuscany, 7 March 1808; Eugene to 
the Minister-Director of the Oaisse d*amortissement,
7 March 1808.
49Sloane, Napoleon, II, 466; Moniteur, 14 March 
1811; 1 January 1813; 25 August 1813; Harrison, "Conti­nental System," 166.
50Beauharnais Archive, Eugene to General 
Lemarois, 22 February 1808.
51Ibid., Eugene to General Lemarois, 2 March1808.
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Whether the Continental System was effective as 
a means of destroying British commerce is far "beyond 
the scope of this work. Even the question of the ef­
fect of the Continental System upon Italian commerce is 
only a part of the larger problem of the effect of the 
entire French commercial policy upon Italy. The lack 
of treasury reports makes the whole problem difficult 
to analyze, and only a few tentative conclusions can be 
drawn from available sources.
Available evidence indicates that Italy’s com-
52mereial life suffered a decline. Eugene, in 1807» 
reported that both imports and" exports were far below 
the figures for 1805. This, he said, caused bonds to 
sell very slowly, and in Venice there had been no bonds 
sold in 1807*^ In 1810 2,000 silk workers were
•^Tarle, he blocus continental, 25> 34-35.
■^Eugene, Memoires, III, 389-390, Eugene to 
Napoleon, 17 August 1807; Harrison, "Continental System,” 167-168. According to Harrison, Venetian 
trade was ruined. See also Tarle, he blocus conti­
nental , 28-29. According to Tarle, in both 1807 and 1810 the Italian budget was balanced. However, his 
figures show that receipts in 1807 were some 26,000,000 lire lower than in 1806, According to his figures, re­
ceipts in 1810 were some 6,000,000 in excess of 1809» 
and were 3,000,000 less than in 1811. Such a steady increase indicates strong economic advance. Tarle ad­mits, however, that his figures are only "approximate,” and in the absence of treasury reports they should be used with caution. »
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94unemployed at Vicenza alone. The French policy of 
forcing Italy to sell her silk to manufacturers at 
Lyons undoubtedly was a factor creating unemployment in 
the silk iJldustry.
Conclusions are much more easily drawn about 
Eugene*s actions with regard to the Continental System 
and other controls placed on Italian trade. The evi­
dence of letters from both principals indicates that 
Eugene often stood between Napoleon and his Italian 
subjects. His actions with regard to salt when Italy 
was in need of that commodity, his prohibition of the 
export of grain in 1810, and his obdurate persistence 
in allowing German goods to enter the kingdom when they 
were prohibited indicate that conditions in Italy were 
his first concern.
■^Napoleon, Correspondence, XXI, 276-277, Na­poleon to Eugene, 15 November 181(5; Harrison, “Conti­
nental System," 166-168.
CHAPTER XIII
END OP THE EXPERIMENT
In 1813, while Eugene fought a delaying action 
with the remnants of the Grand Army, Napoleon built 
another army in Prance and issued orders for the de­
fense of Italy. He ordered the Minister of War of the
*kingdom, General Achille Pontanelli, to form at Yerona 
a corps of observation to consist of two French di­
visions and one Italian division. The French divisions 
were to be thirty battalions strong and the Italian di­
vision nine battalions. This corps should have the 
support of 500 Italian light cavalry and sixteen pieces 
of Italian artillery.'3'
A fortnight later Napoleon wrote Pontanelli to 
begin provisioning Italian forts. He told the Minister 
of War to place at Palmanova half the artillery for 
which the fort had been designed. He further ordered 
Pontanelli to provision the fort with flour and biscuit. 
Meat, wine, fodder, wood and other necessary items




should he provided when conditions demanded them. The
same letter instructed Pontanelli to take the same
2action at Osoppo, Malghera, and Ancona.
Basing estimates upon units he had ordered 
formed in Italy and the manpower levy for 1813, Na­
poleon told Pontanelli that he should he able to raise 
an army of 60,000 to defend the kingdom. In addition 
to this number, the Emperor ordered the Minister of War 
of the Prench Empire, General Henri Clarke, to form 
four half-brigades in Italy and six additional garrison 
battalions. Since men for these last units would be 
raw recruits, Napoleon cautioned Clarke to assign them 
to veteran battalions.
But the officials in Italy could not perform 
the task Napoleon gave them, and in May 1813* following 
the battle of Lutzen, the Emperor sent Eugene back to 
Italy to right the machinery of the state and to build 
the army Napoleon felt Italy would need in the event
4Austria joined the enemies of Prance.
Eugene arrived at Milan 18 May 1813 and received
2Ibid.. 432, Napoleon to Pontanelli, 23 January
1813.
^Ibid.. 469-470, Napoleon to Pontanelli, 31
January 1813; 478-482, Napoleon to Clarke, 5 February
1813 .
^Weil, Eugene et Murat. I, 14.
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an enthusiastic greeting. The populace engaged in
Afetes and gala occasions of all sorts, but Eugene, 
burdened with the necessity of rapidly bringing order
5to Italy, took no part in the parties planned for him.
Eugene’s first report to Napoleon reveals tbe
condition of the Italian state. The Viceroy reported
that there had been a number of bankruptcies in Venice, 
and these had affected adversely the Italian treasury.
Though he had arrived only at noon the day before, he 
wrote the Emperor he was beginning work with General 
Martin Vignolle, the Italian chief of staff, to build 
the Italian army.
The picture he painted was not an encouraging 
one, for he told the Emperor that though the conscripts 
of the class of 1813 were beginning to arrive, the 
Italian regiments under his command still lacked 13,000 
men of being at full strength. He further reported 
that he had only 10,000 rifles with which to arm 18,000 
men.^
Eugene’s report must have been disturbing to 
Napoleon, for in April 1813 General Clarke had reported
5Ibid., 2; Moniteur, 25 May 1813
6Weil, Eugene et Murat. I, 77.
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7that Italy would provide an army of 72,000 men. When 
Clarke presented his plan for an Italian army to the 
Viceroy, Eugene wrote that such an organization could
not be achieved, for Clarke had included two divisions
of Croations and Dalmatians who would he needed in
their own areas* In addition, Clarke included ten bat­
talions Eugene should have received from the Kingdom of 
Naples. But Joachim Murat refused to send troops to
gthe Viceroy.
Murat’s attitude caused Eugene considerable 
concern, as well it might. Eugene understood that with­
out support from the south his position vis-a-vis 
Austria would he seriously compromised. If Murat became 
hostile, the Viceroy’s position would be fatal.
Eugene planned an army of four active divisions 
plus two divisions to serve as replacement units. The 
six divisions were to total 58,000 men. Though he made 
great efforts to achieve his goal, in mid-June 1813 the 
army in Italy numbered only 37,031. In addition to the 
units in Italy Eugene could call on 4,436 troops in
7Ibid., 6-9.
6Ibid., 78; PIanat de la Faye, Le Prince BugSne en 1814 (4ih ed.; Parisi Thunot et cie, l&pSj*si, Sugene to Murat, 14 January 1814f 37-40, Murat to Eugene, 21 January 1814. (Hereafter cited as De la Pay®* X>e Prince Eugene).
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an enthusiastic greeting. The populace engaged in
Afetes and gala occasions of all sorts, hut Eugene,
burdened with the necessity of rapidly bringing order
to Italy, took no part in the parties planned for him.
' Eugene’s first report to Napoleon reveals the
condition of the Italian state. The Viceroy reported
that there had been a number of bankruptcies in Venice,
and these had affected adversely the Italian treasury.
Though he had arrived only at noon the day before, he
wrote the Emperor he was beginning work with General
Martin Vignolle, the Italian chief of staff, to build
the Italian army.
The picture he painted was not an encouraging
one, for he told the Emperor that though the conscripts
of the class of 1813 were beginning to arrive, the
Italian regiments under his command still lacked 13*000
men of being at full strength. He further reported
that he had only 10,000 rifles with which to arm 18,000 
6men.
Eugene’s report must have been disturbing to 
Napoleon, for in April 1813 General Clarke had reported
^Ibid., 2; Moniteur, 25 May 1813.
r KWeil, Eugene et Murat, I, 77.
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7that Italy would provide an army of 72,000 men. When 
Clarke presented his plan for an Italian army to the 
Viceroy, Eugene wrote that such an organization could 
not he achieved, for Clarke had included two divisions 
of Croations and Dalmatians who would he needed in 
their own areas. In addition, Clarke included ten bat­
talions Eugene should have received from the Kingdom of
Naples. But Joachim Murat refused to send troops to 
0the Viceroy.
Murat *s attitude caused Eugene considerable 
concern, as well it might. Eugene understood that with­
out support from the south his position vis-a-vis 
Austria would he seriously compromised. If Murat became 
hostile, the V i c e r o y ^  position would he fatal.
Eugene planned an army of four active divisions 
plus two divisions to serve as replacement units. The 
six divisions were to total 58,000 men. Though he made 
great efforts to achieve his goal, in mid-June 1813 thei
army in Italy numbered only 37*031. In addition to the 
units in Italy Eugene could call on 4,436 troops in
7Ihid., 6-9.
^Ibid., 78; Planat de la Paye, De Prince Eugene 
en 1814 (4th ed.; Paris: Thunot et cie, 1858), 32,
Eugene to Murat, 14 January 1814; 37-40, Murat to 
Eugene, 21 January 1814. (Hereafter cited as De la 
Paye, De Prince Eugene).
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Illyria, 1,220 in the Ionian Isles, and 2,282 who occu­
pied Corsica and Elba. French battalions in Italy had
an organizational strength of 14,230, hut these units
9were 6,100 short of their organizational strength.\
Clarke informed Eugene, however, that the troops in
Illyria could not he included in the Italian army, for
they were destined for policing the interior or for
coastal defense. Contrary to this statement to Eugene,
Clarke reported the Illyrian units to the Emperor as
composing part of the Italian army.^
Napoleon promised the Viceroy troops from
Brittany, Naples, and Provence. Though it is doubtful
that Napoleon actually sent the promised troops, it
appears that he did send the 1st Hussar and 31st Chasseur
11regiments to Italy upon Eugene’s request.
Due to the deterioration of Franco-Austrian re­
lations in the spring and summer of 1813, the French 
Emperor felt that it was of pressing importance that 
the Italian army should take defensive positions along
q sWeil, Eugene et Murat, I, 78.
10Ihid., 95 ff.
11Ibid., 109-110; Napoleon, Correspondance, XXV,
471, Napoleon to Eugene, 18 June 1813; 596, Napoleon
to Eugene, 28 July 1813.
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the Austro-Illyrian border. He therefore ordered the
Viceroy to he on the border with his army by 1 July 
1 21813- Though Eugene told the Emperor he hoped to be 
in position by 10 July, he found it impossible and ob­
tained permission to delay taking positions until 1 
August.1^
During the summer Eugene pressed Italian manu­
facturers for military supplies, and he gained July 
delivery for 10,000 shakos previously scheduled to be 
delivered in October. He met with less success in more 
viatl areas such as muskets.^ Though lacking vital 
equipment Eugene, as a result of a buildup of Austrian
forces in the border areas, began in July to direct his
13army into Priuli. Eugene reported to Napoleon that 
though his army reports indicated he had an army of 
72,000, this number existed only on paper. He had in 
fact something less than 50,000 active combat troops.
-i o Weil, Eugene et Murat, I, 111; Napoleon, Corre- 
spondance, XXV, 404, Napoleon to Eugene, 2 June 1813.
Weil, Eugene et Murat, I, 111-114, Napoleon, Correspondance, XXV» 523-524, Napoleon to Eugene, 1 July 1813.
^Weil, Eugene et Murat, I, 112.
15Ibid., 112-118.
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This number could not be increased without 15 * 000
16troops assigned to him from units in France. Such 
was the army the Viceroy led into the campaign of 1813.
Eugene's information on the Austrians in June, 
July, and early August 1813 was faulty, and he was al­
most entirely ignorant about enemy numbers and po­
sitions. Due to his mis-information, he had troops
scattered from Tarvis to Palmanova, a dangerously long
17line for the forces at his disposal. At the be­
ginning of hostilities between France and the Allies, 
which now included Austria, Napoleon wrote Eugene the 
following letter:
My Son:... I am too far from you to give positive orders. Cover the Illyrian 
Provinces.and Italy; take good positions and attack the enemy, if he is inferior 
to you in strength, as everything leads me to believe, and push him seriously to­ward Graz. 18
This letter left tactics largely to Eugene, and 
he took defensive positions, for his information led
l6Ibid., 125.
~*~̂Ibid., 201 et passim.
18Ibid., 204; Napoleon, Correspondance, XXVI,
69-70, Napoleon to Eugene, 14 August 1813.
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him to believe that the Austrians were before him in
I Qgreatly superior numbers.
For a time the troops of the Viceroy managed to
hold their own along the line and fought well at Spital,
Villach, Laibach, and Klagenfurt. But an invasion of
the Tyrol threatened Eugene’s left flank, and he fell
back from the line along the Illyrian border to the 
20Isonzo. His retreat was not a rout, but a well exe­
cuted movement. After the fighting in September along 
the Illyrian border, Eugene did not engage the Austrians 
in a major battle, but maneuvered his small army with 
skill and forced the Austrian commanders to move with 
caution.
Eugene, in October, following the defection of 
Bavaria took the line of the Piave River for his line 
of defense. He held that position in the face of su­
perior Austrian forces, commanded first by Heinrich 
Bellegarde and then Johann Hiller, until another Aus­
trian column, which had earlier forced its way into the
"*'̂ Weil, Eugene et Murat, I, 204»
20This very brief summary of the Italian cam­
paign depends for its validity upon M. H. Weil’s Prince Eugene et Murat. Approximately three and one-half of 
the five volumes of Weil’s great work are devoted to a day by day, and sometimes hour by hour description, of 
the campaign and Eugene's military talents.
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valley of the Adige in the Tyrol, threatened to invade 
Italy. After this occurrence the Viceroy fell back to 
the Adige and established his headquarters at Verona, 
where he remained until the defection of Joachim Murat. 
He then accomplished a withdrawal from Verona to the 
Mincio in good order. His line on the Mincio was from 
Peschiera to Mantua, rather in the shape of a semi­
circle c21 In February of 1814, though by this time 
France had been invaded through Switzerland, Eugene 
fought and defeated the Austrians at Villafranca, not 
far from Marengo. He was still on that line defending 
the southeastern border of France when Napoleon abdi­
cated in April 1814. Though the Viceroy knew of the 
abdication, he refused to abandon his position to the 
Austrian forces until he received word from his Emperor 
that more fighting to preserve the French Empire and
the Kingdom of Italy was In vain. Even then the
Viceroy negotiated only an armistice which was to last 
until the return of a deputation sent from the Italian





Upon the collapse of the French Empire, the 
supporters of the Napoleonic regime in Italy attempted 
to make the Viceroy king of Italy. Among this number 
were Finance Minister Giuseppe Prina and the former 
head of the police, Diego Guicciardi. Even Chancellor 
of State Francesco Melzi favored the Viceroy. Melzi so 
strongly supported Eugene that he had advised the 
Viceroy to call an extraordinary session of the elec­
toral colleges and ask them for their support in naming 
him king. Eugene bluntly refused to act on this sug­
gestion. He wanted first to know the attitude of the 
conquering allies to such a move, and he wanted also to 
have an expression of the will of the Italian people.
On 20 April 1814 the Italians made known their 
will. On that day Prina attempted to persuade the 
Senate to name the Viceroy king. Prina and Guicciardi, 
who supported the nomination, were killed by an angry
23mob for having made the suggestion. Eugene accepted 
the will of the majority, or what he thought to be the
majority, and left the state. When he left, he took
with him thirty million francs and a fabulous collection
23Ibid., 542-561.
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of paintings. To his honor, the paintings had heen
24purchased, not "liberated."
* * * * * *
Eugene, during the time of his vice-royalty, 
developed into a first-class administrator, both mili­
tary and civil. He gave to Italy orderly government. 
He improved the state through the program of public 
works, and brought a fuller measure of justice to the 
Italian people through his administration of the Na­
poleonic codes. He developed for Italy an admirable 
system of fortifications, and further provided for her 
security by developing a well-organized, well-trained 
armed force.
While it is true that Eugene accomplished the 
above items under the aegis of Napoleon, he had sole 
responsibility for the application of the program. He 
performed his duty well.
In one area Eugene failed utterly. He could 
not make Erench rule over Italy popular. The unpopu­
larity of foreign dominance in Italy accounts for the
o A Andre Berthelot et al. (eds.), La Grande 
Encyclopedie (32 vols.; Paris; E. Arrault et cie, 
n.d.), V, 1021-1022.
unwillingness of the masses to accept Beauharnais as 
king in 1814. By that time he had become a symbol of 
the Napoleonic system, a system which denied to subject 
peoples the right of self rule.
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